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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CLARENCE THOMAS, VICTIM? PERHAPS, AND VICTIMIZER?
YES—A STUDY IN SOCIAL AND RACIAL ALIENATION FROM
AFRICAN-AMERICANS

MICHAEL DEHAVEN NEWSOM*

I. INTRODUCTION
The nomination of Clarence Thomas as an Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court unhinged many African-Americans, including this
writer. Many simply had no idea of what to make of a situation that involved
the combustible mixture of gender, race, class, political duplicity, political
ideology, and alleged sexual harassment, nor of the African-American man
who sat at the center of the maelstrom. Valiant attempts, however, were made
to sort out the issues raised by President Bush’s cynical decision to offer up
Clarence Thomas as “the best person for [the] position”1 vacated by retirement
of Thurgood Marshall.2 But sorting out and settling are two rather different
things. Clarence Thomas continues to be a thorn in the side of many AfricanAmericans and the storm has not subsided. This paper will attempt to explain
why Justice Thomas writes opinions and casts votes on the Court that continue
* Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law.
1. The Supreme Court: A Nominee is Presented, Excerpts From News Conference
Announcing Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES NAT’L, July 2, 1991, at A14 (statement of President
Bush). “Certainly Bush was exaggerating.” Catharine Pierce Wells, Clarence Thomas: The
Invisible Man, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 120 (1993). Wells argues that Thomas was not, however,
an affirmative action appointment. See id. at 121–22 (arguing that “[t]here are two reasons,
however, why it makes sense to believe that Thomas was not an affirmative action appointment
and that Bush was not trying to maintain diversity on the Court by appointing the ‘best-qualified
Black,’” because “the claim that Thomas is the best-qualified Black is so clearly false that it could
not be credited except in the presence of some exceedingly negative stereotypes about Black
people and their achievements,” and because “Bush has consistently demonstrated in real and
concrete terms that he is not the sort of man who places a positive value on diversifying American
political life” given “[h]is repeated opposition to civil rights legislation and the employment
practices of his own administration [as] strong evidence that George Bush is sincerely and firmly
opposed to affirmative action in all its forms”).
2. See RACE, GENDER, AND POWER IN AMERICA: THE LEGACY OF THE HILL-THOMAS
HEARINGS (Anita Faye Hill & Emma Coleman Jordan eds., 1995); AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN
SPEAK OUT ON ANITA HILL-CLARENCE THOMAS (Geneva Smitherman ed., 1995); RACE-ING
JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (Toni Morrison ed., 1992).
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to bother, frustrate, annoy, and exasperate many African-Americans. It is the
thesis of this paper that Clarence Thomas is deeply alienated from most
African-Americans, and his alienation largely operates to repudiate, disavow,
and otherwise insult African-Americans, a fact of which many whites are not
aware.3 This paper also suggests that Thomas’s victimizing alienation is
perfectly suited for a high court bent, unfortunately, on maintaining white
hegemony.
Felix Geyer tells us that “[a]lienation is a venerable concept, with its roots
going back some two millennia.” 4 Its modern meanings might trace their
origins to the works of Karl Marx,5 but others would also point to Sigmund
Freud and psychoanalysis.6 In addition, the experiences of African-Americans
and other people of color have led to yet another school of thought on the
subject of alienation.7 While there are thus several different perspectives or
analytical frameworks within which one can think about the concept of
alienation, some generalizations are possible. Alienation has six dimensions:
powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, social isolation, selfestrangement, and cultural estrangement.8 All six are aspects of distance or
separation. William Monroe writes:
Alienation implies dissatisfaction, discontent, boredom . . . the desire to be
elsewhere. Though the reasons may be vague, the conviction is clear and
sharp: the here-and-now is not good enough. At its most subversive, the call of
alienation emanates from a transcendent realm beyond historicity or originates

3. See John O. Calmore, Airing Dirty Laundry: Disputes Among Privileged Blacks—From
Clarence Thomas to “The Law School Five,” 46 HOW. L.J. 175, 181 (2003) (stating that he
“think[s] that whites generally have no idea of the intensity of black negative feelings toward
Justice Thomas”). Professor Calmore’s article shares many of the themes and modalities of this
essay. See id. His main purpose, however is to connect Justice Thomas’s alienation to a need for
“linking critical race theory to a critical pedagogy that helps to re-socialize law students and
orient them toward a critical race practice.” Id. at 183. The purpose of the present essay is to
explore the nature and dimensions of that alienation and to suggest that Thomas is as much a
victimizer as he is a victim of racial oppression. See infra note 24. As such, the purpose of the
present essay is to sound the tocsin, to warn, to alert, and to argue that Justice Thomas’s
victimizing alienation advances the true goals and objectives of the United States Supreme Court,
goals and objectives that must change if righteousness shall fall like the rain and justice move like
that rolling river. And yet, our purposes ultimately come together; perhaps re-socializing law
students will produce lawyers, legislators and opinion leaders who will seek to reorient, if not
change, the goals and objectives of the Supreme Court, for change is surely needed.
4. Felix Geyer, Introduction: Alienation, Ethnicity, and Postmodernism, in ALIENATION,
ETHNICITY, AND POSTMODERNISM ix, xi (Felix Geyer ed., 1996).
5. Richard Schmitt, Introduction: Why is the Concept of Alienation Important?, in
ALIENATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 1–6 (Richard Schmitt & Thomas E. Moody eds., 1994).
6. See Geyer, supra note 4, at ix–x, xi, xiii.
7. Howard McGary, Alienation and the African-American Experience, in ALIENATION AND
SOCIAL CRITICISM, supra note 5, at 133–35.
8. Geyer, supra note 4, at ix.
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in a consciousness superior to the encultured self. While the modes or
strategies of alienation are many, they all seem to share the conviction that
persons and communities have become estranged from their true destiny or
potential. Thus the sulky signs of alienation often imply an intense but diffuse
accusation.9

Alienation is necessarily a relational concept; it stems from the lack of a
proper balance between individuals and social groups, settings or contexts.10 It
is a product of the man-made world.11 As a consequence, alienation is not
“monolithic; . . . in fact, no one is simply alienated, but persons are alienated in
specific respects and may thus be suffering alienation in some contexts of their
lives and be inflicting alienation in other contexts.”12 Suffering alienation may
even yield a social good because alienation can be a “functional response[] to
dysfunctional cultural situations.”13
More precisely, “[a]lienation is
inseparable from function and even contributes, in its fashion, to healthy
function.”14 Nonetheless, while alienation might validate liberty,15 “many of
our strategies of alienation have denatured themselves by adopting methods of
coercion, gestures of intimidation, and rubrics of violence,”16 the antithesis of
freedom. One cannot easily map the social value or utility of alienation as an
abstract proposition; much depends on particular or specific facts or context.
The final point to bear in mind is Howard McGary’s claim that AfricanAmericans, as a group, are not “alienated or estranged from themselves.”17
This proposition seems counterintuitive, given the conventional wisdom that
holds that African-Americans frequently cannot trust, or do not trust, each

9. WILLIAM MONROE, POWER TO HURT: THE VIRTUES OF ALIENATION 5 (1998) (alteration
in original) (footnote omitted).
10. See Roy S. Bryce-Laporte & Claudewell S. Thomas, Epilogue to ALIENATION IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY EXAMINATION 382, 385–86 (Roy S. BryceLaporte & Claudewell S. Thomas eds., 1976) (arguing that individuals must enjoy a sense of
belonging and feel a sense of belonging to the social organizations of which they are members
while at the same time these organizations must concede individual rights and provide “adequate
services, equal protection, promised opportunities, and just rewards”).
11. Felix Geyer & Walter R. Heinz, Introduction to ALIENATION SOCIETY AND THE
INDIVIDUAL: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THEORY AND RESEARCH, at xi, xxxii (Felix Geyer &
Walter R. Heinz eds., 1992).
12. See Schmitt, supra note 5, at 18. See also Geyer & Heinz, supra note 11, at xxxii
(stating that “[t]he alienated have automatically been viewed as the victims; but some of them at
least may also be the perpetrators” and thus “[m]ore emphasis should be placed on investigating
how precisely those who are alienated may further the continued existence of alienating
conditions on all levls [sic] of social reproduction”).
13. MONROE, supra note 9, at 7.
14. Id. at 210.
15. Id. at 211.
16. Id.
17. McGary, supra note 7, at 142.
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other.18 McGary puts his claim in context, however. First, he concedes that
some African-Americans have experienced such alienation.19 Indeed, the
thesis here is that Clarence Thomas is precisely such an African-American.
Nonetheless, McGary contends:
[Lack of recognition of blacks by whites in American society] does not always
lead to alienation. Even though African-Americans have experienced hostility,
racial discrimination, and poverty, they still have been able to construct and
draw upon institutions like the family, church, and black community to foster
and maintain a healthy sense of self in spite of the obstacles that they have
faced.20

He presses the point, rejecting the central claim of many who seek to
understand alienation through the prism of the experience of oppressed racial
minorities.21
This . . . is not to say that these [African-American] communities provide their
members with all that is necessary for them to flourish under conditions of
justice, but only that they provide enough support to create the space necessary
for them to avoid the deeply divided and estranged selves described in some
recent work on alienation.22

He concludes: “I don’t deny that a hostile racist society creates the kind of
assault that can lead to alienation, but only that this assault can be and has been
softened by supportive African-American communities.”23 McGary argues,
therefore, for the critical importance of community in assessing whether or not
African-Americans, generally, are estranged from other blacks, while at the
same time recognizing that such estrangement can and does occur.
In light of the foregoing, the thesis of this paper, restated, is that for
whatever reason or reasons, Clarence Thomas is estranged and socially isolated
from African-Americans as a group. It is also the thesis of this paper that
Clarence Thomas’s alienation finds powerful expression in the utter lack of
African-American institutional or community support for his views on race and
the votes that he casts on the Court in furtherance thereof.24 To the contrary,

18. One finds powerful expression of this idea in literature. See generally LORRAINE
HANSBERRY, A RAISIN IN THE SUN (1959) (describing that the son of the heroine is conned by
another African-American out of the insurance money that was to fund a move by his family from
the Chicago ghetto to a formerly all-white neighborhood).
19. McGary, supra note 7, at 142.
20. Id.
21. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
22. McGary, supra note 7, at 142.
23. Id. at 142–43.
24. It is also the thesis of this writer that whether or not Clarence Thomas is a victim by
virtue of his alienation, he is surely a perpetrator, victimizing African-Americans by way of the
votes that he casts on the Court. The proper proof of this proposition, which requires a careful
reading and analysis of scores of opinions, is beyond the scope of this paper. However, one need
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the only institutional or community support that Clarence Thomas has comes
from reactionary whites,25 particularly those who see the Supreme Court as the
defender of white hegemony.
This paper will explore Clarence Thomas’s alienation from black people
from a variety of perspectives, each of which points in the same direction. Part
II will examine two competing macro-narratives that frame the tension
between Clarence Thomas and a substantial majority of African-Americans. 26
The first of them, the “Civil Rights Macro-Narrative,” received definitive
treatment at the hands of A. Leon Higginbotham, a distinguished American

only consider Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), in which Thomas joined four other Justices on
the Court in electing George Bush president of the United States, notwithstanding the salient fact
that more than ninety percent of African-American voters supported a different candidate, the one
who actually won the popular vote, on the basis of votes cast or attempted to be cast by the lowly
American people. See Jamin B. Raskin, What’s Wrong with Bush v. Gore and Why We Need to
Amend the Constitution to Ensure it Never Happens Again, 61 MD. L. REV. 652, 702 (2002). If
one takes into account the chicanery involved in disenfranchising African-Americans in Florida,
see Raskin, supra at 202–03, and the incredible snafus in ballot design and defective voting
machines, see Jon L. Mills, Florida on Trial: Federalism in the 2000 Presidential Election, 13
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 85 (2002), Gore carried the State of Florida in the 2000 presidential
election. This writer assumes that the African-American community as a whole knew which
major-party candidate would further its interests and which one would not. One cannot easily
dismiss a vote this lopsided as the product of dementia, delusion, or ignorance.
It is certainly true that anybody who voted for Gore was victimized by the Court’s coup
d’état, and it is more than likely that all Americans ultimately were victimized by the Court’s
unprincipled power grab. None of this detracts, however, from the plain fact that Thomas’s vote
victimized black people even as it victimized others.
Whether Thomas’s alienation accomplishes some socially useful purpose is doubtful at
best. The personal freedom or liberty of one individual—Clarence Thomas—might be socially
valuable. See Bryce-Laporte & Thomas, supra note 10, at 384–85. The question, however, is
whether we can afford the cost, or bear the negative externalities that might flow from an
irresponsible exercise of individual freedom. Exaggerated claims of autonomy ignore the
complex interconnectedness that constitutes social reality. See Schmitt, supra note 5, at 13–14.
25. Clarence Thomas finds support from individual African-American conservatives, few in
number though they may be. See infra note 357 and accompanying text. On the other hand,
whites regularly fawn over Clarence Thomas. See generally, Nancie G. Marzulla, The Textualism
of Clarence Thomas: Anchoring the Supreme Court’s Property Rights Jurisprudence to the
Constitution, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 351 (2002) (praising Thomas’s
“individualism” in the area of property rights); Senator John D. Ashcroft, Justice Clarence
Thomas: Reviving Restraint and Personal Responsibility, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 313, 313 (2000)
(lauding Thomas’s “vital role in advancing the conservative legal tradition of interpreting the law,
not creating it”); Edwin Meese, III, The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, 12 REGENT U. L.
REV. 349, 349 (2000) (applauding Thomas’s “fidelity to the Constitution”); David N. Mayer,
Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme Court’s Rediscovery of the Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP.
U. L. REV. 339 (1996) (approving Thomas’s Tenth Amendment jurisprudence).
26. See Michael deHaven Newsom, Independent Counsel? No. Ombudsman? Yes: A
Parable of American Ideology and Myth, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 141, 148–51 (2000) (defining
ideologies as macro-narratives and myths as micro-narratives).
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jurist and a fierce and persistent critic of Clarence Thomas, in a law review
article.27 This macro-narrative celebrates the works of African-Americans and
their white allies in the struggle to make America’s promise a reality for
African-Americans and others for whom the dream has been long deferred.
Justice Thomas gave the second, the “Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative,” a
clear shape and expression in an important and revealing law review article.28
Thomas’s macro-narrative celebrates the works of white men of illiberal racial
views and casts African-Americans in the role of mere spectators.29 Part III
will return to Judge Higginbotham and study his criticism of Justice Thomas,
which began in 1992,30 was continued two years later,31 and was reaffirmed yet
again in 1995 in a speech delivered at New York University.32 The judge’s
œuvres have led to several responses from African-Americans, three of which
warrant comment.33 This encounter demonstrates the isolation of Clarence
Thomas from large numbers of the community of black law professors. Part
IV will leave Clarence Thomas and A. Leon Higginbotham, at least for the
nonce, and turn to an overview of African-American political ideology,34 and
will demonstrate that the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative more nearly reflects the
political views of African-Americans than does the competing Color-Blindness
Macro-Narrative. Part V will return to the words and deeds of Justice Thomas
and demonstrate that alienation plausibly accounts for them. Part VI will
examine Justice Thomas’s place in African-American communities by looking
at the controversy that continues to swirl around Thomas through the prism of
the African-American characters in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s sprawling, unruly,
and racist novel, Uncle Tom’s Cabin. When all is said and done, Clarence
Thomas, whose governing macro-narrative and conservative ideology appear
to differ not at all from that of the most reactionary whites, and most nearly

27. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal
Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005 (1992) [hereinafter Open Letter].
28. Clarence Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading” of the Constitution—The Declaration of
Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 691 (1987).
29. See id.
30. Open Letter, supra note 27.
31. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas in Retrospect, 45 HASTINGS L.J.
1405 (1994) [hereinafter Retrospect].
32. Hon. A. Leon Higginbotham, Speech at New York University (Nov. 1995) (broadcasted
nationally on C-SPAN) [hereinafter Speech].
33. See generally, Evelyn Wilson, Comments on “An Open Letter to Justice Clarence
Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague,” 20 S.U. L. REV. 141 (1993); Randall Kennedy,
Justice Thomas and Racial Loyalty, 20 AMERICAN LAWYER 91 (1998); Stephen F. Smith, The
Truth About Clarence Thomas and the Need for New Black Leadership, 12 REGENT U. L. REV.
513 (1999–2000).
34. Political ideologies are, perforce, macro-narratives. See Newsom, supra note 26.
However, they constitute merely one subset of macro-narratives. The macro-narratives telling the
story of the African-American struggle are not necessarily political narratives.
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resembles Sambo, one of Simon Legree’s black henchmen who helped Legree
murder Uncle Tom. Not surprisingly, Sambo was deeply and profoundly
alienated from other blacks on Legree’s hellish Louisiana plantation. Part VII
will briefly discuss the “fit” between Thomas’s victimizing alienation and the
Supreme Court, given its dedication to white racial hegemony.
II. A CLASH OF MACRO-NARRATIVES
A.

The Civil Rights Macro-Narrative

Judge Higginbotham clearly believed in the moral power and force of the
macro-narratives that recount the struggles, hopes, dreams, and aspirations of
African-Americans for equal justice in America, narratives that often centered
on the continuing work of civil rights lawyers and civil rights organizations.35
Collectively, these macro-narratives comprise the Civil Rights MacroNarrative (Narrative), and they powerfully reinforce McGary’s insight that
black institutions can ameliorate black alienation largely through means of
community or group identification.36 Higginbotham’s construction of the
Narrative specifically related to and incorporated the life of Clarence Thomas
as a life distant and disconnected in important ways from other blacks.
Higginbotham thereby underscored Thomas’s alienation from large numbers of
black people, and he used that alienation to punctuate and dramatize the
Narrative.
For Judge Higginbotham, the Narrative embodied “the culmination of
years of heartbreaking work by thousands who preceded” Justice Thomas.37 It
consisted of “the memory of their sacrifices.”38 The Narrative related “this
country’s history of civil rights lawyers and civil rights organizations; its
history of voting rights; and its history of housing and privacy rights.”39 The
history “has affected [Thomas’s] past and present life.”40 The Narrative also
declared that, in the words of Justice Thurgood Marshall, “for millions of
Americans, there still remain ‘hopes not realized and promises not fulfilled,’”41
because this country “continue[s] to struggle for equality.”42 James Baldwin
had told us that as of 1962, just before the centennial of the Emancipation
Proclamation, “the country is celebrating one hundred years of freedom one

35. See Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1015–18.
36. See supra notes 17–23 and accompanying text.
37. See Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1007.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1013 (quoting Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United
States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987)).
42. See Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1013.
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hundred years too soon.”43 The core truth of the Narrative lies in the ongoing
unfinished struggle of African-Americans for true racial equality.
Higginbotham declared that the struggles that comprise the Civil Rights
Macro-Narrative produced substantial gains for Clarence Thomas.44
Higginbotham constructed the following four-part analysis in order to advance
his argument: (1) [T]he impact of the work of civil rights lawyers and civil
rights organizations on [Thomas’s] life; (2) other than having picked a few
individuals to be their favorite colored person, what it is that the conservatives
of each generation have done that has been of significant benefit to AfricanAmericans, women, or other minorities; (3) the impact of the eradication of
racial barriers in the voting on [Thomas’s] own confirmation, and (4) the
impact of civil rights victories in the area of housing and privacy on
[Thomas’s] personal life.45
On the first point, Judge Higginbotham referred specifically to and
incorporated into the Narrative, the works of Charles Hamilton Houston,
William Henry Hastie, Thurgood Marshall, “and that small cadre of other
lawyers associated with them, who laid the groundwork for success in the
twentieth-century racial civil rights cases.”46 For Judge Higginbotham, “[t]he
philosophy of civil rights protest evolved out of the fact that black people were
forced to confront this country’s racist institutions without the benefit of equal
access to those institutions.”47 The meaning of such protest, as it manifested
itself in the Narrative, was well put by Frederick Douglass:
The whole history of the progress of human liberty shows that all
concessions yet made to her august claims, have been borne of earnest
struggle . . . . If there is no struggle there is no progress
....
This struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, and it may
be both moral and physical, but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing
without a demand. It never did and it never will.48

Thus, “[t]he struggles of civil rights organizations and civil rights lawyers
have been both moral and physical, and their victories have been neither easy

43. Id. at 1014 (quoting James Baldwin, The Fire Next Time: My Dungeon Shook, in THE
PRICE OF THE TICKET 336 (1985)).
44. Id. at 1015.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1016.
48. See id. at 1016 (quoting Philip S. Foner, West India Emancipation, Speech delivered by
Frederick Douglass at Canadaigua, New York (Aug. 4, 1857), in 2 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS: PRE-CIVIL WAR DECADE, 1850–1860, at 437 (1950)).
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nor sudden.”49 But there were victories even if other victories continue to
elude our grasp.50 Civil rights protests worked.51
Finally, Judge Higginbotham incorporated a series of micro-narratives
illustrating the larger theme of the Narrative by way of individual cases and
circumstances and by way of moral and physical protest, beginning in 1833.52
Grounding the grand Narrative in a series of micro-narratives demonstrated
and reinforced its legitimacy, reality, and its moral force and claims.
On the question of the contribution of conservatives, mainly if not
exclusively white, to African-Americans and their struggle to get out from
under racist oppression, Judge Higginbotham declared that “[a]t every turn, the
conservatives, either by tacit approbation or by active complicity, tried to
derail the struggle for equal rights in this country.”53 Again, he referred to
specific cases, using micro-narratives to the same effect as in the first segment
or element of the Narrative, as he pointed to George Bush (the elder), Ronald
Reagan, and Strom Thurmond and their opposition to civil rights legislation.54
Alliance with white conservatives has not advanced the goals and objectives of
the struggles that inform the Narrative.
With regard to voting rights, Judge Higginbotham argued that many
members of the Senate, facing the Thomas nomination, had to “weigh[] the
potential backlash in their states of the black vote that favored [Thomas] for
emotional reasons and the conservative white vote that favored [Thomas] for
ideological reasons.”55 The very success of the work of civil rights lawyers
and civil rights organizations in overturning barriers to the franchise had
created a situation in which senators had to take the views of black voters into
account, something that they did not have to do in the days of Benjamin
Tillman, a racist senator from South Carolina, in the early years of the last
century56 when the struggle had borne but little fruit.
On the final point, Judge Higginbotham showed how the works of civil
rights lawyers and civil rights institutions had broken down the barriers erected
by laws designed to segregate blacks and whites by geography or district and
to criminalize interracial marriages. Here again, he used micro-narratives to
shape and explain the larger macro-narrative.57
The moral power or force of the Narrative certainly speaks to AfricanAmericans, including Clarence Thomas who has clearly benefited from the
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. at 1016–18.
Id.
Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1017.
Id. at 1019.
Id.
See id. at 1020–21.
Id. at 1021.
Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1022–25.
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struggles, and imposes affirmative duties on them, the duty to struggle, as
Frederick Douglass might have put it, to persuade power to concede rights to
the powerless. 58 The Narrative calls for an African-American community and
not idiosyncratic individualism. It, by its terms, however, presents serious
difficulties for blacks who are alienated from their own people and who cannot
easily make common cause with other African-Americans, who cannot and do
not “belong” to African-American structures, institutions, and organizations.
The duty to struggle, implicit in the Narrative, presupposes a belonging, a
sense of identification with a larger social reality, as well as a decent respect
and gratitude for those whose works produced a benefit.
Whether or not the Narrative similarly speaks to non-African-Americans is
largely beside the point, the question being whether or not it calls as one of its
beneficiaries, Clarence Thomas. The implications of the Narrative as to how
non-African-Americans should form community and with whom as well as to
the moral significance of alienation or nonconformity, lie beyond the scope of
this paper. However, a belief in the power and force and the concomitant
duties of African-Americans derived from the Narrative—to join in the moral
and physical struggle rather than to reject and demean it—lay at the heart of
Judge Higginbotham’s critique of Justice Thomas. The thorn in Judge
Higginbotham’s side was not only that Thomas, a black man, rejected the
moral claim of the Narrative, notwithstanding the benefits that he had received,
but that Thomas had the power and authority to act on that rejection in ways
that were harmful to the struggles, hopes, dreams, and aspirations of AfricanAmericans. Judge Higginbotham’s critics, like Justice Thomas, rejected or

58. Elsewhere this author has addressed the question of the moral power or force of macronarrative and micro-narratives. See Newsom, supra note 26 (arguing that the ideology of the
Watergate break-in and the myth of Richard Nixon as the bad and Archibald Cox as the good led
the country into making a disastrous mistake in creating the Independent Counsel); Michael
deHaven Newsom, The American Protestant Empire: A Historical Perspective, 40 WASHBURN
L.J. 187 (2001) [hereinafter Newsom, Protestant Empire] (arguing that an ideology of AntiRoman Catholicism, dedication to the Protestantization of the subject peoples, a commitment to
pan-Protestantism, a belief in social reform, and a pragmatic commitment to a war of attrition and
a willingness to exercise restraint, albeit with the threat of force in the background, gave rise to
the Protestant Empire and a highly problematic Church-state macro-narrative); Michael deHaven
Newsom, Common School Religion: Judicial Narratives in a Protestant Empire, 11 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 219 (2002) [hereinafter Newsom, Common School Religion] (arguing that the
refusal of the Supreme Court to embrace the macro-narrative developed by the minority of state
courts and state court judges that had struck down or limited—or would have, in the case of
judges filing dissenting opinions—the reach of common school religion, compromised the ability
of the Court to fashion a workable set of rules to restrain common school religion in an era of
increasing religious diversity, thus giving majoritarian religion more sway in the common schools
that would be the case if the state court macro-narrative (albeit a minority macro-narrative) had
prevailed).
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ignored the moral or normative claims of the Narrative, seeking to avoid moral
obloquy.
B.

The Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative

Another macro-narrative has emerged to challenge the Civil Rights MacroNarrative. This one, largely fashioned by Justice Thomas, although one his
acolytes, Stephen F. Smith, a former clerk of Justice Thomas and now a law
professor, has also helped to shape it, is the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative
(Counter-Narrative). The Civil Rights Macro-Narrative embodies a racial
consciousness—the struggle of largely, if not exclusively, African-American
civil rights lawyers and civil rights organizations to gain equal justice for
African-Americans and others oppressed and subordinated by and in this
country. The moral claim is that such a consciousness is necessary if one is to
further the objective of equal justice for all in America. If race is the defining
fact of American history, experience, culture, and tradition, then the raceconsciousness of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative has moral and normative
force. If race consciousness led to the oppression of racial minorities, AfricanAmericans in particular, then race consciousness can lead to their liberation.59
It is this proposition that the Counter-Narrative challenges.
The Counter-Narrative confronts the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative
directly. The latter focuses primarily on the works of African-Americans
engaged in the struggle for civil rights. Judge Higginbotham called out
“Frederick Douglass, Sojourner Truth, Harriet Tubman, Charles Hamilton
Houston, A. Philip Randolph, Mary McLeod Bethune, W.E.B. Dubois, Roy
Wilkins, Whitney Young, Martin Luther King, Judge William Henry Hastie,
[and] Justice[] Thurgood Marshall. . . .”60 For good measure, he also called out
Earl Warren and William Brennan, white Americans who sought to further at
least some of the goals and objectives of the moral and physical protest that
constitutes the heart and the soul of the struggle for equal rights in America.61
By contrast, Justice Thomas’s pantheon of African-American heroes consisted
of Frederick Douglass.62 The true heroes of his macro-narrative, however,

59. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (declaring that “[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must
first take account of race”).
60. Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1026.
61. See id.
62. Thomas, supra note 28, at 691. Thomas sought to appropriate “the original Civil Rights
movement” and John Hope Franklin to his cause. Id. at 694. However, Thomas never defined
the “original” Civil Rights Movement, and he quoted Franklin out of context, revealing a certain
intellectual dishonesty. Franklin did indeed refer to slavery as “the most remarkable anomaly in
the history of the country” just as Thomas insisted. John Hope Franklin, Slavery and the
Constitution, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1688, 1695 (Leonard W.
Levy et al. eds., 1986). Franklin, however, was not referring to any supposed lofty ideal
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were white men: the Founders, Abraham Lincoln, and the first Justice
Harlan.63 In a profoundly ironic way, given Thomas’s disdain for playing the
“victim card,”64 Thomas’s pantheon turns African-Americans into passive
observers, the beneficiaries of grandiloquent ideas and principles allegedly
advanced by various and sundry white Americans, most of whom harbored
distinctly racist attitudes when it came to African-Americans.65 Black people
are the victims, given Thomas’s hagiography, of white racists who rejected the
lofty ideals and principals of other white racists. Freedom and liberty arise not
from the moral and physical protest and struggle of African-Americans but,
somehow, from white racists deciding to honor principles that they had
observed in the breach for the entirety of our colonial and national history.
Black people’s struggles come to naught in a nomos in which the heroes are
largely white racists who bore false witness to their exalted ideals. In such a
moral universe, the alienation of an African-American from other blacks poses
no great problems, for such a moral universe provides a haven and a safe
harbor for alienated black people.
Thomas’s Counter-Narrative rested on the fundamental abstract
proposition that the ideals of the Declaration of Independence constitute “the
founding principles of equality and liberty.”66 Referring to Abraham Lincoln,
Thomas made the political ideological claim that those principles “led to the
principle of government by consent, limited government, majority rule, and
separation of powers.”67 Moving beyond this self-interested excursus, Thomas
maintained that “Lincoln’s case against slavery insisted on the principle of
equality as fundamental for America.”68 Given Lincoln’s well-known belief in
the social inferiority of African-Americans as against white Americans,69

contained in the Declaration of Independence, or any words or writings of Abraham Lincoln.
With regard to the Declaration of Independence, Franklin correctly noted that the signers rejected
draft language that would have indicted the King of England for his assent to the slave trade. Id.
at 1688. Franklin made no high-flown claims about the Declaration of Independence. Similarly,
with respect to Abraham Lincoln, Franklin was decidedly cool. Id. at 1694–95.
63. See Thomas, supra note 28, at 693.
64. See id. at 698.
65. Abraham Lincoln rejected white-black racial equality. See Raoul Berger, Constitutional
Interpretation and Activist Fantasies, 82 KY. L.J. 1, 20 (1993–1994) (stating that Abraham
Lincoln “opposed slavery and racial equality with equal intensity”); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE
BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 81 (1960) (quoting a speech of President Lincoln rejecting
racial equality). Thomas Jefferson was even more vicious in his racist views. See THOMAS
JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (William Peden ed., 1954). With respect to the
first Justice Harlan, Thomas is reduced to trying to explain away his racist remarks in his dissent
in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See Thomas, supra note 28, at 701.
66. Thomas, supra note 28, at 692.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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Thomas’s “principle of equality” verges on incoherence. Nonetheless, Thomas
took the view that the Declaration of Independence had a “universal meaning”
that rejected slavery.70 Thomas went so far as to argue that the “three-fifths”
clause somehow was an anti-slavery text because it reduced “who could be
counted among these being represented” in the House of Representatives from
the slave states.71 Thomas’s argument makes no sense because AfricanAmericans could not vote and would never, as slaves, be able to vote. Slave
owners, therefore, had greater rather than less political power, because, in a
functionalist real world sense, they could cast votes for their “three-fifths”
slaves no matter what their slaves thought of the political choices of their
masters. In the non-slave states, those whites who were counted—at least
males—could vote. Whites of low social and economic standing could,
depending on the voting eligibility rules, trump the votes of rich and powerful
whites, should they deem it in their interest to do so.72 Such a political
dynamic could never play itself out, even in theory, in the slave states. Instead,
Thomas again reinforced his reduction of African-Americans to mere observer
status, shut out from participation in the political economy, and yet Thomas
found something to praise in the constitutional treatment of this depraved and
degenerate Eighteenth Century society.73
Thomas turned next to Brown v. Board of Education.74 He criticized the
Court’s opinion because it “made sensitivity the paramount issue.”75 Thomas
referred to the infamous remark in Plessy v. Ferguson to the effect that “we
consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored
race with a badge of inferiority.”76 He argued that “[t]he Plessy psychology
would have it that laws and social practices have no influence at all over how
people, especially those recently released from slavery, view themselves.”77 In
contrast, “[t]he Brown psychology makes the legal and social environment allcontrolling.”78 In lieu of “sensitivity,” Thomas offered up the human capacity
to reason and choose objectively.79 Thus, for Thomas, “the Brown focus on
70. Thomas, supra note 28, at 695.
71. Id. at 696.
72. Indeed, it was precisely the fear that naturalized Catholic immigrants, largely a group of
low economic standing, could control the outcome of American elections that lay at the heart of
one of the great works in defense of a white, Protestant America. See LYMAN BEECHER, A PLEA
FOR THE WEST 49–50 (1835) (arguing, inter alia, that steps be taken to curb immigration).
Lyman Beecher, of course, was the father of Harriet Beecher Stowe. See infra Part VI.
73. Thomas, supra note 28.
74. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
75. Thomas, supra note 28, at 698.
76. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
77. Thomas, supra note 28, at 699.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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environment overlooks the real problem with segregation, its origin in slavery,
which was at fundamental odds with the founding principles. Had Brown done
so, it would have been forced to talk about slavery, which it never mentions.”80
Thomas is, perhaps unwittingly, also making the argument that in a world of
“reason” rather than “sensibility” the alienated African-American can find that
safe harbor because it might be “reasonable” to be alienated.
All of this led, for Thomas, to the “color-blind Constitution,”81 the core of
his argument, and the heart of the Counter-Narrative. Thomas conceded that
the idea failed to attract much support, criticizing both conservatives
uninterested in equality and liberals like Justice Brennan.82 Thomas’s
argument turned largely on his reading of Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy.
He insisted that “Justice Harlan understood, as did Lincoln, that his task was to
bring out the best of the Founders’ arguments regarding the universal
principles of equality and liberty.”83 Thomas argued that those principles give
meaning to the idea of a “color-blind Constitution.”84 Thomas excused
Harlan’s racism, on open display in his Plessy dissent, by arguing that Harlan
was in fact calling the white race to adhere to the “ultimate American
principle . . . that all men are created equal.”85 Thus, given Thomas’s rewriting
of Harlan’s opinion, “[t]he ‘superiority’ of the white race would appear to
depend on its acknowledgement that it is not superior but equal and a ‘colorblind Constitution’ would insure that this revolutionary principle would be
always kept in mind.”86 Thomas totally missed the irony of his suggestion that
white superiority was non-superiority, or at least the idea thereof. As noted
above, Thomas has reduced African-Americans to mere spectators of a white
drama.87 Everything depends on what white people do. African-Americans
are powerless to affect the plot line of the drama. Moral and physical protest,
which Frederick Douglass favored, no matter what Thomas believed was

80. Id.
81. Id. at 700.
82. Thomas, supra note 28, at 700.
83. Id. at 701.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Such reductionism also produces bad political science. See Hanes Walton, Jr., Black
Southern Politics: The Influences of Bunche, Martin and Key, in BLACK POLITICS AND BLACK
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: A LINKAGE ANALYSIS 32–38 (Hanes Walton, Jr. ed., 1994). Reducing
African-Americans to mere observers overlooks “the purposeful activity of black people to
acquire, use, and maintain [political] power.” Rickey Hill, The Study of Black Politics: Notes on
Rethinking the Paradigm, in BLACK POLITICS AND BLACK POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: A LINKAGE
ANALYSIS, supra, at 11. Hill, of course, merely restates the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative as a
political narrative. See id.
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Douglass’s constitutional jurisprudence,88 has been reduced to appealing to
some notion of reason and objectivity and hoping that white people would
figure out that they should pay attention to what Thomas Jefferson wrote, not
what he and countless other white slave masters, including a fair number of
Thomas’s revered Founders, did. It should not matter, therefore, that some
blacks are alienated from their own race because racial solidarity has nothing
to do with white people coming to their senses.
The foregoing summary of Thomas’s views reveals one other fascinating
aspect. Not only did he celebrate white racists like Jefferson, Lincoln, and the
first Justice Harlan, not only did he invent an “original” Civil Rights
Movement and misread John Hope Franklin, but, with regard to the
fundamental craft of the construction of narratives, Thomas utterly failed to
use micro-narratives. In the construction of his Counter-Narrative, Thomas
never bothered to explore the complex and intricate relation between the two
major forms of narrative. Perhaps this is so because it turns out that Thomas
cares only about one micro-narrative—his own89—surely a hallmark of
alienation of the narcissistic sort. Thus Thomas would have no interest or
desire to contest the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative at the level of micronarratives as constituent elements of macro-narratives, except with his own
personal micro-narrative.90 For the rest of us, however, Thomas’s blindness
with respect to micro-narratives, a blindness that has nothing to do with color,
calls into question the legitimacy of his Counter-Narrative.
Thomas’s disciple, Stephen F. Smith, elaborated on the Justice’s efforts in
1987 to construct a macro-narrative that could compete with the Civil Rights
Macro-Narrative.91 Smith must have recognized that Thomas’s sterile
formalism and reliance on abstractions, not to mention his pantheon of white
heroes, leaving African-Americans largely on the sidelines, presented serious
problems. He attempted, therefore, to restate the Color-Blindness MacroNarrative as if it were not the narrative of the isolated, alienated AfricanAmerican. Smith began by arguing that there has been a diversity of views in
88. Thomas argued that Frederick Douglass agreed with him that the Constitution embodied
the color-blind principle found in the Declaration of Independence. Thomas, supra note 28, at
703. It suffices to note that Douglass might have believed that the Declaration sits “in the center
of the frame formed by the Constitution.” Id. However, Douglass, unlike Thomas, was smart
enough to know that the civil rights struggle called for more than Thomas has been willing to
grant or concede. One might have more respect for Thomas’s views if he were willing to accept
the simple proposition that the struggle for civil rights requires the use of all of the weapons and
strategies available to African-Americans at any particular time. Thomas is utterly incapable of
adopting this new.
89. See Samuel Marcosson, Colorizing the Constitution of Originalism: Clarence Thomas at
the Rubicon, 16 LAW & INEQ. 429, 489–90 (1998) (arguing that Thomas will engage his own
personal story but ignore the narratives of “faceless, impersonal others”).
90. See Part V, infra.
91. See Smith, supra note 33.
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the black community even on civil rights issues.92 Smith characterized W.E.B.
Dubois as a dissenter, “rejecting the orthodox approach of Booker T.
Washington.”93 He continued: “This long tradition of dissent within the black
community on civil rights issues continued well after the turn of the century,”94
referring to Marcus Garvey’s stand against integration and for repatriation to
Africa, as against others like Thurgood Marshall, to Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. and Malcolm X and the Black Panther Party, and to Justice Thomas and
Shelby Steele in opposition to “many in the black community [who] agitate for
race-conscious remedies such as affirmative action in the belief that racism
constitutes an insuperable barrier to black progress.”95 Alienation is now
merely a matter of dissent.
The difficulty with Smith’s argument is that it supposes that dissent is
somehow fungible. He failed to confront the claim made by the Civil Rights
Macro-Narrative that the moral and physical protest, the struggle for equal
justice in America, binds us into a community, a complex web of not only
rights, privileges, powers, and immunities, but also “no rights,” duties,
disabilities, and liabilities.96 While “rights talk” has dominated the rhetoric of
the struggle, 97 perhaps sometimes to its detriment,98 the truth has always
92. Id. at 530.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 530–31.
96. This terminology first appeared in Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
97. See William E. Forbath, Civil Rights and Economic Citizenship: Notes on the Past and
Future of the Civil Rights and Labor Movements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 697, 698–702
(2000) (tracing rights talk back at least as far as the New Deal).
98. See Melissa Cole, The Color-Blind Constitution, Civil Rights-Talk, and a Multicultural
Discourse for a Post-Reparations World, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 127, 128 (1999)
(arguing that “[t]he failure of affirmative action . . . results from its roots in ‘civil rights-talk’”);
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics,
and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455, 1477 (2002) (noting that Critical Race Theorists both
“acknowledge the limitations of rights talk” but “also believe that rights play a vital role in
antiracism”). But see Francesca Polletta, The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims:
Southern Civil Rights Organizing, 1961–1966, 34 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 367 (2000) (arguing that
rights talk was essential to political organizing); Daria Roithmayr, Left Over Rights, 22 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1113, 1129 (2001) (noting that “[w]hile rights talk in a particular moment may well serve
to drain political energy through a focus on litigation, in other historical moments rights talk
might help inspire political and social movements for change” and “[r]ights talk is not always and
inevitably depoliticizing (take, for example, the civil rights movement)”).
For a more general criticism of rights talk, see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:
THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 14 (1991) (referring to a rhetoric that “in its
absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue
that might lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground”
because “[i]n its silence concerning responsibilities, it seems to condone acceptance of the
benefits of living in a democratic social welfare state, without accepting the corresponding
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remained that rights are not mere abstractions, but that they take their meaning
in relations, not only relations between blacks and whites but also between
African-Americans. The moral claim of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative is
rooted in the norms of community and reciprocal responsibilities,99 not in
abstract “rights,” notwithstanding the rhetoric of the struggle for racial justice
in America. Thus, some dissent falls within the contours and ambit of the
African-American communitarian norm, and some dissent does not. Even
Booker T. Washington’s wretched accommodationism fell within it. He
constantly pandered to reactionary whites, but Washington secretly financed
Perhaps one might say that Washington’s
civil rights litigation.100
conservatism derived not from some silly notions about the Declaration of
Independence, or, more to the point, the supposed lofty ideals of white men
whose actions betrayed a different set of beliefs and priorities, but from an
appreciation of the practical inability of African-Americans to engage in a
moral and physical protest, given the deeply entrenched racism of the vast
majority of American whites of Washington’s time.101 The problem, of course,
is that during the years of his hegemony, from 1895, the year of his infamous
Atlanta Compromise speech,102 to 1915, the year of his death, whites took

personal and civic obligations”). As far as she goes, Professor Glendon is probably correct.
However, she utterly fails to recognize that African-American communitarianism has so far
blocked the degeneration of rights talk by and between African-Americans into the kind of selfish
individualism that she decries. Although, it would seem that Clarence Thomas is the exception
that proves the rule. The collapse of white American political discourse and the concomitant
devaluation of social duty and responsibility results from an extreme individualism foreign to the
large majority of African-Americans, not from the struggles and the related rhetoric that lie at the
core of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative. The normative meaning of rights talk is entirely
contextual.
However, Professor Glendon’s critique of rights talk might have meaning for AfricanAmericans to which we need to pay heed. The problematic feature of rights talk for any racial or
ethnic group stems from the failure of such rhetoric explicitly to yoke individual rights and
communitarian duties. Professor Glendon has described a present reality for white American
political discourse that might become a future reality for African-American discourse should
black people lose the communitarianism that lies at the heart of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative
and the broader black experience in America. See MICHAEL DAWSON, BLACK VISIONS: THE
ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN-AMERCIAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 11 (2001). The deep
and profound social, cultural and theological implications of this African-American
communitarianism will be the subject of a future essay.
99. And so it is that African-American political ideologies, again a subset of macronarratives, with the exception of black conservatism, reflect a communitarian perspective. See
Newsom, supra note 26 and accompanying text; DAWSON, supra note 98, at 31.
100. See J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844–
1944, at 15–16 (1993); Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17
CONST. COMMENT. 295, 304–05 (2000).
101. See DAWSON, supra note 98, at 283.
102. BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY 101–02 (William L. Andrews ed., 1996).
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Washington’s accommodationism as “a signal to squeeze blacks harder.”103
Perhaps one might better say that Washington badly misjudged the situation.
However, Washington remained a part of the family, even if not a terribly
helpful one.
There is also no doubt but that W.E.B. Dubois, Marcus Garvey, Thurgood
Marshall, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X, and the Black Panthers
remained members of the family, whatever assessment one might make of their
respective contributions to its welfare. The question remains whether Justice
Thomas has engaged in radical alienation by simply abandoning us and leaving
the family. Smith, in his appeal to black dissent, has not shown that Thomas is
still with us. Instead, there is good reason to believe that most of the dissenters
to whom he referred, Booker T. Washington in particular, accepted, in
substantial degree, the communitarian norm. Certainly Smith has not
demonstrated, and neither has Thomas, that there is any institutional embrace
or support of the Counter-Narrative among African-Americans. Given
McGary’s careful analysis,104 one might conclude that Thomas and Smith have
conceded the point and accepted the moral judgment that they are alienated
African-Americans.
Nonetheless, Smith continued his effort to integrate the Counter-Narrative
into the fabric of African-American history and experience, trumping the
significance or importance of community, by stating that “[b]lack people have
struggled too hard and too long in this country to surrender the precious right
to read and think for themselves—rights that were denied them in slavery—to
any orthodoxy, whether black or white.”105 After arguing that if AfricanAmericans insisted that all blacks should think alike, he concluded that we
would have to accept the possibility that all whites should think alike and, as a
minority group, accept that we would not be able “to win any gains in a
democracy based on the principle of majority-rule” and “[t]he most blacks can
expect . . . is handouts from kind-hearted whites, who are moved either by a
sense of compassion or noblesse obligee [sic] to put aside their ‘white’ way of
thinking.”106
Smith fared no better on this point. He never adequately debated the
central assertion of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative that the AfricanAmerican community has a moral claim on each one of us. Smith created a
false dichotomy between that claim and the “precious right to read and think
for [oneself]. . . .”107 Leaving aside the question of the proper relation between
103. Peter Eisenstadt, Introduction to BLACK CONSERVATISM: ESSAYS IN INTELLECTUAL
POLITICAL HISTORY, at ix, xix (Peter Eisenstadt ed., 1999) [hereinafter BLACK
CONSERVATISM].
104. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
105. Smith, supra note 33, at 531 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 531–32.
107. Id. at 531.
AND
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the individual and the nestled communities to which he belongs, the practical
issue, of course, concerns not at all how Thomas thinks, but rather how he
votes on the Court. Thus Smith had to make a larger claim of autonomous
individual right—to read and think for oneself and to act thereon. Smith, the
acolyte, could, it appears, never quite bring himself to say such a thing. The
great insight of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative is that it treasures creative
thought and imagination, but insists that before acting upon those ideas, the
thinker sit down and talk things over within the family. Moral and physical
protest requires nothing less, if it is to succeed. It calls for organization,
consensus, and a willingness to think the problem through from the point of
view of the larger African-American community, the community that sanctions
and gives form to the protest itself. Put somewhat differently, the struggle that
informs the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative does not denigrate the right to think
for one’s self. What is does do, however, is pass judgment on how one acts on
those thoughts, with whom one acts, and against whom one acts. In short,
Smith misrepresented the question. He merely seeks to gain acceptance for
those alienated from the African-American community and its institutions and
structures as “free thinkers,” ignoring the inescapable fact that thoughts might
or might not do much harm, but actions certainly can. Smith sought to avoid
the hard question posed by Geyer and Heinz that sometimes those who are
alienated perpetrate and give effect to alienating conditions that harm victims
of alienation.108 Ultimately, those who fashion the Counter-Narrative cannot
avoid the conclusion that they stand, to one degree or another, apart from the
moral and physical protest that forms the heart of the Narrative, just as they
must grant that they stand apart from the community of struggle and protest,
and, as far as African-Americans are concerned, that they stand apart from the
community and institutions of African-Americans.
Undaunted, Smith reprised Justice Thomas’s vision of the color-blind
Constitution. Smith wrote:
Justice Thomas is being true to the principles of the civil rights movement in
calling for colorblindness. It was this country’s unfortunate willingness to
tolerate convenient exceptions from the colorblindness principle embodied in
the Declaration of Independence (and, later, in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution) that led to slavery in the first place.
That is how millions and millions of blacks came to be enslaved and treated as
chattel in a Nation whose charter expressly committed it to the “self-evident”
principle that “all men are created equal” and “are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights.”109

Smith has necessarily accused Thurgood Marshall and other civil rights
leaders of abandoning the principles that inform the struggle at the heart of the
108. See Geyer & Heinz, supra note 11, at xxxii.
109. Smith, supra note 33, at 532 (emphasis omitted).
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Civil Rights Macro-Narrative. Indeed, Smith went out of his way to argue that
Marshall’s appeal to colorblindness as an advocate in Brown v. Board of
Education110 reflected the commitment to colorblindness as a legal and moral
principle.111 Smith overlooked the fact that the Narrative has always had a
racial consciousness. Colorblindness, therefore, could never guide or shape the
struggle as a first principle. Rather, colorblindness has always served as
merely an argument employed when civil rights lawyers and civil rights
organizations believed that it might advance the struggle, and they left it to one
side when it did not advance the struggle. The objective of the Civil Rights
struggle has never been colorblindness. Rather, it has been the elimination of
racial oppression. Therefore, when Smith argued that the principle of
colorblindness “freed blacks from the shackles of slavery and lifted the dark
veil of segregation,”112 he had confused means and ends, a serious blunder.
But more serious than even the insult to the integrity of the Civil Rights
Movement and to the African-American institutions that nurtured and
supported that movement, the failure to recognize candidly the reality of
battling macro-narratives, yet further evidence of alienation, is Smith’s fatuous
assertion that slavery resulted from the country’s willingness to abandon the
colorblindness principle. The British North American colonists established
slavery long before 1776. They established an elaborate system of slavery that
ultimately came to rest on a deeply felt belief in the inferiority of Africans (and
later African-Americans, as African slaves endured the process over time, of
acculturation to a new status and a new country), a bitter and unyielding
racism.113 Slavery “became firmly established in . . . most of the mainland
[British North American colonies] . . . by the end of the seventeenth
century.”114 Thus, the reality, the context in which the events of 1776 take
meaning includes:
The linkage of . . . [slavery and race] in whites’ minds [that] produced a
derivative fusion of the two objectives of enslavement: labor coercion and race
control. When slavery as a system of labor coercion was abolished by 1865,
the race-control element of slavery lingered on, more powerful than before.
The fusion is with us even today, as we still debate whether the constitutional
and statutory structure that abolished slavery-as-labor-coercion can be used to
eradicate the vestiges of slavery-as-race-control.115

One must ask in what way did the colorblindness principle inhabit the
heart and soul of the British North American colonists in the years leading up
110.
111.
112.
113.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Smith, supra note 33, at 534.
Id. at 532.
See William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North America, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1712 (1996).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1713.
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to 1776. A fair reading of history suggests that the search will yield no fruit.
The principle simply does not exist. To suppose that the Declaration of
Independence overthrows the intense and concentrated history of slavery and
racism,116 yoked together in the minds of most Eighteenth Century whites,
including the likes of Thomas Jefferson, not to mention their Seventeenth
Century forebears, is to suppose that pigs can fly. Thus Smith’s casual
reference to slavery as a “convenient exception” cannot bear its own weight.
Smith made one more attempt to downplay the problem of alienation.117
Recasting the claim of “dissent,” he argued that Thomas’s conservatism fits in
the mainstream of African-American thought, given certain polling data that
tends to suggest “that an incredible 70% of blacks nationwide flatly reject
liberalism as an overarching political philosophy.”118 Smith then reported on
polls that showed blacks favoring the death penalty, supporting the “[denial of]
increased welfare payments to welfare recipients who have more children . . .
back[ing] mandatory sentences for drug dealers, and . . . feel[ing] black leaders
are too quick to cite racism as an excuse for black crime.”119 Still other polling
data revealed that varying majorities of blacks favor school choice,
“disapprove of mandatory [school] busing,” “feel that minorities should not
receive preferential treatment to make up for past discrimination (affirmative
action),” believe in God, and are pro-life, “flatly opposing abortion under any
circumstances.”120 Smith hoped for a political realignment on the horizon, but,
even granting that such realignment might not take place, he concluded that
“on a whole host of issues, including civil rights, the black community is more
instinctively conservative than liberal.”121
As far as it goes, Smith is correct. Other polling data, suggests, however,
that whether or not African-Americans reject or support liberalism, they
emphatically reject the political conservatism of Clarence Thomas.122 The
structure and logic of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative explain the apparent
discrepancy in the data. If the normative moral predicate of the vast majority
of African-Americans is communitarian,123 then the labels “liberal” and
“conservative” may obscure, not illuminate, the reality and meaning of
African-American political and social thought.

116. See Kevin Mumford, After Hugh: Statutory Race Segregation in Colonial America,
1630–1725, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 280 (1999) (arguing that racial segregation was enforced
beginning in 1630).
117. Smith, supra note 33, at 534–36.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 536.
122. See infra note 341 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 336-42 and accompanying text.
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The 2000 presidential election makes the point.
A supposedly
conservative subset of the American electorate, black folk, if one believes
Smith, voted overwhelmingly for Al Gore, the liberal candidate, rejecting
George Bush, the “compassionate” conservative. The African-American vote
for Gore exceeded ninety percent.124 An appreciation of the race-conscious
and communitarian premise or predicate of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative
would suggest that the reasons African-Americans support certain arguably
“conservative” positions differ markedly from the reasons advanced by whites
in support of those positions.
Take welfare payments, for instance. Black people have their own
perfectly good reasons for opposing a system that appears to pay unwed
mothers for having more children, reasons having nothing to do with white
fears of an African-American population explosion. African-American
concern rests on the well-founded belief that the black community cannot
easily accommodate large, poor single-parent families because the resources
available to African Americans—as a community—to raise and care for those
children are in perilously short supply. As another example, take belief in
God. While expressing that belief in and through the forms of evangelical
Protestantism might be problematic for African-Americans,125 God is a source
of strength, courage, comfort, and repose in the ongoing moral and physical
protest. The Black Church—whatever the theological problems of the Black
Church might be—is one of the few places where African-Americans have
been able to express many important aspects of their very humanity in an
institutional and communitarian setting. Belief in God inexorably follows.
Of course, from the other side, African-Americans simply do not trust
white conservatives because alliances with them have not furthered black
interests, a point that Judge Higginbotham placed in the center of the
Narrative.126 African-American understandings of various political, social, and
cultural questions turn on how those issues impact the struggle for equal justice
and on the health and welfare of the community, whereas white conservatives,
if history is any guide, stand opposed to that struggle and wish that community
ill.127 We might agree with white conservatives on many issues, as abstract
propositions, but we are not inclined to make alliances with them in order to

124. See supra note 24.
125. See Newsom, Protestant Empire, supra note 58, at 266 n.3 (arguing that “the American
Protestant Empire has largely been an unmitigated disaster for . . . African Americans”).
126. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
127. See Eisenstadt, supra note 103, at xxvii (arguing that “many so-called conservative
African-American voters are really moderates who are (with some reason) suspicious of the
motives of the Republicans, and fear that they will be used as stalking horses for an agenda
profoundly unsympathetic to the plight of poor, urban African Americans”).
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further these issues.128 Again, Smith has blurred the critical distinction at the
heart of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative between belief and action; black
people may believe in certain “conservative” ideas, but they are not prepared to
act upon them in alliance with conservative whites. There is no room in the
struggle for such an alliance. Those who make such an alliance, given our
experience with white conservatives, are surely alienated from the majority of
African-Americans.
The final major element of the Colorblindness Macro-Narrative is the
claim that life is so much better for so many African-Americans these days that
we just need to pull up our socks and soldier on.129 Smith acknowledged that
we have far too many poor people in our midst and that “black leadership must
turn its focus to creating economic opportunity for the poor.”130 But Smith
concluded that the problem of black poverty was not a problem of white racism
but instead, one of black leadership.131 Smith pressed on, insisting that there
only “have been isolated instances of racially polarized voting in recent
years.”132 Black leadership has much to account for, but to lay the entire
problem of black poverty at its feet evidences an isolation from and a rejection
of that leadership, and therefore, alienation from black people.
C. The Narrative and the Counter-Narrative Compared
The Narrative is the story of the black struggle. The Counter-Narrative is
the story of a white struggle.133 If either narrative generates heroes, a related
or cognate set of micro-narratives bearing witness to heroism, the Narrative
constructs heroes who are largely, but not exclusively, African-American. The
128. See infra notes 285-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of how two prominent
African-American conservatives have flatly refused to make common cause with white
conservatives on the question of affirmative action.
129. Smith, supra note 33, at 537–38.
130. Id. at 538.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 541.
133. There is a “progressive” colorblindness narrative, one that does not seek to camouflage
racial oppression, but rather claims that race consciousness “alienates the individual from his or
her ‘true’ self, a self unmarred by the myth of racial subjectivity.” Hutchinson, supra note 98, at
1462 (criticizing, inter alia, two colleagues of this author, C. Christi Cunningham and Reginald
Leamon Robinson, although Professor Cunningham, in conversations with this author, rejects the
charge). Any such “progressive” colorblindness must, however, take into account McGary’s
perceptive analysis of the role of black institutions in curbing or reining in black alienation from
self or from other African-Americans. See supra notes 17–23 and accompanying text. Any such
narrative must also explore the theory of “self.” “Progressive” colorblindness might rest on a
model of “self” that is far too individualistic, failing adequately to examine the complex nexus
between race, race consciousness, and community. See Calmore, supra note 3, at 205 (arguing
that the gulf between abstract or formal colorblindness and operational or functional
colorblindness produces, in most black people in America, “a strong sense of race
consciousness”).
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Counter-Narrative constructs heroes who are, with minor exceptions, white. It
is difficult to see how the Counter-Narrative can be anything other than the
voice of alienation.
However, several important questions remain. Perhaps the Narrative
stands for a pessimistic, defeatist view of the condition of African-Americans,
a view that might conveniently preserve a set of ideological beliefs and
maintain a set of institutional arrangements, leadership, and leaders—the socalled civil rights community. But perhaps it reflects a cold, harsh, realistic
assessment of the situation in which African-Americans find themselves. On
the other hand, perhaps the Counter-Narrative captures an optimistic view of
that state. But perhaps it makes an opportunistic understatement of the true
condition of African-Americans in order to curry favor with reactionary racist
whites in an attempt to gain individual advantage and trump the civil rights
community.
As in many things, there is some truth in all of these propositions. What
matters, however, is how much truth they contain. There are many reasons for
black people to be wary of the civil rights community. It has not delivered for
poor African-Americans. But, white conservatives have not delivered anything
for the black poor, and many of us believe that white conservatives wish to
retard if not reverse whatever gains the black middle class has made.
Disappointment with the civil rights community, however, does not, by its own
force, lead to making common cause with white reactionaries. The civil rights
community may indeed have to change. But it does not follow that African
Americans have to overthrow it. The Counter-Narrative, however, insists that
African-Americans should and, furthermore, embrace white reaction. It is the
radical, formalist, starkness of the Counter-Narrative that causes it ultimately
to fail African-Americans and to mark its adherents as alienated AfricanAmericans.
III. JUDGE HIGGINBOTHAM AND HIS CRITICS
This part will analyze the encounter between Judge Higginbotham and his
critics by focusing primarily on how they use—or do not use—the Civil Rights
Macro-Narrative and the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative. It will also
examine how they view the structure and logic of macro-narratives by
exploring how they see the relation, if any, between macro-narratives and
micro-narratives. This part will also shed some light on the position held by
African-American law professors134 on Clarence Thomas.

134. A. Leon Higginbotham was an adjunct law teacher at numerous law schools, and he
taught at Harvard following his retirement from the bench. John Q. Barrett, Teacher, Student,
Ticket: John Frank, Leon Higginbotham, and One Afternoon at the Supreme Court—Not a
Trifling Thing, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 311, 322 (2002). He was also a man of impressive
legal scholarship. See Anita F. Hill, The Scholarly Legacy of A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.: Voice,
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The Letter from the Judge

Shortly after Clarence Thomas became a member of the Court, Judge
Higginbotham wrote his now famous letter to Clarence Thomas.135 The letter
takes the form of a lecture and a scolding, as if Judge Higginbotham were
trying both to teach and to reprimand a callow and indifferent student. Indeed,
at one point Judge Higginbotham flatly declared that he did “not believe
that . . . [Clarence Thomas was] indeed the most competent person to be on the
Supreme Court.”136 And at another point Judge Higginbotham stated
“[c]andidly, I and many other thoughtful Americans are very concerned about
your appointment to the Supreme Court.”137 At first blush, such a tone and
approach seem presumptuous at best and would seem destined to give offense
because they reek of a certain paternalism and arrogance, if not green-eyed
envy. But the tone was defensible, given the logic and structure of the Civil
Rights Macro-Narrative, even if misguided.138 Thomas is not merely a pupil,
and Judge Higginbotham is not merely a teacher. The relation between black
people, as far as the Narrative is concerned, rests in a complex understanding
of community. Any community has both teachers and students, to be sure, but
one does not think of judges—even African-American judges—merely
“teaching” other African-American judges.
This suggests that Judge
Higginbotham, to some degree or another, views Thomas as outside the
relevant community, as a person who has repudiated that community and its
governing macro-narrative. Thus Judge Higginbotham wrote not as if he and
Thomas were members of the same community, but rather as one within it and
the other without. Judge Higginbotham meant either to recall Thomas to the
community (hence to teach), to rebuke him for leaving it (hence to reprimand),
or both. Judge Higginbotham, therefore, undertook his reprimand on the basis
that Clarence Thomas stood alienated from the African-American community.
Judge Higginbotham began with a declaration of purpose: to “write this
letter as a public record so that this generation can understand the challenges
you face as an Associate Justice to the Supreme Court, and the next can

Storytelling, and Narrative, 53 RUTGERS L.J. 641 (2001); Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Pioneering
the Lens of Comparative Race Relations in Law: A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. as a Model of
Scholarly Activism, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 331 (2002).
135. See Open Letter, supra note 27.
136. Id. at 1020. See also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
137. Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1025.
138. On the matter of Clarence Thomas’s competence, however, it is difficult to gainsay the
claim of “Charles Bowser, a distinguished African-American Philadelphia lawyer, [who] said,
‘I’d be willing to bet . . . that not one of the senators who voted to confirm Clarence Thomas
would hire him as their lawyer.” Id. at 1020 (citing Peter Binzer, Bowser is an Old Hand at
Playing the Political Game in Philadelphia, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov. 13, 1991, at A11
(quoting Charles Bowser)).
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evaluate the choices you have made or will make.”139 He declared that
Thomas had “the option to preserve or dilute the gains this country has made in
the struggle for equality.”140 Declaring this to be a “grave responsibility
indeed,” Judge Higginbotham insisted that Thomas will need to recognize the
“force of history” within him and that he will need “to remember how you
arrived where you are now, because you did not get there by yourself.”141
Judge Higginbotham argued that the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative applied to
Thomas, be he member or renegade.142 In so doing, he was acknowledging the
race consciousness that forms the heart and center of the Narrative.
Judge Higginbotham took Thomas to task for failing to demonstrate “an
insightful understanding on your part on how the evolutionary movement of
the Constitution143 and the work of civil rights organizations have benefited
you.”144 He continued:
Like Sharon McPhail, the President of the National Bar Association, I kept
asking myself: Will the Real Clarence Thomas Stand Up? Like her, I
wondered: “Is Clarence Thomas a ‘conservative with a common touch’ as
Ruth Marcus refers to him . . . or the ‘counterfeit hero’ he is accused of being
by Haywood Burns . . . ?”145

He accused Justice Thomas of making unwarranted attacks on civil rights
organizations, the Warren Court, and even Justice Thurgood Marshall.146 Put
differently, Judge Higginbotham was accusing Thomas of disrespecting the
Narrative and the African-American institutions that supported it. Perhaps
Thomas’s attacks were designed to discharge political obligations to Reagan
and Bush the elder, Judge Higginbotham noted, but he indicated that he hoped
that Thomas would now “take time out to carefully evaluate some of these
unjustified attacks.”147 He pressed the point, declaring that Thomas’s attacks
troubled him “because they convey a stunted knowledge of history and an
unformed judicial philosophy.”148 As a member of the Court, Judge
Higginbotham lectured Thomas that he had an obligation to “reflect more

139. Id. at 1005.
140. Id. at 1007.
141. Id.
142. Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1007.
143. Higginbotham is here referring to the jurisprudential views of liberal Supreme Court
Justices like Warren, Brennan, Blackmun and Marshall. Id. at 1011.
144. Id.
145. Id. See generally Haywood Burns, Clarence Thomas, A Counterfeit Hero, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 1991, at A19; Ruth Marcus, Self-Made Conservative: Nominee Insists He Be Judged on
Merits, WASH. POST, July 2, 1991, at A1; Sharon McPhail, Will the Real Clarence Thomas Stand
Up?, NAT’L B. ASS’N MAG., Oct. 1991, at 1.
146. Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1011.
147. Id. at 1012.
148. Id. at 1014.
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deeply on legal history than you ever have before.”149 He graciously did
admit, however, that he believed that Thomas had “the intellectual depth to
reflect upon and rethink the great issues the Court has confronted in the past
and to become truly your own man.”150
The Judge then laid out the substance of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative.
The first part of the letter, as noted previously,151 lies at the core and consists
largely of macro-narratives. The remaining three parts, however, by the very
way that Judge Higginbotham framed them, sought to relate the works of the
civil rights community to Thomas’s personal life, his micro-narrative.
However, even as to the first part, he understood the complex relation between
the two forms of narrative. Judge Higginbotham said:
As you now start to adjudicate cases involving civil rights, I hope you will
have more judicial integrity than to demean those advocates of the
disadvantaged who appear before you. If you and I had not gotten many of the
positive reinforcements that these [civil rights] organizations fought for and
that the post-Brown era made possible, probably neither you nor I would be
federal judges today.152

Civil rights advocates made it possible for Higginbotham and Thomas to
become federal judges. Thus the macro-narratives and the micro-narratives
reinforce each other.
The letter concluded with an admonishment:
You, however, must try to remember that the fundamental problems of the
disadvantaged, women, minorities, and the powerless have not all been solved
simply because you have “moved on up” from Pin Point, Georgia, to the
Supreme Court . . . . I have written to tell you that your life today, however,
should be not far removed from the visions and struggles of Frederick
Douglass, Sojourner Truth, Harriet Tubman, Charles Hamilton Houston, A.
Philip Randolph, Mary McLeod Bethune, W.E.B. Dubois, Roy Wilkins,
Whitney Young, Martin Luther King, Judge William Henry Hastie, Justices
Thurgood Marshall, Earl Warren, and William Brennan, as well as the
thousands of others who dedicated much of their lives to create the America
that made your opportunities possible. I hope you have the strength of
character to exemplify those values so that the sacrifices of all these men and
women will not have been in vain.153

Judge Higginbotham, rightly concerned that the Court would continue “to
retreat from protecting the rights of the poor, women, the disadvantaged,
149. Id.
150. Id. However gracious Judge Higginbotham might have been on this point, it remains to
be determined just how much intellectual depth is necessary to crank out the arid formalist
opinions that form the core of Thomas’s work on the Court.
151. See supra text accompanying note 142.
152. See Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1018.
153. Id. at 1026.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

354

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:327

minorities, and the powerless,”154 ended “with hope to balance my
apprehension, I wish you well as a thoughtful and worthy successor to Justice
Marshall in the ever ongoing struggle to assure equal justice under law for all
persons.”155
Judge Higginbotham had called on Justice Thomas to recognize and accept
the moral force and power of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative and to rejoin
the community from which he came.
B.

The Comment from the First Law Professor

Professor Evelyn Wilson responded to Judge Higginbotham’s letter.156
She reacted to its tone:
I read Judge Higginbotham’s letter quickly the first time and felt embarrassed
for Justice Thomas. He had just assumed a lifetime position at the top of his
career ladder, one of only nine in the nation, a position from which his
thoughts, values, perceptions, and priorities will impact not only this country,
but all humanity. Before Justice Thomas rendered a single judgment, Judge
Higginbotham seemed to suggest that Judge Thomas is immature and not
especially bright. My head said: Give the boy a chance. Let him decide what
to do with his newly gained power. My heart said: Judge Higginbotham is
probably right. I’m glad he expressed our fears.157

Her suggestion that we “[g]ive the boy a chance” fails to consider the clearly
defined views expressed by Thomas in his seminal law review article.158 If she
had taken Thomas’s position into account, perhaps she had also taken into
account his confirmation testimony that arguably discarded some or all of the
views contained in that article.159 But perhaps her remarks portend a deeper
claim, that there exists a dichotomy between her head and her heart, and that
the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative has a claim on her heart but not necessarily
on her head. However, she never satisfactorily demonstrated this proposition.
If anything, the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative speaks with equal force to both
head and heart.160
Professor Wilson careened back and forth between shared micronarratives, rooted in the personal experiences of both Thomas and herself, and

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 1027.
Id. at 1028.
See Wilson, supra note 33.
Id. at 142.
Id.; see Thomas, supra note 28.
See CHRISTOPHER SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE REAL CLARENCE THOMAS:
CONFIRMATION VERACITY MEETS PERFORMANCE REALITY (2000).
160. For a much more useful analysis of head and heart, see Wells, supra note 1, at 147
(arguing that “Clarence Thomas is his principles; he lacks the flesh and blood of concrete
connection to individual context” and “[w]hat I see in Thomas is a man who has suffered many
forms of racial abuse and who has tried to avoid the pain of this abuse by ‘living in his head’”).
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a broader macro-narrative that encompasses larger numbers of AfricanAmericans and their experiences and struggles over the preceding four or five
decades that mark and measure the lives of both Thomas and herself.161 For
her, the various forms of narrative proceeded on parallel tracks, neither
speaking to the other in any meaningful way.
Not surprisingly, Professor Wilson ultimately turned to Thomas’s micronarrative, surely a narrative of racial discrimination, poverty, obstacles in
education and employment, and race, but also of an African-American man
who “has become talented and well-trained.”162 From the perspective of this
micro-narrative, she then posed the following questions: “Are we fair to
require him to bear an extra burden of additional personal sacrifice because he
was born Black in America? Are we fair to deny him the opportunity to make
his contribution in his own way, to live up to his own potential, to be his own
person?”163 Again, she relied on Thomas’s micro-narrative, ignoring the Civil
Rights Macro-Narrative. “We can only encourage him to be honest to himself
now that he no longer needs to please others.”164 When Judge Higginbotham
referred to Thomas pleasing others, he had conservative whites in mind.165
When Wilson referred to pleasing others she had no such limitation in mind.166
For her, Justice Thomas has no more obligation to please African-Americans
than he does to please anybody else. Her translation of the “other” to be
“pleased” negates the normative power of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative.
Unlike Higginbotham, who clearly wanted Thomas to emulate Marshall,
Wilson took a different view.
We cannot expect that his decisions would be those of Justice Marshall. We
can expect that he will vote in accordance with his own conscience and
experience. We should criticize Justice Thomas when we disagree with his
decisions because he is a Supreme Court Justice and ought to do better. We
should not criticize him because he did not vote “Black.”167

Professor Wilson left unanswered, however, the question as to how one
determines what amounts to doing “better.” Voting “Black” has to mean
voting with the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative, the normative expression of the
African-American struggle for equal rights, in mind. Perhaps for her,
therefore, doing “better” has no referent to the Narrative. Perhaps this is so
because the moral power of the Narrative reaches the heart but not the head of
Professor Wilson. But she offered up no alternative metaphor, narrative or

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See SMITH & BAUGH, supra note 159 at 143–44.
See Wilson, supra note 33, at 145.
Id.
Id.
See Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1014.
See Wilson, supra note 33, at 145.
Wilson, supra note 33, at 146.
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other moral, or other referent for measuring whether a particular vote is
“good.” She provided nothing that speaks to one’s head, to her head, or to
Clarence Thomas’s head.
But the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative is essentially a narrative about the
law precisely because of the central role of civil rights lawyers doing law in the
construction of this particular macro-narrative. To conclude that the Narrative
is somehow irrelevant in analyzing judicial opinions, is to impoverish legal
analysis to an extraordinary and unacceptable degree. Professor Wilson has
not established a normative or jurisprudential formalist position that would
warrant the silencing of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative in the fashion that
she supposed. Trying to carve out a disembodied autonomy for Clarence
Thomas—for accommodating his alienation—and for micro-narratives, she
robbed the law of comprehensibility, not to mention moral authority.168
Given her implicit rejection of any moral or normative claim of the
Narrative, Wilson criticized Judge Higginbotham for recalling Clarence
Thomas to a duty to remember those who helped him along the way, but not
for recalling the other eight members of the Court to the same responsibility.169
Professor Wilson overlooked the fact that Judge Higginbotham was engaging
in an African-American discourse—one African-American judge speaking to
another African- American judge. The question posed by Judge Higginbotham
was whether black people who wind up in a position to affect the legal
relations of other black people have certain duties to those other black
people.170 Surely one can answer this question, at least in large part, without
also deciding what the duties of other people might or might not be.171
In any event, Professor Wilson answered the question in the negative. She
concluded, “Justice Marshall . . . dedicated his life to creating options for
Black Americans. Justice Marshall fought for the right of Justice Thomas to
determine his own destiny. Perhaps Justice Thomas is a proper heir to Justice
Marshall’s seat.”172 It boggles the mind to suppose that Justice Marshall would
be satisfied if Clarence Thomas used the options that Marshall had fought to
create to undo the legal and other protections necessary to ensure that those
options remained available for other African-Americans, the poor, women,
other minorities, and the subordinated. It lies beyond belief that Justice
Marshall would subscribe to the view that Clarence Thomas’s right to
168. See Newsom, Common School Religion, supra note 58 passim (arguing that the Supreme
Court’s macro-narratives regarding religion in the public schools lack moral authority largely
because they pay insufficient attention to the psychological harm such religion visits upon
religious minorities, and implicitly rejecting the argument that micro-narratives could establish
such authority).
169. Wilson, supra note 33, at 146–47.
170. See Open Letter, supra note 27.
171. See Newsom, Common School Religion, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
172. Wilson, supra note 33, at 147.
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determine his own destiny included the right to constrain the destiny of other
African-Americans, the poor, women, other minorities, and the subordinated.
Marshall surely believed in the moral force and power of the Civil Rights
Macro-Narrative and the duties that it generates. Thus it was folly then, and it
is folly now to suppose that Justice Thomas might be a “proper heir to Justice
Marshall’s seat.”173
Because Professor Wilson rejected macro-narratives as relevant to judicial
decision-making, she did not embrace the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative.
Her position rested largely on empowering Thomas’s micro-narrative. Her
treatment of the Counter-Narrative constitutes the only saving grace of
Professor Wilson’s comment, although the rejection of the moral force of
macro-narratives in doing law presents great obstacles to any rational analysis
of the law. In particular, it enshrines alienation, converting it merely to some
expression or species of unbridled individualism.
C. The Tobriner Lecture by the Judge
Judge Higginbotham resumed his attack on Clarence Thomas in 1994,174
prompted in part by the public response to his letter.175 He reiterated that his
purpose in writing the letter was to state “what I felt his personal obligations
were, both as a Justice on the Supreme Court and as an African-American.”176
He then referred to the responses that questioned his authority to speak for
black people on the character and qualifications of Justice Thomas. Judge
Higginbotham concluded that his authority came from his wife.177 Turning to
Professor Wilson’s comments, Judge Higginbotham teased her for
characterizing Thomas as a “boy.”178 He responded:
Justice Thomas is not a mere boy. Boys play marbles and little league
baseball. Men and women sit on the United States Supreme Court . . . . It is
because Justice Thomas has the power to determine the plight of all
173. Id. It is difficult to follow Professor Wilson’s argument that Clarence Thomas might be
an heir to Justice Marshall’s seat on the Court. On the one hand, she insisted that the seat never
belonged to African-Americans. Id. at 145. But apparently it “belonged” to Justice Marshall
because it must have in order for there to be a possibility that Thomas was “a proper heir to
Justice Marshall’s seat.” Perhaps this merely furnishes further evidence of Professor Wilson’s
rejection of macro-narratives. If the seat were a “Black” seat, then it would take a macronarrative to make it so. If it were merely Justice Marshall’s seat—and now Clarence Thomas’s
seat—then it would only take random, autonomous, and disconnected micro-narratives to support
the latter claim. Her rejection of the normative claims of macro-narratives might explain in part
her inability to construct a good macro-narrative, even when she arguably wanted to construct
them. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
174. See Retrospect, supra note 31.
175. Id. at 1407.
176. Id. at 1408.
177. Id. at 1410.
178. Id. at 1411.
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Americans, and particularly the disadvantaged, women, minorities, and the
powerless, that I wrote to him. If he were a mere boy, I would have sent him a
bag of marbles or a blank pad with crayons on which he could draw fantasies.
I would not have feared that the destiny of our nation might in some instances
rest on his decisive vote when the Court was evenly divided.179

Professor Wilson undoubtedly meant to use the word “boy” in a jocular, if not
flippant way, as Judge Higginbotham recognized.180 Higginbotham used her
choice of words against her, correctly noting that the word “boy” connotes
membership in the African-American family and thus, for him, a binding link
to the shared experiences and thus the macro-narratives of that family,
including the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative.181 The metaphor or figure of
“family” led Judge Higginbotham to pose the question whether Clarence
Thomas had the moral right to become hostile to the very opportunities “that
made his success possible” being seen as viable options for “the present
generation of African-Americans, many of whom have found barriers to entry
as high and impenetrable as any he encountered.”182 The answer to the Judge’s
question turns largely on the recognition of the moral or normative claim of the
Narrative. For Professor Wilson, who rejected such a claim at least with
regard to the “head,” Thomas presumably has such a moral right. For Judge
Higginbotham, who accepted such claims, Thomas does not. The issue was
clearly joined.
Judge Higginbotham then responded to Wilson’s objection that he sought
to impose a double standard, demanding of Thomas what he would not demand
of the other members of the Court. Higginbotham made a moral claim, one
resting on the Narrative.
I believe all Justices of the Supreme Court should be fair to everyone, and
particularly in the “defense of the weak, the poor, minorities, women, the
disabled, and the powerless.” However, I do believe that it is a tragic irony
when a Black Justice adopts the anti-minority position advocated by the most
conservative and racially uninformed Justice on the Court, and when even
many of his White colleagues demonstrate a far greater insight and concern
about the history of the plight of African-Americans in this country.183

The assertion of “tragic irony” makes sense only if one supposes that the
history of the struggle, the story of the struggle, as it constitutes a macronarrative, makes demands on those who belong to the community engaged in
the struggle.
179. Retrospect, supra note 31, at 1411–12.
180. Id. at 1411, n.16.
181. Id. Of some importance, Judge Higginbotham did not accuse Professor Wilson of using
the word “boy” so as to call up or implicate the racist tendency of some whites to refer to AfricanAmerican men as “boys.”
182. Id. at 1412.
183. Id. at 1413 (emphasis added).
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Judge Higginbotham zeroed in on Professor Wilson, arguing that “her
writing suggests some confusion about the unavoidable obligation and status in
life one has as an African-American—an obligation and status attributable to
historic policies that have at various times been invoked by the overall
American society.”184 He argued that the duty arises out of the “twoness” that
Dubois described, being both an American and a Negro.185 Perhaps he meant
to suggest that in African-Americans, Professor Wilson’s “head” of the
American is conjoined with Professor Wilson’s “heart” of the Negro, the
African. But in any event, Judge Higginbotham placed the subject of moral
duty squarely in the realm of psychology, linking not only head and heart, but
also history or narrative and the psyche. “The first sign of emotional
maturity186 in all African-American public officials is the recognition of this
duality that we all confront daily.”187 Judge Higginbotham had clearly
ratcheted up his critique of Justice Thomas.
Having introduced the subject of psychology and having declared that the
Civil Rights Macro-Narrative contains a psychological dimension,
Higginbotham bided his time. He began a careful and cautious development of
the subject by rephrasing or restating the theme of “tragic irony,” and at the
same time, moving beyond it. He said:
I would hope that no African-American in high public office would become a
major voice in the intentional destruction of the potential of his own people.
No judge, whatever his race, should do that. And if the person who engages in
destructive conduct against a minority is also a member of a minority group
that has been historically discriminated against, what is its special
significance?188

Judge Higginbotham had now yoked the idea of ironic tragedy with the
idea of destructive conduct, a conduct having special significance. He
explored that significance by considering what the consequences might have
been if African-American judges had joined in the majority opinions in Dred
Scott v. Sanford,189 and Plessy v. Ferguson.190 Those dire consequences only
reinforced his harsh judgment on the works of Clarence Thomas as evidence of

184. Retrospect, supra note 31, at 1413.
185. Id. at 1414.
186. Perhaps the contretemps on the use of the word “boy” should be revisited. See supra
notes 178-81 and accompanying text (emphasis added). In a sense Judge Higginbotham accused
Clarence Thomas of immaturity. Perhaps Clarence Thomas is a “boy” after all.
187. Retrospect, supra note 31, at 1414–15 (emphasis added). In support of this claim, Judge
Higginbotham gave examples of how even the most distinguished African-American public
officials, including himself, are, in this day and age, subjected to the indignities of racial bigotry
and prejudice. Id. at 1415–18.
188. Id. at 1418 (emphasis added).
189. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
190. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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destructive conduct. “[A]t times, in his opinions, [Justice Thomas] is as
conservative for this generation of the Supreme Court as were the majority of
Justices who acted so hostilely to Blacks in Dred Scott and Plessy. I think
such extreme conservatism is a compounded irony when advocated by an
African-American.”191 The complex dynamics of alienation are evident in
Judge Higginbotham’s criticism of Thomas. Whether or not Thomas might be
a victim, he surely acts like a perpetrator.
Judge Higginbotham was highly critical of Thomas’s dissent in Hudson v.
McMillian, the case in which a black prisoner was severely beaten by prison
guards and the question was whether such a beating constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.192 In light of
Thomas’s view that there was no violation, Judge Higginbotham asked “[w]hy
is he no different or probably even worse than many of the most conservative
Supreme Court Justices of this century?”193
By the time he delivered this lecture, unlike the case with the letter, Judge
Higginbotham had Supreme Court opinions of Justice Thomas to scrutinize.
His judgment of them was harsh, as his treatment of Hudson v. McMillian
shows. But the judge pressed ahead, developing and articulating not only a
critique based on the moral meaning and significance of the Civil Rights
Macro-Narrative, but also a critique that challenged the psyche of Justice
Thomas.194 Judge Higginbotham concluded that Clarence Thomas might well
be “entangled with racial self-hatred.”195 It was as if there could be no other
explanation for the harsh, mean-spirited and reactionary views expressed by
Clarence Thomas in his votes and opinions on the Court, and no other
explanation for his destructive conduct.
However, the two elements of Judge Higginbotham’s critique are linked
together. Rejection of the moral claims of the Narrative, a macro-narrative
generated by the struggles, history, experience, hopes, and dreams of one’s
own race, might be evidence of racial self-hatred and might give rise to
destructive conduct. This linkage in large part turns on the anterior assertion
that the Narrative in fact carries with it binding moral and normative force on
African-Americans, including Clarence Thomas, but also on the new assertion
that acceptance of the normative power of the Narrative is evidence of a
healthy racial self-identity.
If Professor Wilson was right, then perhaps one could say that Thomas’s
work on the Court merely reflects Thomas’s determination of his own

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Retrospect, supra note 31, at 1423.
503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992).
Retrospect, supra note 31, at 1426.
Id. at 1427–29.
Id. at 1429.
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destiny,196 a destiny that is nowise connected to the destiny of other AfricanAmericans because there is no macro-narrative that can make a moral claim on
African-Americans of the sort contended for by Judge Higginbotham. One
could also say that determining one’s own destiny in such a fashion does not
necessarily evidence either racial self-hatred or racial self-identity or
acceptance because macro-narratives bear no relation to psychological
development. Put differently, one could suppose that Clarence Thomas has
discharged any duty that he might owe other blacks by determining his destiny
according to his best lights, even while in doing so he harms black interests.
However, history, this paper warrants, will cast a harsh judgment on those who
view reality primarily through the lens of unconnected micro-narratives.197
Equally telling, the notion that Justice Thomas is free to work out his own
destiny entirely on his terms and entirely without reference to the Civil Rights
Macro-Narrative overlooks the stubborn fact that the issue is not what one
believes, but what one does and with whom one does it. Clarence Thomas, the
academic thinker, can hold whatever views he might want to, academic
freedom guarantees this result. However, Clarence Thomas, the Supreme
Court Justice, presents an entirely different situation. The Court, the third
branch of our national government, is no ivory tower.198 Any proper analysis
of Judge Higginbotham’s critique of Justice Thomas must take into account the
functional difference between academia and the judiciary.
D. The New York University Law School Speech by the Judge
On November 21, 1995, Judge Higginbotham weighed in yet one more
time.199 In a speech, he largely reprised his letter and his lecture. But he
pressed ahead with his attack on Clarence Thomas.200 First he sought to
contrast Clarence Thomas and Colin Powell.201 Higginbotham was exploring
the complex relation between macro-narratives and micro-narratives,
demonstrating that one micro-narrative can reflect the Civil Rights MacroNarrative, Powell, whereas another can repudiate it, Thomas.202 He went

196. See Wilson, supra note 33, at 147.
197. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
198. Robert Bork was denied Senate confirmation of his nomination to the Court in part
because he described the role of a judge as an abstract, barren, and disembodied intellectual feast.
See The Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 854 (1987) [hereinafter
Hearings]. See generally Frank Guliuzza, et al., Character, Competency, and Constitutionalism:
Did the Bork Nomination Represent a Fundamental Shift in Confirmation Criteria?, 75 MARQ. L.
REV. 409 (1992) (summarizing the commentary on the meaning of the Bork nomination).
199. See Speech, supra note 32.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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further to suggest that the former lacked the moral integrity or claim of the
latter.203 He saw Powell leading America to a state of “greater justice and
opportunity for all Americans,” whereas he saw Thomas as “dragging AfricanAmericans back to a past of oppression and inequality,” bemoaning how much
worse off African-Americans and others are because of Thomas’s presence on
the Court.204 Judge Higginbotham insisted that Thomas’s rise to power and
influence was perhaps “less deserving” than Powell’s.205 He attacked, as he
had done before, Thomas’s background, experience, and qualifications, but
found Powell’s to be outstanding.206 He described both of them as social
conservatives, but insisted that they have “profound philosophical differences”
and quite different feelings about African-Americans.207
On the nettlesome subject of affirmative action, Judge Higginbotham noted
that Powell did not attack it even though doing so would have improved or
enhanced his standing with whites.208 He declared that Powell was not like “an
earlier generation of Uncle Toms.” Instead, Powell acknowledged that he was
helped by affirmative action, but was not shown preference.209 The judge
reminded us that in 1983 Thomas acknowledged that he had benefited from
affirmative action, but he concluded that Thomas was “impacted by the
Reagan-Bush revolution” such that by 1988, Thomas was attacking affirmative
action.210 He was particularly critical of Thomas’ brief concurring opinion in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, an opinion that restated the basic premise
of the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative that the Declaration of Independence
is the governing source of meaning for the Equal Protection Clause. 211
Returning to the theme of racial self-hatred, which increasingly had come
to dominate his attack, Judge Higginbotham insisted that something had
happened to the core of Justice Thomas’s soul; that he had forgotten from
whence he had come.212 He declared that Thomas’s self-hatred was clinically
observable. Judge Higginbotham mocked Thomas, stating that Thomas must
think that he would have been a confidant of Thomas Jefferson, the author of
the Declaration of Independence, when in reality he would have been the
203. Id.
204. Speech, supra note 32.
205. Id.
206. Id. At a later point in the speech, Judge Higginbotham insisted that Colin Powell was
clearly deserving of the position as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but that Clarence
Thomas would probably not have been considered for any other seat on the Court except that of
Justice Marshall. Id. He referred to then-dean Guido Calabresi’s testimony in the confirmation
hearings, offering up only the faint praise that Thomas had “capacity for growth.” Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Speech, supra note 32.
210. Id.
211. 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
212. Retrospect, supra note 31, at 1428–29.
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person “who fed his hogs, hoed his tobacco, and planted his corn.”213
However, as Part VI of this paper will demonstrate, Thomas might have
thought that Jefferson, like the vile Simon Legree, would have had a small
number of black henchmen of the order of Quimbo and Sambo, and that he,
Thomas, would have been one of them, a view that this author finds to be
entirely plausible. Thus Judge Higginbotham might have been wrong on this
point. But given his view, Judge Higginbotham wondered why Thomas would
quote Jefferson, the slave master, as authority on the matter of affirmative
action. Judge Higginbotham, drawing on his lecture, repeated his criticism of
Thomas’s attack on the very civil rights groups whose works had benefited
Thomas.214
Attesting again to the contemporary relevance of the Civil Rights MacroNarrative, the judge made use of then-recent developments. He compared
Thomas’s rejection of affirmative action with the September 1995 decision of
Newt Gingrich, then the new Republican Speaker of the House of
Representatives, to hire 64 pages, none of whom was an African-American and
only one of whom was a racial minority. In contrast, under the previous
leadership in the House, twenty percent of the pages were minorities.215 Judge
Higginbotham continued on with a somber assessment of the Congressional
redistricting cases and the impact that those cases would, in his opinion, have
on the number of African-Americans in the House of Representatives.216
Given the structure of the Narrative, the story of the struggle for civil
rights for African-Americans, Judge Higginbotham relished the fact that Colin
Powell had attended the installation of a new head of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) at an overly long meeting in
a black church in Washington, D.C. The NAACP, of course, is one of the
nation’s premier African-American civil rights organizations. He argued that
Thomas would never have attended such an event.217 Judge Higginbotham
concluded his lengthy speech with the charge that Clarence Thomas was “the
black clone,” an invention of racist, reactionary whites.218 He claimed that
their strategy entailed finding someone who: (1) had been involved in the
struggle, coming from a background of poverty; (2) would disregard his roots;
(3) would be totally confused about self-identity, and (4) would exhibit some
hostility to black women (Judge Higginbotham having Professor Anita Hill in
mind).219 The reactionary whites found Clarence Thomas in the view of Judge
Higginbotham.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Speech, supra note 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Speech, supra note 32.
Id.
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The Article by a Second Law Professor

Professor Wilson found an ally in Professor Randall Kennedy. He joined
the lists to attack the idea that a moral predicate exists for the claim of racial
loyalty, the predicate for Judge Higginbotham’s criticism of Clarence
Thomas.220 Professor Kennedy made the categorical assertion that the
argument for racial loyalty is internal to black elite circles.221 Concededly, the
Civil Rights Macro-Narrative demands racial loyalty, or at least, Judge
Higginbotham would avow that it does. Professor Kennedy, however, offered
no evidence that only black elites react to or contemplate the meaning of the
Narrative. Indeed, there is good reason to think black people generally pay
attention to and are influenced by the Narrative.222 It is clear Professor
Kennedy sought to limit the reach and scope of the Narrative, claiming it to be
the plaything of the black elite. He did not resort to the “head-heart”
dichotomy of Professor Wilson.223
He did, however, correctly note that the racial disloyalty charge aims most
powerfully at African-American lawyers in general and at Clarence Thomas in
particular,224 a tribute to the elemental power and force of the work of civil
rights lawyers and civil rights organizations in the African-American struggle
for equal justice and a testimony to the central components of the Narrative.
Thus, “in the eyes of his most bitter detractors, Thomas is worse than a
[George] Wallace [at his white supremacist worst] since Thomas is a race
traitor and not simply an enemy.”225 Professor Kennedy failed, apparently, to
consider the logic behind the relative intensity of the attacks on Clarence
Thomas. The other racial disloyalty targets—all lawyers, specifically, Vernon
Jordan, Jr., Christopher Darden, and Anthony Griffin—lack the power to
impact the lives of African-Americans that Clarence Thomas (lawyer and now
Supreme Court Justice) possesses. 226
Kennedy insisted the racial disloyalty critique exhibited “a tendency to
homogenize blacks, woefully minimizing the complex, contentious diversity
that marks the African-American population.”227 In Part IV, this article will
demonstrate that Professor Kennedy is simply wrong on the facts—African-

220. See Kennedy, supra note 33.
221. Id.
222. See DAWSON, supra note 98, at 11 (stating “the black media, the black family, and
religious and community-based organizations . . . have been largely responsible for crystallizing
the shared historical experiences of African Americans into a sense of collective identity, and
they have also played a key role in shaping the development of black political ideologies”). See
also McGary, supra note 7.
223. See supra notes 157–60 and accompanying text.
224. See Kennedy, supra note 33.
225. Id.
226. See generally id.
227. Id.
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Americans from a variety of ideological perspectives condemn and reject the
conservatism of Clarence Thomas.228 Furthermore, while there is an AfricanAmerican conservative ideological tradition, today it claims the allegiance of
only a handful of African-Americans,229 and it has no institutional or structural
support or presence in and with African-Americans.230 The racial disloyalty
critique neither homogenizes blacks nor does it minimize “the complex,
contentious diversity that marks the African-American population”231 because
the overwhelming majority of African-Americans, perhaps as great as ninetynine percent, do not accept Clarence Thomas’s conservative ideology, and a
sizeable minority dislikes it.232 Thus Kennedy’s claim that “Thomas’s brand
of conservatism, though by no means dominant, is by no means scarce in black
America”233 goes against the evidence, unless one were to grant that a political
ideology adhered to by one percent of the African-American population was
not “scarce,” or that a ninety-nine to one split constituted a “division.”234
Professor Kennedy stood on surer ground when he noted, with respect to
social conservatism, that Thomas had soul mates in the African-American
However, Part IV of this article will show social
communities.235
conservatism enjoys far more support among African-Americans than either
economic or racial conservatism.236 It comes as no surprise that the criticism
of Clarence Thomas focuses largely on race questions, as it surely did in the
hands of Judge Higginbotham. Therefore, Kennedy’s argument regarding
social conservatism is of no avail.
Because African-American critics of Clarence Thomas can embrace a wide
range of political ideologies, Professor Kennedy’s argument that “[t]he racial
disloyalty critique makes the erroneous assumption that it is clear what policies
best serve the interests of black communities” cannot stand.237 But Professor
Kennedy continued:
It is becoming increasingly difficult to discern what effect policies will have on
blacks across regions, classes, genders, and other significant social
stratifications. Making wise decisions is not simply a matter of wanting to be
loyal to one’s people. It is a matter of knowing facts, interpreting trends,
making use of proper values, comparing arguments, and sometimes reaching

228. See infra notes 337-74 and accompanying text.
229. See infra note 357 and accompanying text.
230. See Calmore, supra note 3, at 195–96 (noting Thomas lacks “affirmation from a black
constituency” and “black conservatives lack a constituency among other blacks”).
231. Kennedy, supra note 33.
232. See infra note 357 and accompanying text.
233. See Kennedy, supra note 33.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See infra notes 357-58 and accompanying text.
237. Kennedy, supra note 33.
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counterintuitive conclusions that are at odds with conventional understandings.
Arbiters of racial loyalty err when they suggest that affirmative action, racial
gerrymandering, and similar strategies are obviously and unquestionably the
best policies for blacks to pursue. Perhaps they are the best available. But one
cannot be confident of that conclusion absent reconsideration and
experimentation with alternatives—just the sort of open-minded testing that is
inhibited when a failure to embrace these strategies gives rise to charges of
“selling out,” “forgetting where you came from,” or “turning your back on
your people.”238

Professor Kennedy here has posed a fair challenge to the civil rights
community, and thus to those—elites or otherwise—who control and shape the
Civil Rights Macro-Narrative. But, given Clarence Thomas’s rigid formalism
and commitment to “original intent,” 239 it is difficult to see just how Thomas’s
narrative-pathic jurisprudence240 responds to or bears any relation to
Kennedy’s call for a functionalist approach to working on large social and
racial legal problems.
If anything, Professor Kennedy gave us yet one more reason to criticize
Clarence Thomas. Thomas makes no effort “to discern what effect policies
will have on blacks across regions, classes, genders, and other significant
social stratifications.”241 He makes precious little effort to “know[] facts,
interpret[] trends, mak[e] use of proper values, [or] compar[e] arguments.”242
It will not do to suggest that Thomas might reach “counterintuitive conclusions
that are at odds with conventional understandings” when the very methods he
uses to reach those conclusions are highly suspect.243 With Thomas we do not
get “open-minded testing.”244 Three examples, all involving affirmative
action, which Thomas opposes, will suffice.
In Adarand Constructors, Inc v. Peña,245 Thomas’s concurring opinion is
terse, rigid, and formalist in the extreme. It makes no effort to connect his
views with empirical social reality. He made nothing more than the following

238. See id.
239. See Jared A. Levy, Blinking at Reality: The Implications of Justice Clarence Thomas’s
Influential Approach to Race and Education, 78 B.U. L. REV. 575 (1998) (criticizing Thomas’s
views in Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995)).
240. See Marcosson, supra note 89.
241. Kennedy, supra note 33.
242. Id.
243. See Christopher E. Smith, Clarence Thomas: A Distinctive Justice, 28 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1, 8 (1997) (stating, “[i]f one were asked to select a few words to describe Thomas based
on his judicial opinions, several specific adjectives would quickly come to mind: originalist,
formal, rigid, legalistic, and aggressive”).
244. For an example of a critic of affirmative action being moved by the evidence to stake out
a different position, see Nathan Glazer, A Place for Racial Preferences, WASH. POST, Nov. 24,
1998, at A19.
245. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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series of categorical claims: (1) “[g]overnment cannot make us equal; it can
only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law;”246 (2) “[t]hat
these programs may have been motivated, in part, by good intentions cannot
provide refuge from the principle that under our Constitution, the government
may not make distinctions on the basis of race;”247 (3) “[t]here can be no doubt
that the paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of this program is at war
with the principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our
Constitution;”248 (4) “[t]hese programs . . . undermine the moral basis of the
equal protection principle . . . [a] principle [that] reflects our Nation’s
understanding that such classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on
the individual and our society;”249 (5) “there can be no doubt that racial
paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous and
pernicious as any other form of discrimination;”250 (6) this paternalism
“teaches many that because of chronic and apparently immutable handicaps,
minorities cannot compete with them without their patronizing indulgence”
and “[i]nevitably, such programs engender attitudes of superiority or,
alternatively, provoke resentment among those who believe that they have
been wronged by the government’s use of race,”251 and (7) “[t]hese programs
stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop
dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to preferences.”252
Thomas cited no empirical social research to buttress any of these highly
contestable categorical claims that he makes. To take just one of these claims,
there is solid evidence that the stigma to which Thomas referred in claim seven
is largely a figment of his imagination.253
Thomas fared no better in Missouri v. Jenkins, where he made a series of
claims that are abstract and not rooted in anything other than Thomas’s view of
the world. 254 He began with the remarkable statement that “[i]t never ceases
to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume that anything that is
predominantly black must be inferior.”255 Unfortunately, he never bothered to
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 240.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE & UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998). See
also Charles R. Lawrence, III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of
Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 951–52 (2001) (arguing affirmative action is a
black communitarian response to white structural or institutional oppression of the AfricanAmerican community).
254. 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
255. Id.
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explain just what that “anything” might be. The only “thing” we know for sure
is that a majority of the students in the Kansas City, Missouri public schools
were African-Americans.256 We do not know the racial make-up of the
faculty, the administrators, or those who determine how much money the
school district would receive in any fiscal year.
Undaunted, Thomas charged ahead, arguing that the District Court had
“read our cases to support the theory that black students suffer an unspecified
psychological harm from segregation that retards their mental and educational
development. This approach not only relies upon questionable social science
research rather than constitutional principle, but it also rests on an assumption
of black inferiority.”257 Thomas thus made it perfectly clear that he rejected
empirical research, preferring instead to rely on what he supposed to be
“constitutional principle.” He went so far as to state, “assumptions [of racial
inferiority in situations of de facto segregation and any social science research
upon which they rely certainly cannot form the basis upon which we decide
matters of constitutional principle.”258 However, when it suited his purposes,
Thomas was prepared to rely on his private untutored intuition: “The
continuing ‘racial isolation’ of schools after de jure segregation has ended may
well reflect voluntary housing choices or other private decisions.”259 There is
too much hard evidence of continuing residential racial apartheid in this
country, a state of affairs resulting from concerted action to restrict housing
choices for African-Americans,260 for anybody to take Thomas’s intuition or
hunch seriously. Nonetheless, Thomas concluded “massive demographic
shifts” lay “beyond the authority and . . . the practical ability of the federal
courts to try to counteract.”261 Again, Thomas indulged in armchair psychiatry
when he declared that the Kansas City public schools “can function as the
center and symbol of black communities, and provide examples of independent
black leadership, success, and achievement.”262 Here too, Thomas chose not to
back up this claim with any empirical research or support. Finally Thomas
trumpeted the unsubstantiated and unsupported claim that “‘[r]acial isolation’
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 76 (Rehnquist, J.).
Id. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 119-20.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 116 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); Jennifer C. Chang, In Search of
Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The Implications of the Communications Decency Act for Fair
Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN. L. REV. 969 (2002); Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Black
Suburbs and the State of Integration: A Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 729, 741 (2001) (noting “[a] high degree of residential segregation persists for
African Americans in all income brackets”).
261. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 117–18 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U.S. 467, 495 (1992)).
262. Id. at 122.
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itself is not a harm; only state-enforced segregation is . . . . [Because otherwise
one would have to insist that] there must be something inferior about
blacks.”263 This claim is highly debatable because there is good evidence that
racial isolation does in fact harm African-Americans.264
Finally, in Grutter v. Bollinger,265 Thomas appeared to depart from the arid
formalism of Adarand and Jenkins. In his lengthy dissenting opinion, he
appears to rely on some statistical data and other forms of empirical data to
support his arguments against affirmative action.266 Accordingly, he appeared
to have moved in the direction Professor Kennedy supposed, however, the
Justice did not. Thomas argued that because some states do not have a public
law school then a presumption arises “that the enterprise itself is not a
compelling state interest.”267 However, Thomas never explained why State A
could not, as a practical matter, meet its need for lawyers through the public
law schools of State B. Thomas forged ahead and argued the fact that “[l]ess
than 16% of the [University of Michigan] Law School’s graduating class elects
to stay in Michigan after law school”268 militates against any claim that the law
school serves a compelling state interest. Thomas utterly failed to consider,
however, what percentage of the minority graduates of the law school elected
to stay in Michigan. He also relied on the statistical fact that only a few states
maintain elite public law schools to “raise[] a strong inference that there is
nothing compelling about elite status.”269 Thomas, again, failed to consider
that some states might not feel the need to benefit from the prestige that an
elite public law school might confer upon it. He never established the general
proposition that a compelling state interest must find expression in every state
in order to be compelling. If this were not bad enough, Thomas never
connected elitism with affirmative action. The hard fact is that non-elite law
schools practice affirmative action too. So far, Thomas has not handled spotty,
empirical data particularly well.
Thomas would appear to be on firmer methodological ground when he
argued that there is growing social evidence “that racial (and other sorts) of
heterogeneity actually impairs learning among black students.”270 The thrust
of the argument Thomas constructed was that African-Americans do better

263. Id.
264. See Julie F. Mead, Conscious Use of Race as a Voluntary Means to Educational Ends in
Elementary and Secondary Education: A Legal Argument Derived from Recent Judicial
Decisions, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 120 n.325 (2002) (collecting the research establishing the
harmful effects of racial isolation). See also Levy, supra note 239, at 607–16.
265. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
266. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
267. Id. at 2354.
268. Id. at 2355.
269. Id.
270. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2358 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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academically in black schools than they do in white schools.271 What Thomas
failed to consider, whether or not studies on which he relied do, is the life
histories and the numerical credentials of the black students analyzed in these
reports and the academic environments of the schools they attend. For
example, one has to consider whether white racism contributes to AfricanAmerican underachievement in some white schools. Thomas’s failure to
appreciate the need to contextualize the findings on academic achievement
suggests either an inability or an unwillingness on his part to do good social
science. Thomas insisted that Boalt Hall has an underrepresented minority
student enrollment that “now exceeds 1996 levels.”272 But the relevant
question is, but for California Proposition 209, what would that enrollment be?
One way to think about the question is to ask why 171 American law deans
supported the University of Michigan Law School’s position on affirmative
action?273 This suggests that Thomas failed to appreciate the reality of the
situation at Berkeley, a reality that was more apparent to virtually all of the
deans of American law schools, elite or otherwise.
Thomas returned to his large theme that affirmative action is bad for
African-Americans, that black students are better off if they are not
“overmatched” in white schools.274 He relied on Stephan and Abigail
Thernstrom’s Reflections on the Shape of the River as authority for the
proposition that the beneficiaries of affirmative action are underperforming in
the classroom.275 He also referred to Thomas Sowell,276 but Thomas essentially
struck out on his own without any real need for either the Thernstroms or
Sowell. He had it all figured out; he accused law schools of “seek[ing] only a
facade” of “tantaliz[ing] unprepared students . . . [who] take the bait, only to
find that they cannot succeed in the cauldron of competition.”277 There is
evidence, of course, that this is flatly wrong.278 And on the question of stigma,

271. Id.
272. Id. at 2359.
273. Brief of American Law Deans Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents
at 1, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02–241).
274. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2361-62 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
275. Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections on the Shape of the River, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1583, 1605–08 (1999).
276. See THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE: A WORLD VIEW 177 (1994) (arguing black
students are “generally overmatched throughout all levels of higher education” in white schools).
277. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2362 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
278. See Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical
Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admssion
Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1997). Wightman reports on a bar passage study that
demonstrated that almost approximately eighty percent of the African-American students covered
by the study graduated from law school, and that more than seventy-five percent of the AfricanAmerican graduates ultimately passed the bar examination. Id. at 35–37. The Thernstroms tackle
the conclusions reached by Wightman. See Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 275, at 1611–
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Thomas reverted to the same sort of barren, sterile, and self-serving categorical
claims that he advanced in Adarand and Jenkins, citing no social science
whatsoever in support of his claim that blacks admitted to law school, whether
or not because of affirmative action (what Thomas calls “discrimination”), are
“tarred as undeserving.”279 Nothing in Thomas’s dissent in Grutter, therefore,
demonstrates any real change in the methodological approach first displayed in
Adarand.
Even if this analysis of three of Thomas’s anti-affirmative action opinions
fails to settle the matter, Professor Kennedy did not explain how adopting the
agenda of the most reactionary whites, whites who, demonstrably throughout
our nation’s history, have stood athwart the goals and objectives of the vast
majority of African-Americans, is merely “counterintuitive.”280 The burden
lies on those whites to demonstrate a commitment to the African-American
agenda, the struggle for equal justice, a commitment that they have utterly
failed to make. In the event some of them have made such a commitment,
Professor Kennedy should have demonstrated that fact.
Professor Kennedy contended that critique “takes the form of alleging that
[Thomas] mouths conservative opinions to curry favor with powerful whites or
out of a mere habit of following such conservative ideologues as his colleague
Antonin Scalia.”281 The point, however, is trivial. If Thomas is guilty of racial
disloyalty, then it would stand to reason that he might wish to curry favor with
powerful whites if he were to curry favor with anybody. Kennedy continued
by arguing that the critique negates “[t]he one possibility . . . that a thoughtful
black person could, on his own, with sincerity, believe what Clarence Thomas

12. But it is far from clear that they succeed in undermining them. Wightman was reporting on a
study that asked the question whether the African-Americans admitted to law school in 1991
should have been. See generally Wightman, supra at 1-2. The Thernstroms were seemingly
intent on reducing the number of African-Americans at elite law schools. See Thernstrom &
Thernstrom, supra note 275, at 1599, 1626–27 (not flinching at the prospect that black enrollment
at elite schools might drop forty-nine percent if race-neutral academic admissions criteria were
employed; also noting with equanimity, if not outright approval, the “post-Proposition 209”
“redistribution” of African-American students away from the elite Berkeley and UCLA campuses
to the more proletarian Davis, Santa Cruz, Riverside, and Irvine campuses of the University of
California system, not to mention the less prestigious California State University campuses). In
effect they are asking a rather different question: that is whether African-Americans have been
admitted to the “right” law schools.
279. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2362 (Thomas J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
280. See Martin Kilson, The Washington and Du Bois Leadership Paradigms Reconsidered,
568 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 298, 309, 312 (2000). See also Christopher E. Smith,
Clarence Thomas: A Distinctive Justice, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 19 (1997) (arguing “[b]y
formally rejecting the value and utility of social knowledge and asserting that rigid legal
principles can solve all issues, Thomas is not merely blinding himself to the relationship between
law and society, he is also revealing his ignorance of society”).
281. See Kennedy, supra note 33.
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says that he believes.”282 But this point is equally trivial. Clarence Thomas, as
a member of the Court, does more than merely “believe,” sincerely or not. He
also acts, and he does so with a great deal of power and authority in league
with the most reactionary members of the Court, and it is his actions, his
exercise of power, and his alliances that outrage many African-Americans, not
merely his beliefs.
Kennedy saw that micro-narratives could not carry the weight that
Professor Wilson thought that they could. He tried, therefore, to create another
macro-narrative to function either as a correction to or a limitation on the Civil
Rights Macro-Narrative. Kennedy, however, did not seek to use the CounterNarrative. He attempted to link Thomas to “such figures as Booker T.
Washington, Kelly Miller, George Schuyler, Zora Neale Hurston, and Thomas
Sowell.”283 Black conservatives do in fact have “deep roots in Afro-American
history,” as Kennedy argued,284 but the point is trivial. Not only is their
political ideology embraced by only a small number of African-Americans, it
is by no means evident that the thinkers Kennedy identified would agree with
Thomas’s acts, votes, opinions, and alliances on the Court.285
One need not merely speculate on the matter. As Judge Higginbotham
demonstrated in his speech, Colin Powell has made the case for affirmative
action, understood as equal opportunity without preferential treatment.286 On
this point, Colin Powell and Thurgood Marshall stand as one. Justice Marshall
never referred to affirmative action as a “preference.” Instead, he invariably
characterized it as a remedy to correct past racial injustice.287 J. C. Watts, the
reliably conservative former Republican Congressman from Oklahoma,288
began his career in the House of Representatives wanting to “slow down the

282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. In all fairness, however, Zora Neale Hurston might have agreed. She was highly critical
of Brown. See Zora Neale Hurston, Court Order Can’t Make Races Mix, in FOLKLORE,
MEMOIRS, AND OTHER WRITINGS 956–58 (1995).
286. COLIN L. POWELL, MY AMERICAN JOURNEY 608 (1995).
287. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 398 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (describing affirmative action as action to remedy the
effects of past racial discrimination as “race-conscious remedial measures”); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 296 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to a “race-conscious
provision that purports to serve a remedial purpose”); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488
U.S. 469, 529, 552 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to “race-conscious measures
designed to remedy past discrimination” and “governmental actions that seek to remedy the
effects of prior racism or to prevent neutral governmental activity from perpetuating the effects of
such racism”).
288. See
Americans
for
Democratic
Action,
Voting
Records,
at
http://www.adaction.org/HouseVR2002.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2003).
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Republican train” designed to end or derail affirmative action.289 Watts agreed
philosophically with conservative critics of affirmative action, but wanted to
avoid a “war between men and women, black and white.”290 Watts’s views
have remained largely the same over time. Thus, while still opposed to
affirmative action, he continued to oppose its abolition. He joined with the
liberal African-American Democratic Congressman John Lewis of Georgia,
thus echoing the nexus or link between Colin Powell and Thurgood Marshall,
to declare that “[t]his is not the time to eliminate the one tool we have—
imperfect though it may be—to help level the playing field for many minority
youth.”291 Watts “has flatly criticized affirmative action in public forums . . . .
But he also is unsparing in his assessment of GOP leaders, arguing that they
cannot afford to abolish affirmative action without first taking substantive
steps to reach out to blacks.”292 On the other hand, Clarence Thomas has been
unsparing in his criticism of affirmative action and has consistently voted to
strike it down in the cases coming before the Court.293 Given the position of
conservatives like Powell and Watts, it does not follow that Booker T.
Washington, Kelly Miller, George Schuyler, Zora Neale Hurston, and Thomas
Sowell—all African-American conservatives—would agree with Justice
Thomas on the question of affirmative action.294 Most of them died, after all,
before affirmative action emerged. Professor Kennedy’s attempt to link
Clarence Thomas with other African-American conservatives to construct a
competing macro-narrative collapses.
The flaw in Professor Kennedy’s analysis on this point is both large and
deep. One could oppose affirmative action and seek to have Congress
eliminate it—a position more extreme than Congressman Watts’s view—and
still not agree with Justice Thomas’s votes to abolish affirmative action. One
could object to affirmative action on prudential grounds but still uphold it in

289. Kevin Merida, Within GOP, Conflicts on Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, July 29,
1995, at A4.
290. Id.
291. Juliet Eilperin, Watts Walks a Tightrope on Affirmative Action, and the House GOP
Follows, WASH. POST, May 12, 1998, at A17.
292. Id.
293. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). See also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996);
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); and Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
294. Thomas Sowell criticizes affirmative action as much as Clarence Thomas does and
would undoubtedly vote, were he on the Court, the same way that Justice Thomas does. See
THOMAS SOWELL, BLACK EDUCATION: MYTHS AND TRAGEDIES (1972); THOMAS SOWELL,
CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? (1984); THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1990). One cannot say the same about any of the other
previously mentioned African-American conservatives. Indeed, in the case of Booker T.
Washington, he secretly supported civil rights litigation seeking remedies and outcomes that
Clarence Thomas presumably would oppose. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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the face of a judicial challenge raising constitutional objections to affirmative
action.295 One could object to affirmative action on philosophical grounds but
still uphold it in the face of judicial challenges on the ground that the
Constitution gives Congress the right to be wrong on affirmative action, and
thus the courts should not interfere with Congressional decision-making
regarding affirmative action because the separation of powers gives Congress
the right to find the social facts on which affirmative action arguably rests.296
Principled conservatives, African-American or otherwise, could take either or
both of these positions.297
Professor Kennedy then argued that the racial disloyalty claim fuels “the
suspicion that a successful black person obtained his or her success necessarily
through opportunism or the indulgence of white folks or by serving as a front
for white puppeteers who call the shots.”298 Part VI of this article will
demonstrate that Professor Kennedy overreached. Black people are able to
distinguish between those members of the race who succeeded by selling out
the race and those who did not, as the world of Uncle Tom’s Cabin illustrates.

295. See Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 1, 3 (2002) (opposing affirmative action on claimed prudential grounds while
granting that Congress could constitutionally adopt affirmative actions programs, at least in some
circumstances).
296. Cf. Girardeau A. Spann, The Constitution Under Clinton: A Critical Assessment: Writing
Off Race, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 467, 475 (2000) (urging President Clinton to challenge
the Court’s anti-affirmative action decisions through a policy of political action, nonacquiescence, and retaliatory legislation designed to “strip the Court of appellate jurisdiction to
invalidate affirmative action programs adopted by the political branches”). But see Neal Devins,
Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1169, 1170, 1200–05 (2001) (challenging, inter alia, on the basis of the author’s opposition to
affirmative action, the traditionalist model regarding Congressional fact finding, arguing that
Congress never found the social facts on which affirmative action could rest). Professor Spann’s
desire to see President Clinton box in the Court, while commendable, presupposes that an abiding
and stable pro-affirmative action political majority exists or that a President determined to create
such a majority will successfully do so. Professor Devins fails to justify adequately his
opposition to affirmative action. He makes large unsubstantiated claims about the supposed costs
of affirmative action borne by “nonminorities,” and, more importantly, he seeks to rationalize
judicial hegemony. See id. at 1200–05. After Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), one might
reasonably ask whether such hegemony serves any purpose, other than the perpetuation of rightwing Republicanism.
297. For a slightly different perspective, see Robert F. Nagel, Affirmative Action: Diversity of
Opinions: Utilitarianism Left and Right: A Response to Professor Armour, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
1201, 1207 (1997) (arguing that “affirmative action policies should be decided as far as possible
at the local level,” and “because courts do not easily reverse direction, it means such policies
should not be decided by the courts” for “[i]t makes no difference to this analysis whether a
liberal judge is striking down the California Civil Rights Initiative or a conservative judge is
striking down the Texas Law School’s admissions program” because “[i]n either case, judges are
writing on constitutional stone when they quite literally do not know what they are doing”).
298. See Kennedy, supra note 33.
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He also insisted that the racial disloyalty critique runs the risk of a boomerang,
driving the targets into precisely the beliefs and actions complained of.299 But
whatever the merits of the claim might be, it does not apply to Clarence
Thomas. His “reflexive conservatism”300 was on display both before and after
his nomination and confirmation.301 Professor Kennedy failed to show that,
somehow, attacks leveled on Clarence Thomas in the 1980s produced any
supposed “boomerang.”
Finally, Professor Kennedy expressed his admiration for the courage of
Justice Thomas in confronting his African-American critics at the 1998 annual
meeting of the National Bar Association.302 Kennedy reminded us that
Thomas declared on that occasion that “I am . . . a black man” with the “right
to think for myself,” refusing “to have my ideas assigned to me as though I
was an intellectual slave because I’m black.”303 At least the Justice joined the
issue. The moral claim of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative does not make
“intellectual slaves.” Like Thomas’s assertion that the Senate hearings
addressing the charges filed by Professor Anita Hill amounted to a “high-tech
lynching,”304 the rhetorical flourish and flair of a supposed “intellectual
slavery” is flashy, but it misleads. Just as the only lynching that took place
during the confirmation hearings happened to Professor Hill, so too the only
slavery at issue here is the condition of the black inmate who was beaten by
prison guards, or of the innumerable qualified African-American prospective
students, employees and contractors, vendors and suppliers, and political
leaders who will find their life choices diminished by the views of a narrow
reactionary majority on the Court that is bent on turning the racial progress
clock back—a majority in which Thomas is a member in good standing.
Justice Thomas might have had a passable argument if his jurisprudence was
functionalist, that is, a theory of law that placed maximum emphasis on the
myriad of facts and narratives that are the sum and substance of a law case. He
might have had a passable argument if he could have demonstrated that he has
engaged in precisely the complex balancing and weighing process called for by
Professor Kennedy, and having done so, concluded that the approach of the
most reactionary whites would nonetheless benefit African-Americans in their

299. Id.
300. See DAVID BROCK, BLINDED BY THE RIGHT: THE CONSCIENCE OF AN EXCONSERVATIVE 88 (2002).
301. See supra Part IIB.
302. See Kennedy, supra note 33, at 91. On this point, Judge Higginbotham was simply
wrong. Justice Thomas perhaps would never attend an NAACP meeting. However, he did attend
a meeting of the premiere organization of African-American lawyers, a group which, given the
importance of African-American lawyers, has as much of a claim on the Civil Rights MacroNarrative as does the NAACP.
303. Id.
304. See infra note 332 and accompanying text.
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quest for equal justice. But of course Justice Thomas has no credible argument
on this score, and neither does Professor Kennedy.
F.

The Tribute by the Law Clerk (now Himself a Law Professor)

Unlike Professors Wilson and Kennedy, Stephen F. Smith enthusiastically
embraced and embellished the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative.305 He took
the fight to Judge Higginbotham with fury and gusto.306 He pointed out that
“some in the civil rights community had hoped [that Judge Higginbotham]
would succeed the late Justice Thurgood Marshall,”307 a hard, but fair
comment. Smith wrote:
[T]he relentless assaults on the Justice are part and parcel of a larger struggle
for the hearts and minds of black America, a veritable last gasp of those who
have traditionally viewed themselves as leaders of the black community to
maintain their hold on power and of the liberal Democrats to maintain control
over their core constituency.308

Smith accused Judge Higginbotham of unleashing in the speech “a bitter and
intensely personal attack on the Justice,”309 and a savage attack on “the
Justice’s status as a black man.”310 Thomas, by contrast “personifies the rise of
black conservatism in America.”311 Furthermore, [Thomas] should be a source
of great pride to black Americans and also a source of hope that the failed
policies of the past will be replaced by a future in which black Americans,
freed from the restraints of victimology and poverty, will be able to realize
their full potential in America.312 Smith had made his political agenda quite
clear.
But he did engage Judge Higginbotham on the question of macronarratives, burnishing, as noted above,313 the Color-Blindness MacroNarrative. He also invested it with a supposed moral force, stating that “it was
the legal and moral principle of colorblindness that freed blacks from the
shackles of slavery and lifted the dark veil of segregation.”314 But this is a silly
argument, given the fact that the very black people who struggled to free and
lift people like Thurgood Marshall, never elevated colorblindness to the level
of first principle.315
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

See supra notes 91-132 and accompanying text.
See Smith, supra note 33.
Id. at 513.
Id.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 529.
See Smith, supra note 33, at 513.
Id. at 514.
See supra notes 91-132 and accompanying text.
See Smith, supra note 33, at 532.
See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
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Smith made common cause with Professor Kennedy in arguing that some
of Thomas’s most controversial opinions either did not in fact harm black
interests, or in fact furthered those interests.316 In so doing, Smith
unsuccessfully sought to locate the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative in the
African-American community.
With regard to Hudson v. McMillian,317 Smith insisted that the record of
the case does not establish that the prisoner who was beaten was black.318
However, because a disproportionate percentage of prisoners in America are
African-Americans, Smith’s point falls to the ground. With respect to the
voting rights cases, Smith made the argument that there have been only
“isolated instances of racially polarized voting in recent years,”319 surely a
debatable proposition.320 Indeed the 2000 presidential election stands as a
monument to persistent racially-polarized voting.321 On the matter of
affirmative action, Smith made the stock conservative argument that
affirmative action is bad because it stigmatizes the supposed beneficiaries of
the program.322 This is a particularly egregious argument for Smith to offer up
because Smith claimed that “[p]sychological injury or benefit is irrelevant”323
in the context of Brown v. Board of Education,324 but, mirabile dictu, becomes
relevant in analyzing the impact of affirmative action. Finally, in connection
with school desegregation, Smith argued that coerced busing “has arguably
hurt black students in their formative years by taking them out of the very
schools that ‘can function as the center and symbol of black communities, and
provide examples of independent black leadership, success, and
achievement.’”325 Leaving aside Smith’s and Thomas’s disingenuous appeals
to psychology here, this argument fares no better because black people were
316. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
317. 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
318. See Smith, supra note 33, at 540.
319. Id. at 541.
320. See Jamin B. Raskin, Burton D. Wechsler, Scholar of Struggle, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 9, 9
(2002) (referring to “votes in racially polarized Florida”); Equal Protection After the Rational
Basis Era: Is it Time to Reassess the Current Standards of Review? Judicial Supremacy and
Equal Protection in a Democracy of Rights, 4. U. PA. J. CONST. L. 281, 306 (2002) (noting that
“[t]he politics of the contemporary South continue to be saturated by . . . racially polarized bloc
voting”). But see Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science
and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1524, 1530 (2002) (stating that “[r]acially
polarized voting . . . was a pervasive fact of political life” in the 1980s, but calling into question
the extent of it today, suggesting that a substantial minority of whites, roughly one-third, will
support black candidates).
321. See supra notes 24, 124 and accompanying text.
322. See Smith, supra note 33, at 545–46.
323. Id. at 544.
324. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
325. See Smith, supra note 33, at 546 (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 121 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)).
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not in charge of the school system at issue in any meaningful sense of the
word. The role of the State of Missouri in Missouri v. Jenkins326 in presiding
over a racially biased school system, not that of black people, constituted the
central issue in that protracted litigation. One need only ask whether AfricanAmericans in fact control urban school systems, have access to adequate
financial resources, and are free to choose the teachers and to design programs
and policies that take the circumstances of urban black students into
account.327 So much for “independent black leadership, success, and
achievement.”
G. Some Concluding Thoughts
Judge Higginbotham and Smith represent the extremes in the encounter
discussed previously. Each one sought to have his preferred macro-narrative
control the discourse. Few macro-narratives could be as diametrically opposed
as the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative and the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative,
hence the debate became, for want of a better word, intense. This left some
room for Professors Wilson and Kennedy to maneuver. Each sought to limit
the reach of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative without embracing the CounterNarrative. They sought to take a more moderate position than had Judge
Higginbotham. They also sought to minimize, or downplay, Thomas’s
alienation from black people. Their strategies failed largely because their
limiting principles do not hold up under close scrutiny.
The central problem concerns the relation between black conservatism, a
subject that Part IV of this article addresses, and alienation from black people.
Judge Higginbotham sought to define black conservatism with reference to the
relative moderation of Colin Powell on the question of affirmative action. He
sought to place Powell squarely in the civil rights tradition as it now exists, to
place him in the Narrative. Smith sought to place black conservatism in a
different macro-narrative, one radically opposed to the macro-narratives of the
civil rights community. While he sought to place the Counter-Narrative in the
African-American political and philosophical traditions, he, like Thomas
himself, could not come to grips with its contextualism and could not show
that identifiable black conservatives in African-American history would agree
326. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
327. See Pamela J. Smith, Looking Beyond Traditional Educational Paradigms: When Old
Victims Become New Victimizers, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 101, 119–24 (1999) (arguing that today
black children are taught primarily by white female teachers, even in predominantly black urban
schools, and that “it appears that white women, as teachers, are using their power and authority to
solidify age-old racial hierarchies,” particularly to the detriment of black male students). See also
Alicia L. Mioli, Sheff v. O’Neill: The Consequence of Educational Table-Scraps for Poor Urban
Minority Schools, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1903, 1930–41 (2000) (challenging the notion that
black people control the schools that their children attend or that urban schools provide a quality
education for black children).
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with Thomas’s votes. Smith also sought to draft the civil rights community
itself into the service of the Counter-Narrative, the mirror image, one supposes,
of Judge Higginbotham’s attempt to draft Colin Powell into the service of the
Civil Rights Macro-Narrative. At least with respect to affirmative action,
however, Higginbotham’s draft succeeded and Smith’s failed. Powell has
made it clear that he supports at least one vision, or version, of affirmative
action, a view that Marshall embraced.328 Smith could not explain how
Thurgood Marshall could make the arguments he did in Brown v. Board of
Education,329 and yet vote the way that he did in the affirmative action cases.
Indeed, Smith did not even try.
Wilson and Kennedy also sought to place black conservatism in the
African-American community but did so in ways that might leave black
conservatism more firmly connected to the views of others in the community,
to make it part of the family, so to speak, and thus less the domain of the
alienated. They eschewed the attempt to turn Thurgood Marshall into a
onetime apostle of colorblindness. But they sought to add Thomas into the
company of black conservatism as they had constructed it. Wilson argued for
the autonomy of the “head” even as the “heart” was dominated by the
Narrative. Her approach defines conservatism as a “head” matter, a difficult
proposition to defend in the abstract, and maybe not even in more concrete,
historical terms. Kennedy sought to tie, or link, Thomas to a number of
historical personages who populate the small world of black conservatism, but
his efforts failed because he could not show, as Smith could not, that the black
conservatives to whom he referred would have agreed with Thomas’s votes on
the Court. Black conservatism, obviously, is problematic for a variety of
reasons. This article takes them up in Part IV.
Law professors—both the full-time and the part-time variety—have shaped
the foregoing discourse. Of some interest, law professors continue to protest
and to struggle against Clarence Thomas and his works. For example,
Clarence Thomas had been invited to spend a day with students and faculty at
the University of North Carolina School of Law at Chapel Hill.330 However,
the African-American faculty of the school boycotted the appearance. In a
statement dated February 28, 2002, they reaffirmed the salience of race in
American life, and thus disavowed the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative.331
They pointed out that Thomas appealed to race when he “declared himself the
victim of a ‘high-tech lynching’ during the heated opposition to his

328. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
329. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
330. Tony Mauro, Clarence Thomas’ Law School Visit Brings Professors’ Boycott, MIAMI
DAILY BUS. REV., Mar. 19, 2002, at A7.
331. Statement by the African-American Faculty of the UNC School of Law Regarding the
Visit of Justice Clarence Thomas (Feb. 28, 2002).
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appointment to the Supreme Court.”332 They argued that the problem with
Thomas is not merely his beliefs, but his votes, votes “inevitably linked to
those of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justices Scalia, O’Connor, and
Kennedy. . . . [H]e has provided the critical fifth vote in a number of decisions
that set back the quest for racial equality and social justice in this country.”333
They declared that “we know that society is now more closed, more hateful,
less democratic, and less just than it could be if only Justice Thomas’s deciding
fifth vote were cast, even some of the time, with the four justices who
generally dissent from his majority colleagues.”334 They concluded by stating
that they would “not participate in any institutional gesture that honors and
endorses what Justice Thomas does. We cannot delight in such a day.
Therefore, while away from the day’s events that will honor Justice Thomas,
we will re-read Judge Higginbotham’s letter . . . .”335
Alienation is surely abroad in the land, as the spectacle of such a boycott
clearly demonstrates. One cannot seriously argue that Charles E. Daye,
Marilyn V. Yarbrough, John O. Calmore, Adrienne D. Davis, and Kevin V.
Haynes are alienated from the African-American community. But one could
say, as “the UNC Five” suggest, and as I suspect, the vast majority of AfricanAmerican law professors might say, that it is Clarence Thomas who stands
apart from that community.336
IV. AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES: MICHAEL G. DAWSON’S
BLACK VISIONS
Professor Dawson has written the definitive work on the nature, character,
and substantive content of African-American political ideologies.337 His major
conclusion is that “six distinct political ideologies . . . have evolved as a result
of the continued ideological conflict which has been a constant feature of black
politics since at least the early nineteenth century.”338 But these ideologies
grew out of “an African-American world view in which the moral, spiritual,
and material development of the community is at least as important as the
development of the individual.”339 And “[a] communal approach to politics
continues to influence African-American political life.”340 But “[n]either the
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. (referring to Open Letter, supra note 27).
336. For a thoughtful treatment of the boycott, and an analysis of Clarence Thomas that
shares many themes with this paper, see Calmore, supra note 3.
337. See DAWSON, supra note 98.
338. Id. at 10.
339. Id. at 11.
340. Id. See also WILSON JEREMIAH MOSES, BLACK MESSIAHS AND UNCLE TOMS: SOCIAL
AND LITERARY MANIPULATIONS OF A RELIGIOUS MYTH, at vii (rev. ed. 1993) (stating that “[o]ne
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communal nature of black politics nor the strong sense of the majority of
blacks that their fate is linked to that of the race prevent political conflict from
raging within black communities.”341 Dawson identifies six ideological
groupings: “the radical egalitarian, disillusioned liberal, black Marxist, black
nationalist, black feminist, and black conservative342 ideologies.”343 Radical
egalitarianism, one of three strands of black liberalism,344 calls for:
[A] strong central state which promotes equality combined with respect for
individual liberty and self-reliance. Capitalism is criticized but considered
reformable. Racism is seen as a vile ideology that will disappear after
vigorous debate and social action demonstrate the untruthfulness and moral
bankruptcy of its basic principles and assumptions. Alliances with all other
people of good will, including white Americans, are considered vital to the
quest for racial justice and achievable through a variety of mechanisms,
including scientific explanation and moral suasion. The use of violence,
except in self-defense, is rejected.345

Radical egalitarianism demands “equality,” not “liberty,” as the central goal or
objective, of its activism and protest.346 Notwithstanding its assimilationist
ethic, radical egalitarianism recognizes the need for black autonomy and that
black institutions are “necessary for self-development.”347
Disillusioned liberalism, the second strand of black liberalism, constitutes
an unstable348 political ideology, a temporary refuge for formerly optimistic
radical egalitarians who have since lost hope in the ability of white America to
accept or move towards racial justice and equality.349 Notable examples of
African-Americans who moved from radical egalitarianism to disillusioned
liberalism include Ralph Bunche, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Student
The doctrinal or
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee activists.350
of the more convincing arguments that black Americans are not a mere amorphous group bound
together solely by negative racial experiences is that we have been able to sustain a myth of our
history and destiny”). Moses uses the term “myth” to mean or refer to a form of macro-narrative
that this author has called “ideology.” See Newsom, supra note 26.
341. DAWSON, supra note 98, at 11.
342. One commentator suggests that black conservatism is more of a mood or an impulse that
finds expression “within the diversity of opinion that has always been characteristic of AfricanAmerican thought” rather than a separate ideology. Eisenstadt, supra note 103, at x.
343. DAWSON, supra note 98, at 14–15.
344. Black liberalism differs markedly from white liberalism, and is highly critical of it. See
id. at 29–42 (discussing African-American criticism of hegemonic individualism in favor of a
communitarian perspective, the institution of private property in favor of a redistributionist ethic,
and the minimalist, laissez-faire state in favor of a strong central state).
345. Id. at 17.
346. Id. at 267.
347. Id. at 273.
348. DAWSON, supra note 98, at 279.
349. Id. at 275.
350. Id. at 275–78.
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programmatic difference between radical egalitarianism and disillusioned
liberalism lies primarily in the focus or emphasis of the latter “on building the
political and economic power of the black community as part of the strategy
for gaining equality and admission into American society.”351 The former,
consistent with its optimism, places great weight on building alliances with
non-African-Americans.352
Black Marxism, an anti-liberal ideology, has in recent years “moved to the
right toward a more social democratic orientation.”353 It is a radical ideology
that, like other forms of Marxism, emphasizes “the central role of the capitalist
system.”354 But “black Marxism also emphasizes race as a fundamental
[analytical] category and spirituality to a degree not found in traditional EuroAmerican Marxism.”355 Whatever importance this ideology might have had in
the past, it is no longer “a mass force.”356
Black conservatism, the last of the three strands of black liberalism, has
“remarkably little mass support.”357 There is some evidence of support on
social issues,358 but not on racial or economic issues. Black conservatives are
staunch advocates of libertarian capitalism,359 denigrate the older generation of
black leadership,360 and seek to replace it with conservative moral
leadership.361 On the matter of race, black conservatives stress the theme of
black uplift, or self-improvement, but do not link it to white racism as other
African-American political ideologies do. Thus, “[t]he problem, argues
[Glenn] Loury, is not the racist attitudes of whites, for ‘blacks’ problems lie
not in the heads of white people but rather in the wasted and incompletely
fulfilled lives of too many black people.”362 In a similar vein, they tend to
downplay the legacy of racism, arguing that blacks should stop acting like
victims.363 African-American conservatives rail against the evil state,
preferring self-reliance and taking advantage of the market.364 They rebel
against black communitarian norms of authenticity,365 and following their

351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 17.
DAWSON, supra note 98, at 221.
Id. at 18.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 236.
Id. at 281.
DAWSON, supra note 98, at 281.
Id. at 281–82.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 296–98.
Id. at 287.
DAWSON, supra note 98, at 289–93.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 294–96.
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views regarding racial uplift and legacy, argue that blacks should conform to
white opinions and sensibilities.366
Black feminism focuses on “the intersection of gender with race and class”
as the normative analytical construct for understanding the situation of
African-American women.367 Black feminists “see themselves as struggling
against both patriarchy and white supremacy. . . . [They] are especially critical
of ideologies which include as core elements claims about the ‘natural’
leadership role of black men and contain essentialized views of gender
roles.”368
Black nationalism emphasizes “African-American autonomy and various
degrees of cultural, social, economic, and political separation from white
America. Race is seen as the fundamental category for analyzing society, and
America is seen as fundamentally racist.”369 Community nationalism, now the
most prevalent form of black nationalism, stresses both equality and
“nation.”370 However, it “is not attached to integrationism, and rejects
Community nationalism emphasizes black economic
assimilation.”371
development, but does not altogether dismiss black politics.372 It supports
“affirmative action and antidiscrimination programs.”373 It limits, however,
the leading roles to men, never defining the role of African-American
women.374
The six ideologies overlap in complex ways. Dawson mapped the linkages
between them, showing that radical egalitarianism, the oldest of the six,
maintains strong ties with disillusioned liberalism and black social democracy
(the successor to black Marxism), a moderate tie with black feminism, a weak
tie with community nationalism, and no tie at all with black conservatism.
Disillusioned liberalism has a strong connection with community nationalism
and a moderate linkage with black social democracy. It has no connections
with black feminism or with black conservatism. Black social democracy has
a moderate tie with black feminism and a weak one with community
nationalism. It maintains no linkages with black conservatism. Black
conservatism has a moderate tie with community nationalism. It has no
connections with black feminism. Black feminism maintains a weak tie with
community nationalism. Community nationalism has ties of varying strength
or degree with all of the other African-American political ideologies. Radical
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Id. at 299.
Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).
DAWSON, supra note 98, at 21.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 120.
DAWSON, supra note 98, at 122.
Id. at 121.
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egalitarianism, disillusioned liberalism, black social democracy, and black
feminism have linkage of varying cohesion with the other African-American
ideologies save black conservatism. Black conservatism, the most isolated of
the six, has only a moderate linkage with community nationalism. By contrast,
community nationalism is the least isolated, having linkages of varying
strength with the other five black ideologies. Radical egalitarianism and black
social democracy have ties of varying strength with all other ideological
groups save black conservatism, and black feminism and disillusioned
liberalism have connections with three of the black political ideologies, but do
not have ties with each other or with black conservatism.375
At the level of community support, Dawson reports that disillusioned
liberalism and black nationalism, followed by black Marxism, have the
greatest number of true believers. Black conservatism has the least. On the
other hand, black conservatism has far and away the largest number of “true
haters.”376 These results largely mirror the degree to which a particular
ideology has links, or ties, to other black political ideologies. Black
conservatism has the fewest links and the lowest level of black popular
support.377
It is now possible to evaluate the encounter between Judge Higginbotham
and his three critics as a political discourse. The Civil Rights Macro-Narrative
clearly falls within the parameters of radical egalitarianism, as Parts II and III
of this article hinted. The Narrative emphasizes struggle and protest, as does
the activism of radical egalitarians. Judge Higginbotham flayed Thomas for
having a pinched and narrow conception of equality, for forgetting where he
came from, and for hurting black interests.378 Radical egalitarianism has fallen
on hard times, however. “The ‘victory’ of radical egalitarians in public
opinion polls, while substantial, misrepresents their ability to shape the
contours of black politics. . . . Liberalism has become a weak force in shaping
the politics of the black community, even though a large percentage of blacks
support the radical egalitarian program.”379 Nonetheless, the struggle for civil
rights matters for black people. It is noteworthy that community nationalism,
perhaps now the dominant African-American political ideology, supports
affirmative action and other antidiscrimination programs.380
By contrast, the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative expresses the core
principles and tenets of black conservatism. However, black conservatism has
subdivided into two groups, one that has criticized white conservatives for

375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

Id. at 317 fig. 7.1.
Id. at 83 tbl. 2.8.
Id. at 281 (stating that black conservatives “have remarkably little mass support”).
See generally Open Letter, supra note 27.
DAWSON, supra note 98, at 309.
See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
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taking a “harsh, antiblack turn,” and one that remains “staunchly libertarian,”
with nary a complaint about white conservatives.381 Of this second group,
Dawson writes: “Of the latter we can reasonably ask if there is anything
distinguishably ‘black’ about their conservatism.”382 Given its extravagant
praise of Jefferson, Lincoln, and the first Justice Harlan, the Counter-Narrative
more properly reflects the second subgroup, not the first. One can only
imagine how few African-Americans support the political ideology that gives
meaning and shape to the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative.383
Thus, Higginbotham has the numbers on his side. He also has the weight
of history and tradition with him. Whatever the present difficulties besetting
radical egalitarianism might be, it sits at or near the middle of black
experience. It is outflanked, to one degree or another, by disillusioned
liberalism, black social democracy, and some forms of black nationalism,
black feminism, and, of course, it is outflanked on the right by AfricanAmerican conservatism. Thus, Judge Higginbotham also has the philosophical
core, or center, of black thought on his side.384
Dawson provides critical insight into the constituent elements of that core,
or center. As noted above, for blacks, the community counts as much as the
individual.385 Thus, “[g]roup-based racial politics have developed historically
to such a degree that many African Americans’ political preferences are shaped
by the belief that their individual life chances are linked to the fate of the
race.”386 The core, or center, also holds no brief for American democracy;
“with the exception of black conservatism, all black ideologies contest the
view that democracy in America, while flawed, is fundamentally good.”387
The larger principle that generates the foregoing views is that unlike white
American political ideologies, black ideologies “all claim to have been
developed out of the historical experiences of African Americans.”388 The
point cannot be overemphasized, black political ideologies do not rest in
381. See DAWSON, supra note 98, at 312.
382. Id.
383. The subdivision of black conservatism into two camps reflects one view. Others
subdivide it into three subgroups: antistatists, organics, and neoconservatives. Clarence Thomas
falls into the last category. See Gayle T. Tate & Lewis A. Randolph, Introduction to
DIMENSIONS OF BLACK CONSERVATISM IN THE UNITED STATES: MADE IN AMERICA 1, 2–4
(Gayle T. Tate & Lewis A. Randolph eds., 2002). The common thread in the two taxonomies of
black conservatism is that Clarence Thomas falls into the most radical of the subdivisions, be they
two or three.
384. It is important to note that Judge Higginbotham transcended the tendency of most black
political ideologies to downplay or denigrate the role of women. In his summoning of the heroes
of the struggle, he called out several women. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 339-40 and accompanying text.
386. DAWSON, supra note 98, at 11.
387. Id. at 14.
388. Id. at 22.
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sterile, formalistic abstractions but rather in concrete experience. They link
“theory and practice.”389 Thus, “[c]oncepts such as equality, freedom, selfdetermination, integration, and nationalism have all developed as part of
attempts by various segments of the African-American community to propose
strategies for the advancement of black racial interests.”390 Black political
ideologies, save black conservatism, often parallel or reinforce each other, each
giving a different emphasis to or stress on particular elements of their macronarratives, and thus they have the complex interrelationships discussed
previously.391
The fundamental weaknesses of the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative now
appear in stunning fashion. It is a macro-narrative that rests on sterile,
formalistic abstractions having nothing whatsoever to do with the historical
experience of African-Americans. It fails to link theory and practice if only
because it reduces African-Americans to mere spectators of a white drama that
portrays the struggles of white Americans to decide whether their grandiose
and lofty ideas should in any meaningful way guide their behavior with regard
to blacks. While the Counter-Narrative may be a “black” macro-narrative, it
fails miserably to show that its origins lie in the experience of the black
community. It is “black” only because black people—and only a very small
number or percentage, at that—hold to it. But that marks the extent, or outer
limit, of the claim. It forfeits the core, or center, of black political thought, and
there are virtually no African-American institutions that adopt, or embrace,
Thomas’s radical conservatism. It may represent, therefore, nothing more than
the cry of an alienated minority of African-Americans, a minority that, at some
level, simply cannot—or will not—connect with the core, or center, of black
political thought.392
Professors Wilson and Kennedy and Thomas’s former law clerk Smith
overcome neither the numbers nor the force of gravity. Professor Wilson
asked us to let Justice Thomas decide for himself what he would make of his
tenure on the Court.393 None of the black political ideologies, save for black
389. Id.
390. Id. at 23.
391. See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
392. Tate & Randolph make the point vividly, arguing that neoconservatives like Thomas
“are not recognized as a part of the long legacy of conservative thought among blacks, but rather
as a separate entity that has been ‘grafted on’ to black political and social thought.” Tate &
Randolph, supra note 383, at 5. They go even further, declaring that while black
neoconservatives preach “‘self-reliance,’ . . . in reality, their heavy financial dependence on
conservative funding for jobs, media exposure, research monies, publications, and other ‘self-help
initiatives’ points to what Hanes Walton, Jr., Robert Smith, and Deborah Toler view as ‘patronclient’ politics, namely, being bought and paid for by the Republican Party.” Id. See also
Edward Ashbee, The Republican Party and the African-American Vote Since 1964, in BLACK
CONSERVATISM, supra note 103, at 252.
393. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2004]

CLARENCE THOMAS, VICTIM? PERHAPS, AND VICTIMIZER? YES

387

conservatism, would agree that his decision was entirely his affair. Thus
Dawson writes, “[p]erhaps the most obvious example of a nonliberal (some
would say antiliberal) political tradition within black politics has been the
consistent demand that individual African Americans take political stands that
are perceived by the community as not harming the black community.”394
Professor Wilson finds herself, therefore, apart from the center, or core, of
black political thought.
Professor Kennedy tries to make more out of the tradition of black
conservatism than the facts would appear to warrant.395 He cannot move it into
the core, or center, of black political thought because black people, past and
present, and probably future as well, simply will not let him do so. The
reaction of the former law clerk, now law professor, to Judge Higginbotham’s
relentless pummeling of Thomas does nothing more than map the sub-strand of
black conservatism about which Dawson was moved to inquire whether there
was “anything distinguishably ‘black.’”396
The political isolation of black conservatives gives one pause. However,
every society or culture has its rebels, its misfits, its nonconformists.397 Judge
Higginbotham accused Justice Thomas of “racial self-hatred.”398 The location
of black conservatism in African-American political thought suggests that at
the very least, some black conservatives might find themselves, for whatever
reason, alienated from the mainstream of black thought, and perhaps even from
the community itself. The subdivision in black conservative thought that
Dawson describes399 might reflect a difference in degree or extent of such
alienation, with the second group, the one to which Thomas apparently
belongs, being more removed from the mainstream than the former, less
libertarian strand of black conservatism.
Racial self-hatred, of course, can be a reason for alienation. But alienation,
rebellion, and nonconformity might have their origins elsewhere in the human
character, personality, and psyche. Judge Higginbotham may have been
correct in his assessment of the source of Justice Thomas’s nonconformity.
Certainly Thomas’s defenders fail utterly to show that Higginbotham was
wrong. However, it suffices merely to show the fact of alienation, rebellion,
and nonconformity. The intellectual dishonesty of the Counter-Narrative and
the isolation of Thomas’s radical libertarian black conservatism make the case.
394.
395.
396.
397.

DAWSON, supra note 98, at 31 (emphasis in original).
See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
See supra note 382 and accompanying text.
See J.C.H. AVELING, THE HANDLE AND THE AXE: THE CATHOLIC RECUSANTS IN
ENGLAND FROM REFORMATION TO EMANCIPATION 21 (1976) (arguing that Roman Catholicism,
whatever its merits might be as a religion, became “a haven for the nonconformist conscience” in
Elizabethan England).
398. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 381-83 and accompanying text.
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The question remains, however, whether misfits can become heroes and not
merely pariahs, and, if so, to whom. More specifically, the question at hand is
whether Clarence Thomas is or can be a hero to African-Americans. It is to
this issue that this article now turns in the next two Parts.
V. CLARENCE THOMAS IN HIS OWN WORDS: A FURTHER EXPLORATION OF
NONCONFORMITY, IDEOLOGY, AND MYTH
We first encountered Justice Thomas’s voice as he gave expression to the
Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative. It was an impersonal voice, offering up no
explicit linkages, or connections, to his personal micro-narrative. It was also a
voice uttered before he became a member of the Court. In the years since
Thomas has been on the Court, he has spoken his story. He relates his
narrative differently, however, depending on the race of the audience.
A.

Speaking to African-Americans

Justice Thomas delivered his most famous speech at the annual meeting of
the National Bar Association (“NBA”) in the summer of 1998. The invitation
to address the NBA generated much controversy, reflecting the negative
feelings that many African-American lawyers have towards Thomas.400 That
said, Thomas took the occasion to lay down the gauntlet to his detractors; he
was going to think for himself, even if his ideas were not “assigned” to him.401
He was a member of the Court and it was time to move on, for being angry
with him did not solve any problems.402 He sounded what appeared to be a
conciliatory note when he said that, because “the problem of race has defied
simple solutions and that not one of us, not a single one of us can lay claim to
the solution,”403 it was time for African-Americans to respect themselves and
each other and “to continue diligently to search for lasting solutions” to the
problems that confront black people.404 The problem with this proposition is
that nothing in the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative admits the possibility of
experimentation, of trial and error, or of compromise.405 Indeed one
commentator has flatly stated that Thomas is unable “to open his heart, to
400. See Calmore, supra note 3, at 177–78 (describing the palpable tension at the 1998 annual
meeting of the National Bar Association and the mixed reaction to Clarence Thomas’s speech
made before the Association); Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for
Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8 n.25 (2000) (noting that “[m]any NBA members had
protested the fact that Justice Thomas had been invited to speak”).
401. Clarence Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American: Searching for Real Solutions
to Racial Hatred, in 64 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 708, Sept. 15, 1998, at 709 [hereinafter
Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American].
402. Id. at 712.
403. Id. (emphasis added).
404. Id.
405. See supra notes 238-80 and accompanying text.
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listen to evidence.”406 The only “search” that Thomas could recognize,
therefore, would be one leading to the discovery that his macro-narrative and
the jurisprudential ideas that it comprehends are the only correct ones.
The speech is suffused with this arrogant cockiness. Regarding the work
of the Court, Thomas stated that some of the criticism “is profoundly
uninformed and unhelpful. And all too often, uncivil second-guessing is not
encumbered by the constraints of facts, logic or reasoned analysis.”407 He
granted the possibility of “thoughtful analytical criticism,”408 but said that the
nature of the Court’s work “plac[es] a premium on outside scholarship”409 and
not on personalized, uncivil attacks on the Court or its members that amount to
little more than “unilateral pronouncements and glib but quotable cliches
[sic].”410 In other words, his critics should quit carping unless they are
prepared to engage in outside scholarship that passes Thomas’s muster.
On the sensitive question of racial identity, Thomas fired back at his
detractors. He said:
I knew who I was [in the early 1970s] and needed no gimmicks to affirm my
identity. Nor, might I add, do I need anyone telling me who I am today. This
is especially true of the psycho-silliness about forgetting my roots or selfhatred. If anything, this shows that some people have too much time on their
hands.411

He made the point a second time: “Despite some of the nonsense that has been
said about me by those who should know better, and so much nonsense, or
some of which subtracts from the sum total of human knowledge, despite this
all, I am a man, a black man, an American.”412 And yet again, “what hurts
more, much more is the amount of time and attention spent on manufactured
controversies and media sideshows when so many problems cry out for
constructive attention.”413
Side by side with the cockiness of a man who knows that he has a lifetime
appointment to the Court and can say and think whatever he wants and vote
however he wants, Thomas also displayed a remarkable sense of self-pity. He
declared that the controversy surrounding his invitation to speak before the
NBA was both customary and wearisome, although Thomas quickly rejoined
that the controversy, although unfortunate, “added little value in the calculus of

406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.

Wells, supra note 1, at 146 (footnote omitted).
Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an America, supra note 401, at 709.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 711.
Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American, supra note 401, at 711.
Id. at 712.
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my decision to be here.”414 In commenting on criticism of the Court, Thomas
stated:
I, for one, have been singled out for particularly bilious and venomous
assaults. These criticisms, as near as I can tell, and I admit that it is rare that I
take notice of this calumny, have little to do with any particular opinion,
though each opinion does provide one more occasion to criticize. Rather, the
principal problem seems to be a deeper antecedent offense. I have no right to
think the way I do because I’m black.415

Thomas tried to defend his dissenting opinion in Hudson v. McMillian,416
relying largely on a disingenuous argument that the injuries sustained by the
prisoner in that case were not “significant.”417 The self-pity reemerged. “It
should be obvious that the criticism of this opinion serves not to present
counter-arguments, but to discredit and attack me because I’ve deviated from
the prescribed path.”418 Thomas recounted how, in his earlier days, he had
been highly critical of two black conservatives. He continued that “[i]n a twist
of fate, they are both dear friends today, and the youthful wrath I visited upon
them is now being visited upon me, though without the youth.”419 Thomas
stated that he understood “the comforts and security of racial solidarity,
defensive or otherwise. Only those who have not been set upon by hatred and
repelled by rejection fail to understand its attraction. As I have suggested, I
have been there.”420 Finally, he declared that it pained him “deeply, or more
deeply than any of you can imagine to be perceived by so many members of
my race as doing them harm.”421
Thomas sought to justify this admixture of arrogance and self-pity by an
appeal to race and a rejection of racial consciousness or solidarity at the same
time. However, he failed in the attempt. Thomas’s appeal to race centered on
the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. He argued that his death “was
the final straw in the struggle to retain my vocation to become a Catholic
priest. Suddenly, this cataclysmic event ripped me from the moorings of my
grandparents, my youth and my faith, and catapulted me headlong into the
abyss that Richard Wright seemed to describe years earlier.”422 He described
the murder of Dr. King as the “event that shattered my faith in my religion and

414. Clarence Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, and American: Searching for Real
Solutions to Racial Hatred, Address before the National Bar Association Convention (July 19,
1998), at http://www.douglassarchives.org/thom_b30.htm (last updated Aug. 15, 1998).
415. Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American, supra note 401, at 710.
416. 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
417. Thomas, supra note 401, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American, at 710.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 711.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 711–12.
422. Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American, supra note 401, at 708–09.
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my country.”423 Many of us were crushed by the death of Dr. King, and the
Justice has managed to strike a note of solidarity. Thomas explained that:
[He,] along with many blacks, found ways to protest and try to change the
treatment we received in this country. Perhaps my passion for Richard Wright
novels was affecting me. Perhaps it was listening too intently to Nina Simone.
Perhaps, like Bigger Thomas, I was being consumed by the circumstances in
which I found myself, circumstances that I saw as responding only to race.424

The Justice continued, stating that his “feelings were reaffirmed during the
summer of 1968.”425 Thomas explained:
[He] closed out the ‘60s as one angry young man waiting on the revolution that
I was certain would soon come. I saw no way out. I . . . felt the deep chronic
agony of anomie and alienation. All seemed to be defined by race. We
became a reaction to the “man,” his ominous reflection.426

Thomas described his role in the struggle. “In college . . . [w]e427 started
the Black Students Union. We protested. We worked in the Free Breakfast
Program. We would walk out of school in the winter of 1969 in protest.”428
However, a demonstration in 1970 “to ‘free the political prisoners’”429 jolted
Thomas. It shattered his worldview because he now saw not a struggle for
freedom, but a struggle between intellect and “fighting much like a brute,”430 a
“battle between passion and reason.”431 He did not then embrace black
conservatism,432 but listening to Marvin Gaye’s What’s Going On?, Thomas
struggled with what he saw as a “road to destruction [that] was paved with
anger, resentment and rage.”433
Thomas never seems to have understood that one could resist struggle
given over to opportunistic, immoral, and illegitimate purposes without
resisting struggle. The misdirection of the struggle for the rights of AfricanAmericans that so jolted the Justice did not mean that one needed to abandon
struggle altogether. Similarly, alienation from bad struggle does not
necessarily warrant alienation from struggle altogether. It is as if Thomas
could only see that to “relieve[] . . . the anger and the animosity that ate at [his]

423. Id. at 709.
424. Id. at 710.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. It would be nice to know who the “we” are. The others had names. His failure to name
them betrays a profound alteration.
428. Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American, supra note 401, at 710.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 710–11.
433. Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American, supra note 401, at 711.
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soul,”434 he had to strike out in a radically different direction.435 That new
direction for Thomas pointed him toward the Color-Blindness MacroNarrative. “I did not want to hate any more, and I had to stop before it totally
consumed me. I had to make a fundamental choice. Do I believe in the
principles of this country or not? After such angst, I concluded that I did.”436
Thomas thus abandoned any racial solidarity or consciousness whatsoever.
Nevertheless, he insisted that his “history is not unlike that of many blacks
from the deep South,”437 as if to claim that his journey was not a solitary one,
and as if to insist that he was not alienated from black people as such. This
article strongly suggests that if his journey were not solitary, he had precious
little company along the way.438
Thomas’s rejection of racial consciousness might have its origins in his
struggle with the content of his soul, as he suggested. But he persistently
overstated and misstated the meaning and content of racial consciousness. He
set the stage for the inquiry into the legitimacy of the idea of racial
consciousness with an interesting use of pronouns. He stated in his address to
the NBA:
While we once celebrated those things that we had in common with our fellow
citizens who did not share our race, so many now are triumphal about our
differences, finding little, if anything, in common. Indeed, some go so far as to
all but define each of us by our race and establish the range of our thinking and
our opinions, if not our deeds by our color.439

Thomas avoided the need to indicate just how many African-Americans are
comprehended in “many” and “some.” In any event, Thomas failed to
consider the possibility that if black people see his votes on the Court as doing
harm to black people, that they, rather than he, might be right, and that one
might reasonably take offense to such gratuitous injuries. Nowhere did
Thomas engage the question in a serious, thoughtful and “connected” way. He
merely declaimed that he is “confident that the individual approach, not the
group approach, is the better, more acceptable, more supportable, and less
dangerous one. This approach is also consistent with the underlying principles

434. Id. at 710.
435. Thomas’s remarkable failure to name the members of the “community” in which he
claims to have participated suggests that the “new direction” was highly individualistic and
disconnected from this “community.” But Thomas has consistently shown no interest in the
micro-narratives of other people.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 711.
438. The Justice must have sensed that fact because he tried to connect notable AfricanAmericans with his journey to the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative. He enlisted Ralph Ellison,
Randall Kennedy, and even poor Frederick Douglass. Id. at 710–11.
439. Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American, supra note 401, at 709 (emphasis
added).
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of this country and the guarantees of freedom through government by
consent.”440 Thomas had insisted that critics of the Court should proceed in “a
thoughtful analytical” fashion.441 However, he saw no need to respond to his
critics in the black community in such a manner. Apparently, it is enough
merely for him to declare what he believes is better for black people and move
on. So speaks one with power who is alienated from those to whom he speaks.
So speaks the alienated victim who perpetuates the alienation of others by
lending support to the environment that harms them.442
Thomas came closest to the truth of the African-American existential
reality when he correctly observed that “[w]e were all black. But that
similarity did not mask the richness of our differences.”443 Nonetheless, he got
it all wrong when he declared that “[t]oday . . . it is customary to collapse, if
not overwrite, our individual characteristics into new, but now acceptable
stereotypes.”444 The moral claim made by the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative is
not that black people fit some stereotype, but rather that black people recognize
that they have obligations to each other, as members of a community engaged
in a struggle, to gain for themselves and for others who have been left out,
ignored, or otherwise dismissed, the promises made to all Americans. Thomas
made a categorical mistake, therefore, when he confused obligation with
stereotype. Thomas sought to conflate alienation with mere difference. It was
enough for him to declare that he was a different kind of black man and leave
it at that.
Given Thomas’s position as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court,
the large theme of alienation running through Thomas’s remarks received an
interesting treatment in his discussion of the interpersonal dynamics within the
Court, as he saw them, and he then used them to rationalize his alienation from
black people. Justice Thomas referred to the Court as “a model of civility.”445
Unkind words are not spoken there, even though the Court has had “many
contentious issues” come before it.446 This civility is remarkably impersonal,
however, drenched in alienation. He stated:
One of the interesting surprises is the virtual isolation, even within the court. It
is quite rare that the members of the court see each other during those periods
when we’re not sitting or when we’re not in conference. And the most regular
contact beyond those two formal events are the lunches we have on conference
and court days.447
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Id. at 711.
Id. at 709.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American, supra note 401, at 711.
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Thomas then shifted to a discussion of his own views as a Justice. The
impersonal isolation that he had just described forms a backdrop to his claim
that given that isolation, he is perfectly free to follow his own ideas and to
think for himself. The Justice bridled at the notion that he “couldn’t possibly
think for [himself].”448 He dismissed the suggestion that he was being led by
the white reactionaries on the Court because some believed, apparently, that
nothing else “could possibly be the explanation when [he] fail[ed] to follow the
jurisprudential, ideological and intellectual, if not anti-intellectual, prescription
assigned to blacks.”449
B.

Speaking to Others

Michael Dawson notes that black conservatives characteristically hold up
white norms while denigrating black norms.450 Thomas’s speech before the
National Bar Association trashed black norms. The articles and speeches that
he prepared for white audiences reveal the kowtowing to whites that Dawson
describes. The Justice’s speeches and articles express two major themes, both
of which play to the goals and sensitivities of the most reactionary whites. The
first is the ascription to both himself and his grandfather of the status of heroes.
The second concerns a theory of responsibility. Thomas expressed four
subsidiary themes that build to one degree or another on the first two. The first
subsidiary theme is his reaffirmation of the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative.
The second subsidiary theme constitutes a criticism of American law schools.
The third and fourth subsidiary themes, mirroring elements of his speech to the
National Bar Association, are his overwrought self-pity and his notion of the
“civility” at the High Court.
Thomas repeatedly makes the audacious claim that both he and his
grandfather are heroes, and if that were not enough, he resents the fact that the
world today does not view them as such. With regard to his grandfather,
Thomas does so explicitly.451 As to himself, the Justice is a bit more
circumspect, but one cannot mistake his meaning and intention as he ties
himself to the virtues that, in Thomas’s mind, made his grandfather a hero. He
stated:

448. Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American, supra note 401, at 709.
449. Id.
450. See supra notes 357-66 and accompanying text.
451. See Clarence Thomas, Freedom: A Responsibility, Not a Right, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 5,
11 (1994) [hereinafter Thomas, Freedom]; Clarence Thomas, Justice Thomas: On Heroes and
Victims, 142 N.J. L.J. 292 (1995) [hereinafter Thomas, On Heroes and Victims]; Clarence
Thomas, The James McClure Memorial Lecture in Law Delivered by the Honorable Clarence
Thomas, 65 MISS. L.J. 463, 473 (1996) [hereinafter Thomas, McClure Memorial Lecture];
Clarence Thomas, Personal Responsibility, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 317, 325 (1999-2000)
[hereinafter Thomas, Personal Responsibility].
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My grandfather would be an anachronism in today’s world. He would be
looked upon as an insensitive brute. I know that many view me that way. This
is quite odd since, without groveling or begging, he maintained his dignity
even in a world that was hell bent on denying it. And, he did all he could to
preserve his freedom and to provide the tools for his family and those around
him to secure and maintain theirs. . . . It would seem to me that those are the
things of legends and heroes. . . .452

In speeches to children, Thomas offers himself “as living proof that hardships
can be overcome without the help of government,”453 again linking himself to
the virtues that lead him to call his grandfather a hero.454
Thomas ties this non-recognition of his true nature and that of his
grandfather to “the rise of radical egalitarianism.”455 The second theme picks
up the thread. Thomas often referred to the following saying of his
grandfather’s: “Old man can’t is dead; I helped bury him.”456 By this his
grandfather rejected victimhood, no matter how hard his life might have been.
“[T]here was much that my family and my community did to reinforce this
message of self-determination and self-worth, thereby inoculating us against
the victim plague that was highly contagious in the hot, humid climate of
segregation.”457 “But today,” Thomas complained, “our culture is far less
likely to raise up heroes than it is to exalt victims,”458 all because of the
emergence of a new political ideology “[b]etween the New Deal and the
1960s”459 that held that the role of the state was to eliminate want, and thus,
encourage those who were in need to “identify themselves as victims and make
demands on the political systems for special status and entitlements.”460 By
contrast, the methodology and structure of the common law, a system of which
Thomas approves, “traditionally required that redress for grievances only be
granted after very exacting standards had been met. There had to be, for
example, very distinct, individualized harm.”461 Thus, “[v]ery generalized
claims of misfortune or oppression or neglect—the kinds of assertions made in

452. Thomas, Freedom, supra note 451, at 11.
453. Tony Mauro, The Education of Clarence Thomas, 23 AM. LAW. 77, 125 (2001).
454. Thomas, On Heroes and Victims, supra note 451 (stating that “[t]he word ‘hero’ refers to
people of great strength, integrity, or courage who are recognized and admired for their
accomplishments and achievements”); Thomas, Personal Responsibility, supra note 451, at 322
(characterizing as heroes, in a circular fashion, “those who achieve success as a result of personal
effort and character traits that we traditionally would consider heroic”).
455. Thomas, McClure Memorial Lecture, supra note 451, at 470.
456. Id. at 464.
457. Id.
458. Thomas, Personal Responsibility, supra note 451, at 318.
459. Id. at 319.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 320.
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the political system—would not easily fit into this common mold of court
activity.”462
With these two themes, Thomas has touched all of the bases with
conservative and reactionary whites. Even the bold assertion of heroism
essentially tells his audience that they were right to trust him to be a reliable,
dependable, right-wing reactionary Supreme Court Justice. He was not going
to let them down, not at the cost or risk of losing his self-proclaimed status of
being a hero. He let it be known that he would not look with favor on
government welfare programs that cut against what he understood to be the
grain of the common law.463 He might just as well have said that he subscribed
to the agenda of the right wing, Republican Party. No alienation here—at least
not from reactionary whites.
At least two difficulties arise from Thomas’s assertions, however. First, in
these speeches and articles, Thomas chooses to minimize, if not outright
ignore, the role that his grandfather played in bankrolling the local chapter of
the NAACP during a particularly troubling time in the early 1960s.464 That
would put the Justice’s audience on edge.465 Second, given the relegation of
African-Americans by the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative to the mere role
of passive onlookers, Thomas’s declaration that he and his grandfather are
heroes suggests either that the Counter-Narrative is false, or that the Justice
and his grandfather were rather special black people, not connected to the mass
of African-Americans, who, after all are mere spectators, not the stuff out of
which heroes are made. Of course his grandfather was more connected than
the Justice was prepared to allow. Thomas, on the other hand, was not, and
Thomas, not his grandfather, sits on the Court. The ultimate irony, of course,
is that the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative would reckon Thomas’s grandfather a
hero, his rugged individualism notwithstanding. His grandfather’s support of
the Civil Rights struggle at a time when it was dangerous to do so guarantees
that result. This calls into question Thomas’s silly claim that the black
community, or at least large chunks of it, seek to enforce a rigid ideological
purity. Finally, one must ask why Thomas chose not to share his views on
462. Id.
463. See Thomas, On Heroes and Victims, supra note 451, at 292; Thomas, McClure
Memorial Lecture, supra note 451, at 468; Thomas, Personal Responsibility, supra note 451, at
321.
464. See ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY 78–80 (2001).
465. It would be the height of rudeness to white conservatives, one supposes, to mention
(something that black conservatives would not be wont to do) that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s great
contributions to the Civil Rights struggle were “a memorandum he had written as a Supreme
Court law clerk that appeared to support segregated schools.” See Neal Kumar Katyal,
Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1344 (2001). He allegedly made
efforts to keep black people from voting in Arizona in 1964, and opposed to a variety of civil
rights in Arizona in the 1960s. See Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v.
Board of Education, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 383, 433–35 (2000).
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heroism in his family with the National Bar Association. Perhaps too many in
that audience knew or might have known of his grandfather’s role in the Civil
Rights struggle, thus undermining what little credibility Thomas has with
African-Americans.
The subsidiary themes elaborate on the fundamental premise of the two
major themes: Clarence Thomas is a hero, the grandson of a hero, and one who
elevates the concept of individual accountability and responsibility to the level
of first principle, thus accounting the Justice as a faithful, reliable, and durable
acolyte of a white reactionary agenda.
Thomas first stated the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative as a disciplined
intellectual proposition in an article in the Howard University Law Journal.466
In his speech to the National Bar Association, he laid out the ultimate
conclusion of the Counter-Narrative—that racial consciousness was
unacceptable and contrary to the ideals of the founders of the nation.467 He did
not, on that latter occasion, lay out the argument in support of his conclusion.
Since his accession to the Court, Thomas has, however, restated the intellectual
premises of the Counter-Narrative in a speech later published in a law
review.468 In another speech, also later published, Thomas mounted an attack
on some of the top or elite law schools, arguing that they “neglect to teach that
law is an art, a craft, and not an adjunct to fancy theories or a means for
political and social revolution.”469 He continued to charge that law school
graduates “are often shocked to learn that much of the law is already settled,
and that it is their job only to apply it to the new set of facts before them. In
other words, law practice requires the common law method our law schools
once emphasized.”470 Here, Thomas is building on his accountability theme in
which he argued that the radical individualism of the common law, and its
emphasis on the particular case, was the normatively proper conception of the
role of the law in adjudicating disputes.471 Not surprisingly, he concluded that
“scholarship has grown far distant from the needs and concerns of the Bar and
the Bench.”472 Thomas framed the problem in such a way so as to make it
perfectly clear that law as social engineering, the jurisprudence of Charles
Hamilton Houston,473 and the jurisprudence of the Civil Rights Macro-

466. See Thomas, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
467. See supra notes 434-42 and accompanying text.
468. Clarence Thomas, Why Federalism Matters, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 231–33 (2000).
469. Clarence Thomas, Speech Delivered at the Cordell Hull Speakers Forum (Nov. 17,
1994), in 25 CUMB. L. REV. 611, 612 (1994–1995).
470. Id. at 614.
471. See supra notes 459-60 and accompanying text.
472. Thomas, supra note 469, at 614.
473. See generally GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983).
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Narrative,474 is simply misguided. His view is evidenced by the following
statement:
I believe that the decline in American legal education has occurred due to a
loss of mission, a loss of purpose among lawyers, judges and professors alike.
We have come to see law as a means and not as an end. Some among us see
law only as a tool to achieve various political and social goals, whether they be
redistribution of income or the emancipation of certain groups that have
allegedly been oppressed by the rich and the powerful. Others view the law as
a tool to achieve a client’s goals, as a weapon with which to win at any cost.
And many, no doubt, look upon the law as a vehicle for personal wealth and
power or as a way to make money—at least as much money as an investment
banker without taking as many risks.475

Civil rights lawyers, like Charles Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall,
are, for the Justice, merely a variation on the theme of radical, unprincipled,
money-grubbing lawyers, while, presumably, conservatives and reactionaries
understand that “[c]entral to [the] vision of law and democracy is a rule of law
as a set of clear rules that are neutral and applicable to all.”476 The claim that
there is any such thing as “neutrality” is, in and of itself, anything but
neutral.477 Thomas has done nothing more than recast, in somewhat different
form, his colorblindness principle, putting a more explicitly formalist spin on
it. Making sure that he appeals to the sensibilities of white reactionaries,
Thomas is quick to claim that “[a]s lawyers, we cannot constantly question and
attempt to modify legal rules in order to allow the underdog or the overdog to
win.”478 One is irresistibly reminded of Anatole France’s dictum that the law
in its majestic equality forbids both rich man and poor man alike to sleep under
bridges.479 Thomas’s mission is to bring aid and comfort to the reactionary
forces, and here he has admirably succeeded.
With regard to self-pity, Thomas outdoes himself when speaking to whites.
He even compares himself to Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane, as the Justice
resisted the promptings, presumably from African-Americans, to change his
now reactionary views.480 How his white audience might react to this
outrageous remark is perhaps unclear. It is my sense, however, that black
people would have booed him off the stage if he had attempted that
comparison in a black setting. Self-pity seems so deeply ingrained in

474. See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
475. Thomas, supra note 469, at 615.
476. Id. at 616.
477. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990) (discussing various meanings of the word “neutrality”).
478. Thomas, supra note 469, at 617.
479. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (Winifred Stephens trans., Frederic Chapman ed.,
1908) (1894).
480. Thomas, supra note 469, at 620.
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Thomas’s character, that he will use it in speeches aimed at both blacks and
reactionary whites. Perhaps he clings to the image of heroism as much as he
does to counteract or compensate for his deeply etched sense of victimhood,
even as he seeks continually to deny the legitimacy of victimology.481 The
fuller implications of heroism and victimhood in the African-American
experience will be explored more fully in the next section of this article.
In his remarks before the National Bar Association, Thomas used his
conception of the civility that he found on the Court, in part, to justify his
radical individualism and alienation from the large majority of AfricanAmericans.482 In his earliest remarks to white audiences, Thomas stated that
“[s]ix of the nine of us enjoy lunch together during the term.”483 By 1998,
Thomas painted the picture of civility rather differently, one much colder and
impersonal: “[W]e simply do not see each other on a frequent basis . . . . For
the most part, we will only see each other when we have conferences, a formal
event, or when we sit. There is rarely contact beyond that.”484 Again, Thomas
used this description of life at the Court to reassure his audience that he will
not be contaminated by the views of any Justices who might march to a more
moderate, not to say liberal, or progressive, drummer. He has gotten to his
position on his own, he has no intention of abandoning it, and he will continue
to vote in accordance with his reactionary ideology while on the Court. Here,
the point is not to challenge or taunt, as was the case in his remarks before the
National Bar Association, but to reassure and empathize with reactionary
whites.
Thomas’s ideological allegiance lies with reactionary whites. Black
people need to get used to that fact. Whatever form alienation might take for
Thomas regarding his fellow Justices on the Court, there will be no ideological
alienation from reactionary whites. As for African-Americans, there is
alienation, not only ideological, but more profoundly psychological.
We see, therefore, in Thomas’s remarks to both African-Americans and to
non-African-Americans, two forms of alienation. The one that pertains to
African-Americans, however, is far more serious, severe, and total. Thomas
fits the profile of black conservatives in that he seeks, in spite of his deeply
ingrained sense of alienation, to make common cause with reactionary whites
at the level of ideology and public policy, and through his voice and votes on
the Court. He will do the work of white reactionaries, no matter the nature,
character, and form of his alienation, and he wants to ensure that nobody

481. See supra notes 454-58 and accompanying text.
482. See supra notes 443-47 and accompanying text.
483. Deborah Pines, Thomas Describes Year in Speech to Second Circuit, 52 N.Y. L.J. 1
(1992).
484. Clarence Thomas, Civility, Speech Delivered to Students at Washington and Lee
University School of Law (Mar. 10, 1998), in 4 RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 1, 1–2 (1998).
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misses that fact. No other reading of his articles and speeches as a Justice is
plausible.
Dramatic evidence of the foregoing was reported recently. In a speech
before the Savannah Bar Association, Thomas broke down and wept while
talking about his decision to take custody of his grandnephew. “It was an
awkward few minutes before Thomas could continue. As Thomas wept, a
lawyer from the back of the dining room called out to him, ‘You’re home.’
Applause broke out . . . . It was an extraordinary moment . . . [because of] the
mainly white Savannah establishment’s embrace of its hometown hero.”485
Forget Pin Point, Georgia, that poor black town down the road from Savannah.
In every meaningful sense of the word, Thomas was “home” in the company of
a white, conservative, if not reactionary, small-town, southern bar.
VI. LOCATING CLARENCE THOMAS IN THE WORLD OF HARRIET BEECHER
STOWE’S UNCLE TOM’S CABIN
The initial reaction of antebellum African-Americans to Uncle Tom’s
Cabin was, on the surface, enthusiastic, because the novel served as an
important antislavery weapon.486 However, enthusiasm quickly gave way to
dismay, anger, and rage.487 African-American criticism of the novel has
remained unrelenting and severe. Almost a century after the novel appeared,
James Baldwin wrote the definitive African-American critique of Uncle Tom’s
Cabin. He called it “a very bad novel, having, in its self-righteous, virtuous
sentimentality, much in common with Little Women. Sentimentality, the
ostentatious parading of excessive and spurious emotion, is the mark of
dishonesty, the inability to feel. . . .”488 He reflected earlier black unhappiness
with the novel, stating that the “book was not intended to do anything more
than prove that slavery was wrong; was, in fact, perfectly horrible.”489
Regarding the title character, Uncle Tom, Baldwin, in what surely must be
seen as overstatement, declared him to be the only black man in the novel, but,
closer to the mark, stated that he “has been robbed of his humanity and

485. Mauro, supra note 453, at 78.
486. Marva Banks, Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Antebellum Black Response, in READERS IN
HISTORY: NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN LITERATURE AND THE CONTEXTS OF RESPONSE
209, 212–13 (James L. Machor ed., 1993). But see infra notes 513-15 and accompanying text.
487. Banks, supra, at 225 (stating that “as blacks became increasingly aware that Stowe’s
novel had an equivalent power to foster certain images of black inferiority and could therefore be
used to bolster the proslavery argument, their early enthusiasm often changed to skepticism and
then to anger”).
488. JAMES BALDWIN, Notes of a Native Son: Everybody’s Protest Novel, in COLLECTED
ESSAYS 11, 11–12 (1998).
489. Id. at 12.
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divested of his sex.490 It is the price for that darkness with which he has been
branded.”491 Because Stowe was driven, on account of the institution of
slavery, by a “panic of being hurled into the flames, of being caught in traffic
with the devil,”492 the book, in Baldwin’s view, was “activated by what might
be called a theological terror, the terror of damnation.”493 As a literary work, a
protest novel, the failure of the book “lies in its rejection of life, the human
being, the denial of his beauty, dread, power, in its insistence that it is his
categorization alone which is real and which cannot be transcended.”494 Uncle
Tom, therefore, was not a human being, a flesh and blood figure, but merely a
formal category.
As stunning as Baldwin’s attack on Uncle Tom’s Cabin may be, Sarah
Smith Ducksworth went him one better. She attended, in much more icy,
clinical detail, to the racism that suffuses the novel. She noted, as Baldwin and
others before him had correctly observed, that Harriet Beecher Stowe’s
motives, her real concern, involved white salvation.495 Again, following
Baldwin, Ducksworth argued that “[s]lave types appear in the novel just as
stiffly drawn as their white counterparts, but unlike those of the white
stereotypes, their roles are functional rather than prescriptive.”496 Thus, she
continued, “[d]epictions of blacks’ faults create for whites a greater
understanding of and appreciation for the innate good qualities of their race,
which they must nurture to a level of excellence in preparation for the hour of
manifest destiny.”497 She now ratcheted up the attack on the novel. The slave
characters were merely “stick figures,”498 and were “figments of a white
cultural imagination.”499 She stated that “Stowe does, in fact, use African
types to model ‘alien’ behavior that flies in the face of ‘civilized’ white
behavior.”500 The flaw in the novel, as it relates to the African-American
characters, went beyond the denial of Uncle Tom’s humanity and the
divestment of his sex, as Baldwin had argued, but “reveal[ed] slaves as both
490. One commentator has described Uncle Tom as the ultimate White Mother. See LESLIE
A. FIEDLER, THE INADVERTENT EPIC: FROM UNCLE TOM’S CABIN TO ROOTS 33 (1979)
(describing Uncle Tom as “a secret self-portrait of the author”).
491. BALDWIN, supra note 488, at 14 (footnote added).
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 18.
495. Sarah Smith Ducksworth, Stowe’s Construction of an African Persona and the Creation
of White Identity for a New World Order, in THE STOWE DEBATE: RHETORICAL STRATEGIES IN
UNCLE TOM’S CABIN 205 (Mason I. Lowance, Jr. et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter THE STOWE
DEBATE].
496. Id. at 213.
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 214.
500. Ducksworth, supra note 495, at 214.
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foils for and inversions of their white counterparts. They appear as distorted
mirror images of whites, painted in various shades of bronze and ebony, acting
black according to their degree of tint.”501
Ducksworth then offered a particularly devastating example of her thesis, a
comparison of Pete and Mose, Uncle Tom’s two boys, with the two white boys
in the Bird family of southern Ohio. Stowe depicted Pete and Mose as
boisterous and incorrigible.502 But “[m]ore indicative of [their] inferior natures
than their irrational behavior is their inability to reason abstractly and to
project into the future. Stowe reveals their mental and emotional shallowness
by juxtaposing their father’s forced departure from home against the boys’
preoccupation with breakfast.”503 They “remain dry-eyed until they actually
see their father being led away by the slave trader. Only at that moment do
they cling to Chloe’s skirts, ‘sobbing and groaning vehemently.’”504 Too little,
The two white boys, by contrast,
too late, Ducksworth declared.505
demonstrated all of the morally and culturally proper responses, processed
information, and showed proper remorse and mending of their ways in the face
of the great tragedy of the escaped slave, Eliza, and her son, Harry.506
Ducksworth analyzed the nature and character of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s
racism. While Uncle Tom may have been a Christ figure,507 “Stowe sees no
contradiction to her theory that even though racial inequality is real in the
secular sphere, perfect racial equality is not impossible in the spiritual
sphere.”508 Thus Stowe, an evangelical Protestant, had merely recast or
reshaped the dualist theology that so dominates her religion,509 in contrast with
another, undoubtedly more popular, dualist construct that would use race—
white versus black—as the sole criterion for judging status and worth both on
earth and in heaven. But, neither construct offered anything for AfricanAmericans in this world. The only difference was whether there is anything
for African-Americans in the next world.
Ducksworth then showed that Stowe treated her mulattoes differently from
her black characters like Uncle Tom. “The mulattoes’ dilemma in America, as
Stowe conceives it, is to be superior to unmixed blacks, but always to be
doomed by ‘the impress of the despised race upon [their] . . . face[s].’”510

501. Id.
502. Id. at 215.
503. Id.
504. Id. at 216.
505. Ducksworth, supra note 495, at 215.
506. Id. at 216–19.
507. Id. at 226. One observer described Uncle Tom rather as “the Blessed Male Mother of a
virgin Female Christ.” FIEDLER, supra note 490, at 36.
508. Ducksworth, supra note 495, at 226.
509. See Newsom, Protestant Empire, supra note 58, at 196 n.65 and accompanying text.
510. Ducksworth, supra note 495, at 230.
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White blood created a “better” breed of black people, but black blood,
nonetheless, doomed it. Stowe’s view bears a marked similarity to the
Afrikaner view of Africans and Coloreds.511 Ducksworth concluded by
placing Stowe’s racist views in a broad historical context. She stated:
By linking her antislavery position to her conviction of racial inequality, Stowe
articulated the hope and belief of great numbers of whites who evidently felt as
burdened as the writer by the sinful weight of slavery. Stowe’s vision of a new
world order offered them a perfect way to attain their manifest destiny and to
control the host of lowly Africans in their midst.512

Ducksworth had carefully traced the nature and character of black objections to
Uncle Tom’s Cabin. She noted, of particular relevance here, that “history
shows that even in the wake of appreciation for Stowe’s antislavery support,
the portrayal of a passive Uncle Tom was problematic for blacks who believed
that every human being’s highest duty is to resist the tyranny of oppression.”513
She had placed the persistent and enduring black criticism of Uncle Tom’s
Cabin squarely in the matrix of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative, a narrative
that places heavy emphasis on black moral and physical protest.514 She stated:
As blacks moved further away from the days of chains and shackles, and as
they became more empowered by their hard-won social and political gains, the
seething disdain for Uncle Tom as a character grew into open declarations of
hostility against Stowe’s entire novel and its whole cast of darky
stereotypes.515

One can reasonably ask whether any good, then, can possibly come from a
bad, dishonest, and racist novel, its antislavery position notwithstanding.
Ducksworth offered one answer:
[The book], viewed as a cultural product, may be useful as a cautionary tale to
help students recognize not only how truly self-deceiving the concept of a

511. Unfortunately, far too many African-Americans internalized this racist bilge and drew
invidious distinctions within the black community on the basis of skin color, a distraction and a
disaster that is still all too much with the African-American Community. See Taunya Lovell
Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1715–24 (2000) (describing
“colorism” in the black community); Leonard M. Baynes, If It’s Not Just Black and White
Anymore, Why Does Darkness Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness? An
Investigation and Analysis of the Color Hierarchy, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 131, 140–46 (1997)
(discussing African-American colorism).
512. Ducksworth, supra note 495, at 233–34.
513. Id. at 233.
514. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
515. Ducksworth, supra note 495, at 233. It has been noted that Frederick Douglass and
others objected to Stowe’s embrace of colonization, even as they “supported both Stowe and her
book.” Susan Belasco, The Writing, Reception, and Reputation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, in
APPROACHES TO TEACHING STOWE’S UNCLE TOM’S CABIN 33 (Elizabeth Ammons & Susan
Belasco eds., 2000).
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“degraded other” can be, but also, on a larger scale, how collective self-images
enhanced beyond reason and laws of nature perpetrate social injustice against
those with the least power to protect themselves.516

She was, one fears, too generous and kind. She begged the question to be
decided, whether collective self-images have, in fact, been “enhanced beyond
reason and laws of nature.” It may not be possible to teach the novel in the
way that she would like, given the self-deception of far too many Americans
when it comes to the matter of race.
Another use of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, both more limited and more radical—
although far less harmful to black interests, however—does present itself.
African-Americans can “revise, renarrate, correct, speak back to the novel in
order to restore the dignity and humanity that the novel so often denies . . .
[African-Americans].”517 To see it, the analysis of Pete and Mose has to be
revisited. They certainly come across as unlikable characters but for one
important fact. Their insouciance, their self-centeredness, and their lack of
feeling in the face of their father’s impending departure have a sad and
sorrowful explanation, having nothing to do with the supposedly innate,
essentialist characteristic or qualities of African-Americans that Pete and Mose
embodied. Mr. Shelby, the supposedly “good” Kentucky owner of Uncle Tom
and his family, including the two little boys, Pete and Mose, sold Uncle Tom.
This is one of those stubborn facts that will not go away. The comparison of
Uncle Tom’s two sons with the Birds’ sons collapses if one takes into account
the evil inherent in Mr. Shelby’s ownership of other human beings. The two
white boys had no Mr. Shelby in their lives. Stowe repeatedly railed against
the institution of slavery,518 so surely she must have intended for her readers to
recognize this fact. Her emphasis, of course, lay with white feelings, white
sensibilities, and white salvation.519 However, that stubborn fact does not keep
readers from reconstructing the text in ways that will allow for a more
comprehensive understanding of the African-American characters, whether or
not Stowe meant for readers to.
Stick characters, mere formalist
characterizations, can be reconstituted as flesh and blood human beings,
complete with the beauty, dread, and power to which Baldwin summoned
us.520 Readers have merely but to use their powers to make it happen.
If one turns to the stubborn fact of the “good” Mr. Shelby, the truth
emerges. Given the reality of the forced separation of black families because
of the financial or other exigencies or whims of white slave owners, it made
516. Ducksworth, supra note 495, at 234.
517. R. C. De Prospo, Afterword/Afterward: Auntie Harriet and Uncle Ike—Prophesying a
Final Stowe Debate, in THE STOWE DEBATE, supra note 495, at 283.
518. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN 8, 33 (Bantam Classic ed., Bantam
Books 1981) (1851–1852).
519. See id. at 440–44.
520. See supra notes 492-94 and accompanying text.
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perfect sense for Uncle Tom and his wife, Chloe, to teach their sons that the
continued existence of their African-American family was beyond their
control, that separation at any time was always a possibility, and that
survivorship required Pete and Mose to steel their emotions and to cope with
fortuitous disaster. It is reasonable to assume that the parents so instructed
their children. We now understand perfectly their behavior at the forced
departure of their father. One need not care for the lesson—and one should
not—in order to appreciate its practical power. It has something of the quality
of Sophie’s choice.521 Uncle Tom and Chloe were dealt a very bad hand and
they played it the best way that they could, under the circumstances. AfricanAmericans might still be recovering from the lesson, from a constricted range
of choices that robbed them of too much of their beauty, dread, and power.
But, the cure requires African-Americans to understand the lessons of history
and to understand the practical problems that confronted Uncle Tom, Chloe,
and all of their African-American slave ancestors. One need not have to
celebrate the lesson taught to Pete and Mose to understand it, to assess it, and
to swear never to have to teach it again. Indeed, the sad story of Pete and
Mose provides a justification for the struggle that lies at the heart of the Civil
Rights Macro-Narrative—save the children!
The adherents of the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative would point to
Shelby’s son, George, the “color blind” white man who, having succeeded to
his father, offered to manumit his slaves. There are problems with this
position, however. As an initial matter, he could not save Uncle Tom. He
could not save him or his family, as family. He tried, but it was too late.
Furthermore, George could only offer a kind of serfdom, a system of free labor
as opposed to unfree labor, but menial labor nonetheless.522 He cannot liberate
his black slaves—former slaves-to-be—from the shackles of peasantry.
Whether George believed in the racial equality that Harriet Beecher Stowe so
stoutly resisted, remains an interesting but open question. George Shelby was
swimming against the tide. Not only did Stowe prove the point, but so did
history.
Pete and Mose might, as literary characters, evince Stowe’s racism. But a
deeper truth about those two characters, mined and shaped through the prism
of the black struggle, is that the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative stands. There
are other truths in Uncle Tom’s Cabin about black people whether or not
Harriet Beecher Stowe had any interest in them. Those truths help us
understand the relation of Justice Clarence Thomas to African-American
communities, and it is to them that this article now turns.

521. WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE’S CHOICE (Random House 1979) (1925).
522. STOWE, supra note 518, at 435–37.
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Uncle Tom

Judge Higginbotham contemptuously referred to Justice Clarence Thomas
as an Uncle Tom.523 But in this regard, he was surely wrong, if one means the
character drawn by Harriet Beecher Stowe. Following is the first introduction
to Uncle Tom through the words of his owner, Shelby:
Tom is a good, steady, sensible, pious fellow. He got religion at a campmeeting, four years ago; and I believe he really did get it. I’ve trusted him,
since then, with everything I have,—money, house horses,—and let him come
and go round the country; and I always found him true and square in
everything.524

Notwithstanding such high praise, Shelby agreed to sell Uncle Tom, who is
married to Aunt Chloe and has three children, including Pete and Mose, to a
slave trader in order to settle a debt.525 Haley, the slave trader, wants more,
and Shelby agrees to let him have Harry, the child of Eliza, another slave on
Shelby’s farm.526
Eliza overhears a conversation between Shelby and his wife in which he
describes his transaction with the slave trader. Eliza promptly decides to take
Harry and escape. Before she leaves the farm, she lets Uncle Tom and Aunt
Chloe know of her plans. His wife encourages Uncle Tom to flee as well,527
but he rejects her advice. His reasoning matters; it was better that he be sold
off than all of the slaves on the farm be sold off. He has not let his master
down before and he will not do so now even to save himself.528 One can read
this to say that Uncle Tom has set the agenda of his white owner over that of
his own people, not to mention himself. However, the moral calculus points in
another direction, Tom declines to flee in order to save other black people in
general, and his wife and children in particular, even at the cost of his own
position, indeed, as it turns out, his life. Thus, Uncle Tom was a “selfless,
stoical, fatalistic martyr” and not a racial traitor.529 When he later remonstrates
with his wife and fellow slaves, who were speculating or hoping that Haley
would go to Hell, and says that they ought to pray for him,530 Tom was not
abandoning his people, but merely trying to understand the world through the
prism, or lens, of a suffering servant.531

523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.

See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
STOWE, supra note 518, at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 37.
Id.
MOSES, supra note 340, at xii–xiii.
STOWE, supra note 518, at 52–53.
See MOSES, supra note 340, at 5.
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Again, in the parting scene with Aunt Chloe when he is turned over to the
slave trader, Tom again makes the point that everything is in the Lord’s hands
and that it is only he that has been sold, not her or their children. She does not
see things that way, and Uncle Tom chides her.532 And so, “Tom rose up
meekly, to follow his new master, and raised up his heavy box on his shoulder.
His wife took the baby in her arms to go with him to the wagon, and the
children, still crying, trailed on behind.”533 Tom left a rather strong
impression, he “had been looked up to, both as a head servant and a Christian
teacher, . . . and there was much honest sympathy and grief about him,
particularly among the women.”534
But the suffering servant, this Christ figure,535 was not wholly selfemptying. He had a powerful sense of what was realistic and practical.
Shortly after Tom begins his trip South to his final destiny, Shelby’s son,
George, happens by chance upon the slave trader’s party. George declares to
Uncle Tom that he wants to “blow [Haley] up! it would do me good!”536 To
which Tom replied, “No, don’t, Mas’r George, for it won’t do me any
good.’”537 Uncle Tom’s decision not to escape with Eliza and Harry was
rooted in a communitarian ethic of the sort described by Michael Dawson as
typical of African-Americans.538 Now, Tom revealed something of an
individualistic streak—he was concerned with what was best for him, not his
wife or the other slaves on Shelby’s farm. However, time and time again,
Tom’s sense of what was best for him largely involved the hereafter, the next
world, as his desperate condition as a slave on Legree’s forlorn Louisiana
plantation, far away from his family and his native Kentucky, ineluctably took
hold.
As the novel unfolds, we see Uncle Tom, the suffering servant, befriending
the lonely and the outcast, bringing aid and comfort whenever he could. We
also see him cultivating relationships with powerful whites, including the
saccharine Evangeline St. Clare. But these relationships enable him to pursue
his objectives, both communitarian and individualistic, the conversion of
African-Americans to his evangelical Protestant faith.539

532. STOWE, supra note 518, at 92–93.
533. Id. at 95.
534. Id. at 96.
535. See supra note 507 and accompanying text.
536. STOWE, supra note 518, at 98.
537. Id.
538. See DAWSON, supra note 98, at 11.
539. In this respect, Uncle Tom emerges as a pious activist, but one deeply connected to the
African-American experience. See MOSES, supra note 340, at ix (declaring that “black
Americans have been immersed in mainstream Protestant American traditions since the
revolutionary period”).
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All of this comes to a head at the end of the novel. Uncle Tom has been
sold by the racist and self-absorbed widow of Augustine St. Clare, the dandy
and fop who betrayed Uncle Tom by failing to manumit him, when he had the
chance to do so, to the brutish Simon Legree.540 Arriving at Legree’s
plantation, deep in Louisiana bayou country, Tom discovers his mission, and
his doom. Legree’s slaves were a brutalized lot.541 But, Uncle Tom’s
character is too strongly formed for him to give in, performing acts of
charity,542 much to the consternation and displeasure of the ever-watchful
Legree.543 Tom refuses Legree’s order to flog an elderly slave woman.544 In
response, Legree beats Uncle Tom, then turns the job of beating Tom over to
Sambo and Quimbo, Legree’s black henchmen.545
Tom explains his actions to Cassy, a slave and former mistress of Legree’s,
who comes to Tom’s aid after the brutal assault by Legree, Quimbo, and
Sambo. Uncle Tom tells her that he does not want to lose heaven, having lost
everything on earth.546 Legree’s field hands come under Tom’s sway as Uncle
Tom continued his conversion work in earnest. They would gather to hear him
speak of Jesus.547 Meanwhile Cassy wants Tom to kill Legree, whom she has
drugged, and make his escape with her and another young slave girl,
Emmeline. Tom, the suffering servant refuses, but he does encourage Cassy
and Emmeline to escape. He, once again, refuses to join in an escape. He has
found his final work among Legree’s field hands and thus will stay until the
dreadful end.548
Tom refused to run away with Eliza and Harry because Shelby would have
to sell off many if not most of the slaves on his farm. Such an eventuality
would cause great damage and harm to other black people—in this world.
Now, Tom refuses to run away with Cassy and Emmeline because his work of
conversion on Legree’s plantation has not yet been finished. If he did make his
escape this would cause great damage and harm to other black people—this
time in the next world. The end comes swiftly. Cassy and Emmeline make
540. See Ducksworth, supra note 495, at 209–10 (describing with supreme irony, Legree, as
Stowe meant or intended him to be, as “the most brutish and debased sort of white man . . . who
has been utterly ruined by his total immersion in the dark world of slave culture” so that “[b]y
cutting himself off from the beneficent influence of the white race, Legree has sunk into an abyss
of iniquity that, in Stowe’s estimate, is about as low as a white man can go” as “[h]is almost
exclusive dealings in black flesh have blunted all of his original racially inherited sensitivities”).
The truth, of course, is that Legree invented his hellish world, not black people.
541. STOWE, supra note 518, at 345–46.
542. Id. at 346–47.
543. Id. at 349.
544. Id. at 354–55.
545. Id. at 355–56.
546. STOWE, supra note 518, at 358.
547. Id. at 392.
548. Id. at 394–95.
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good their escape, plotting and executing a particularly ingenious plan. Legree
correctly surmises that Tom knew of the plan. He confronts Uncle Tom and
Tom defies Legree one last time, admitting that he knew of the plans but
refuses to divulge them.549 Tom’s destruction swiftly follows at the hands of
Legree, Quimbo, and Sambo.550
Uncle Tom’s rejections of offers of escape form the two bookends, or
brackets, of a personal agenda and commitment to black people, even at the
cost of his own life. The suffering servant surely does not battle like the
avenging angel, the other important figure or icon in a larger metaphor.551 But
the suffering servant and the avenging angel are but two sides of the same
coin: the ideology of messianism,552 a macro-narrative, a belief that a group
(Africans-Americans in this instance) has “a manifest destiny or a God-given
role to assert the providential goals of history and to bring about the kingdom
of God on earth.”553 The suffering servant, Uncle Tom, and the avenging
angel, Nat Turner, are the conjoined micro-narratives of black messianism.554
Black messianism finds powerful expression in the Civil Rights MacroNarrative. It makes sense to see movement lawyers like Charles Hamilton
Houston and Thurgood Marshall as both suffering servants and avenging
angels operating within the confines of an institutional legal system that seeks
to wring passion and emotion out of conflicts and battles, making them cases
and controversies instead.555 But black messianism does not operate in the
Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative, celebrating, as it does, various and sundry
white racists. And by reducing African-Americans to mere observers, Justice
Clarence Thomas has denied both the African-American suffering servant and
the black avenging angel even as, in his grandiose self-pity, he offers himself
as both.

549. Id. at 410.
550. Id. at 411.
551. See MOSES, supra note 340, at 5.
552. Id.
553. Id. at 4.
554. Id. at 49–66.
555. Whether bracketing passion and emotion is a good thing is beyond the scope of this
paper. One commentator put it this way:
Law has always stood in an uneasy relationship to emotion. . . . Morality, efficiency,
democratic processes—these are the abstractions that ostensibly guide the law. While
concessions are made to human nature, law is particularly artful at disguising its
relationship to the capacity for love, hate, fear, sympathy, and all the other myriad
feelings that make us human. Law is a special mask that we have collectively made, one
that mutes the “true face” of power and subordination, of conformity and deviance, of
acceptance and ostracism.
Rachel F. Moran, Law and Emotion, Love and Hate, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 747, 747
(2001).
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At the level of micro-narratives, it is difficult to see Justice Clarence
Thomas as a suffering servant.556 The only advantage or benefit that he has
given up in pursuit of what he sees as good for African-Americans is
popularity in the black community,557 a mere trifle in comparison with the
sacrifices made by Uncle Tom. Furthermore, the Justice appears to have
complained more about this supposed burden than Uncle Tom ever complained
about his far more substantial cross. Indeed, Justice Clarence Thomas,
possessed of an arrogance that perhaps knows no meaningful limitation, resorts
to an entirely different metaphor to describe himself—the hero,558 not the
suffering servant. It remains eerily possible, however, that the Justice sees
himself as an avenging angel bent on wreaking destruction not on errant
whites, but on black people. The avenging angel is merely an expression of
the victimized victimizer.
B.

Sam and Sambo

Judge Higginbotham, therefore, made a categorical error in denouncing
Justice Clarence Thomas as an Uncle Tom. But the mistake is understandable.
The suffering servant macro-narrative became distorted. It became an element
in a macro-narrative in which black people were “naturally servile.”559 But,
when the suffering servant is wrenched away from a creative dynamic with the
avenging angel, and thus with messianism, distortion inevitably follows.560 If
Justice Clarence Thomas is no Uncle Tom, no suffering servant, the question
remains whether the Justice might still be found in Stowe’s sprawling novel.
On this point, two slave characters warrant examination: Sam and Sambo. One
writer has noted Stowe’s use of names to describe both reflective and
refractive interracial images.561 Thus, there are two characters named Tom,
two named George, and two named Henry, one black and one white.
However, Stowe’s choice of the names “Sam” and “Sambo” might suggest that
Stowe had some rather different structural or literary relation in mind between
the two slaves. Because “Sam” and “Sambo” are not exactly the same name,

556. It is equally difficult to see Clarence Thomas as an avenging angel. He has not boldly
challenged powerful whites, either within or without the minuet that is our legal system. Rather
he has kowtowed to them, telling them that some of their most racist forebears are his ideological
heroes. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
557. See supra notes 414-21 and accompanying text.
558. See supra notes 451-54 and accompanying text.
559. MOSES, supra note 340, at 53–54.
560. See id. at xii–xiii (stating that black people did not want to be the white man’s suffering
servant, and accordingly, the ideology of Uncle Tom became distorted in the early twentieth
century because it no longer enjoyed a dynamic relation with the ideology of the black avenging
angel).
561. Michael J. Meyer, Toward a Rhetoric of Equality: Reflective and Refractive Images in
Stowe’s Language, in THE STOWE DEBATE, supra note 495, at 236–54.
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and because both characters are African-American, the relation between the
two necessarily differs from the linkages between the Toms, the Georges, and
the Henrys. Stowe does compare and contrast Sam and Sambo, and it is in the
comparison, a study in alienation and social isolation and in conservatism, that
we can see the proper location of Clarence Thomas in the world of Uncle
Tom’s Cabin.
When Eliza flees with her son, Harry, Shelby is faced with a dilemma. His
improvident business decisions had necessitated the sale of Uncle Tom and
Harry to the loathsome slave trader, Haley. But Shelby has to show his good
faith with Haley by helping Haley capture the escaped slaves. Shelby’s wife,
however, has no such compunctions, having no involvement in her husband’s
poor business decisions and having quite an attachment to Eliza. And thereby
hangs the tale.
The sale of Uncle Tom and the escape of Eliza and Harry become the talk
of the farm. Sam, a slave given to “a strict lookout to his own personal wellbeing,”562 entertained thoughts of succeeding Tom as Shelby’s head slave. He
had little time to mourn the sale of Uncle Tom.563 Sam, and another slave,
Andy, are asked by Shelby to accompany Haley on the chase, as Andy puts it,
“to look arter” Eliza.564 Sam immediately pops off at the mouth, bragging
about how he is the man to catch Eliza and Harry.565 Andy, whose role or
function, is to keep Sam honest, points out that Mrs. Shelby does not want
them caught.566 Sam appreciates the reality of the situation, and he and Andy
manage to thwart Haley by a string of clever ruses and stratagems. Eliza and
Harry make it across the Ohio River, but just barely.567
Sam and Andy return to the Shelby farm, their story to relate. Mrs. Shelby
hears them approach and Sam tells her that Eliza is “clar ‘cross Jordan.”568
Shelby joins his wife, and Sam describes the desperate flight across the ice
floes in the river.569 Sam makes sure to tell the Shelbys that the escape would
have failed but for his efforts. In effect, he seeks to establish his value to his
owner.570 Of Sam, Stowe wrote, “Master Sam had a native talent that might,

562. STOWE, supra note 518, at 41.
563. Id.
564. Id. at 42.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. STOWE, supra note 518, at 57–58.
568. Id. at 69.
569. Id. at 70.
570. In establishing his value to his owner, it has been suggested that Sam trumped certain
negative stereotypes. James Bense, Myths and Rhetoric of the Slavery Debate and Stowe’s Comic
Vision of Slavery, in THE STOWE DEBATE, supra note 495, at 189 (finding value in Stowe’s work,
on its own ideological and racial terms, describing Sam not just as a “bumptious, giggling,
outsized adolescent[]” but as “a shape-shifting, encompassing figure who would, through his
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undoubtedly, have raised him to eminence in political life,—a talent of making
capital out of everything that turned up, to be invested for his own especial
praise and glory. . . .”571 Taking his leave upon Mrs. Shelby’s orders for him
to go to the kitchen to get something to eat, Sam declares, “I’ll speechify these
yer niggers . . . now I’ve got a chance. Lord, I’ll reel it off to make ‘em
stare!”572 The scene shifts to the kitchen, which by now was full of Sam’s
fellow slaves. “Now was Sam’s hour of glory. The story of the day was
rehearsed, with all kinds of ornament and varnishing which might be necessary
to heighten its effect. . . .”573 Sam, like any good politician, concludes with a
ringing declaration of his intention to stand for the rights of his fellow
slaves.574 Andy, Sam’s conscience, reminds him, in the presence of the others,
that only that morning Sam had said that he would help catch Eliza.575 Sam
responds with the best piece of rhetoric in the entire novel. In a masterful
display of doubletalk and gobbledygook, Sam proceeds to convert his
hypocrisy, which Andy had perhaps not so innocently unmasked, into a claim
of conscience and principle—persistence.576
The striking feature of Sam’s tour de force is his deeply felt need to stay in
the good graces of the community of slaves on Shelby’s farm. Sam is a
hypocrite and a self-promoter, as Andy and Aunt Chloe (who does not much
care for Sam)577 well know, and his principle of “persistence” betrays the truth
of his character to any perceptive listener. But he knows that he has no future
apart from that community. Given the reality and the constraints of the
institution of slavery, he cannot survive alienated or socially isolated from
black people. He has to make his peace with both Andy and Aunt Chloe, and
he makes an effort to do so. At the end of the novel Shelby’s son, George,
now the owner of the farm, manumits his slaves.578 Sam does not make an
appearance in this scene, however. One is left to wonder whether Sam, with
freedom papers in hand, would have left the farm and the slave community to
make his own way in the world. But it is equally likely that Sam would have
remained on the farm as a worker, not a slave, and continued to cast his lot
with the black community there.
Not so with Justice Clarence Thomas. He is a hypocrite—an “affirmative
action baby” who opposes affirmative action. On this score he matches up

words and enactments, deflate major tenets of American ideology that had made his ‘creation’
possible”).
571. STOWE, supra note 518, at 71.
572. Id.
573. Id. at 73.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. STOWE, supra note 518, at 73–74.
577. Id. at 72.
578. Id. at 435–37.
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rather nicely with Sam. Similarly, like Sam and even like Uncle Tom, the
Justice seeks to cultivate good relations with powerful whites. But he parts
company with both Sam and Uncle Tom in his rejection of community with
African-Americans. His remarks to the National Bar Association bear no
resemblance to Sam’s spiel in the kitchen on the night of his triumphal return
from a mission to thwart the slave trader. For Justice Thomas, the struggles of
the black community for equal rights justify his decision to abandon that
community and its norms in order to pursue his highly idiosyncratic and
dubious notions of what is good for African-Americans, if, indeed, that good is
a matter of concern at all for the Justice. Justice Clarence Thomas certainly
stands for the principle of persistence, but for Thomas, the principle operates to
alienate and separate, not to reconcile or bring together. In his speech, Justice
Thomas essentially said that he was who he was and his listeners had better get
used to that fact. An African-American wielding a considerable amount of
power as a sitting Justice on the Court tells other African-Americans to take it
or leave it.
In Sambo and in his mirror and foil, Quimbo, we find precisely the same
dynamic: African-American henchmen, or overseers, for an evil slave owner
telling their fellow slaves to take it or leave it. We first meet Sambo as Legree
returns to his plantation with a new batch of slaves, Uncle Tom among them.
Harriet Beecher Stowe wasted little time in setting out the fundamental social
dynamic between Sambo, Quimbo, the other slaves on Legree’s plantation, and
Legree. Sambo and Quimbo “were the two principal hands on the plantation.
Legree had trained them in savageness and brutality as systematically as he
had his bull-dogs; and, by long practice in hardness and cruelty, brought their
whole nature to about the same range of capacities.”579 The novelist
continued:
Legree, . . . governed his plantation by a sort of resolution of forces.
Sambo and Quimbo cordially hated each other; the plantation hands, one and
all, cordially hated them; and, by playing off one against another, he was pretty
sure, through one or the other of the three parties, to get informed of whatever
was on foot in the place.
Nobody can live entirely without social intercourse; and Legree
encouraged his two black satellites to a kind of coarse familiarity with him,—a
familiarity, however, at any moment liable to get one or the other of them into
trouble; for, on the slightest provocation, one of them always stood ready, at a
nod, to be a minister of his vengeance on the other.580

What transpires, ending with the death of Uncle Tom, is the working out of
this cruel minuet of alienation and social isolation. In the midst of this utter

579. Id. at 344.
580. Id.
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desolation, Uncle Tom does his work, seeking to build community through
conversion and good works.
Sambo is, at least for the nonce, untouched. He continues to treat the other
slaves owned by Legree with an admixture of cruelty and callous disregard. In
one particularly brutal scene, Sambo kicked a slave woman named Lucy that
Uncle Tom had helped by taking cotton from his sack and transferring it to
hers. The woman fainted from the blow and Sambo revived her by sticking a
pin in her flesh. The woman came to and resumed work as best she could.581
Uncle Tom continued to add cotton to her sack, much to the consternation of
Sambo who complained to Legree of Uncle Tom’s acts of kindness towards
Lucy.582 Legree came up with the idea of having Uncle Tom whip Lucy,
causing Sambo and Quimbo to break out laughing.583 Later on, he refuses
Legree’s orders, defiantly telling Legree that Legree does not own the
suffering servant’s soul. Legree immediately orders Sambo and Quimbo to
give him a beating. Stowe writes, “The two gigantic negroes that now laid
hold of Tom, with fiendish exultation in their faces, might have formed no
unapt personification of the powers of darkness. . . . [T]hey dragged [Uncle
Tom] unresisting from the place.”584
While beating Uncle Tom, Sambo discovered that Uncle Tom had, among
other mementos, a lock of the hair of Evangeline, the doomed daughter of his
previous owner in New Orleans, Augustine St. Clare. Sambo promptly takes
the hair to Legree, claiming that it was “a witch thing.”585 Legree reacts with
fear and alarm, asking Sambo why he had brought the hair to him.
Admonished, Sambo dutifully takes his leave of Legree.586 Still upset about
the hair because it reminded him of his own mother, Legree first seeks relief
and solace from his dogs. Then he decides to have Sambo and Quimbo sing
and dance for him. Stowe writes, “Legree was often wont, when in a gracious
humor, to get these two worthies into his sitting-room, and, after warming
them up with whiskey, amuse himself by setting them to singing, dancing, or
fighting, as the humor took him.”587 And so it goes with the three of them
carousing “in a state of furious intoxication” into the wee hours of the
morning.588
Legree notices a change in Uncle Tom. Sambo wonders if he is going to
run away. Sambo is quick to assure Legree, in much the same way that Sam

581.
582.
583.
584.
585.
586.
587.
588.

STOWE, supra note 518, at 351.
Id. at 353.
Id.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 369.
STOWE, supra note 518, at 369.
Id. at 372.
Id.
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had assured Shelby, that he would catch Uncle Tom if he tried to run away.589
Matters come to a head, Cassy and Emmeline have escaped, and Uncle Tom
admits to Legree that he knew of the plans but refuses to tell anything.590 The
destruction of Uncle Tom commences at the hand of Legree, and Sambo and
Quimbo join in.591 The two slaves come to regret their role in the mortal
beating of Uncle Tom and he forgives them.592 Sambo is converted, asking
Jesus to have mercy on him. Uncle Tom asks God to give him the souls of
Sambo and Quimbo, and his prayer was answered.593
Unfortunately, Justice Clarence Thomas and unregenerate Sambo have
much in common. No one could accuse the Justice of being physically brutal
to black people or to anybody else, for that matter. But he seems to have
condoned physical brutality when visited upon prison inmates.594 The prison
systems in more than a few American jurisdictions bear an uncanny
resemblance to Legree’s plantation in that they are monuments to alienation
and social isolation. Not surprisingly, violence seems to accompany that
state,595 and Justice Thomas is markedly insensitive to it. It is not enough to
claim that inmates have violated the moral duty to take responsibility for their
actions, as Justice Thomas does,596 because the right question is whether it
satisfies the goals and objectives of the criminal law to deprive criminals of
their freedom and to subject them to a harsh—but not violent—prison regime.
Beyond the question of violence, the similarities are striking. The unsaved
Sambo has no community with Quimbo, the other slaves, or Legree. Unlike
Sam, the rascal and hypocrite, Sambo sees no need to form one. Here the
literary relation between Sam and Sambo now becomes clear. Both are studies
589. Id. at 390.
590. Id. at 410.
591. STOWE, supra note 518, at 411.
592. Id. at 412.
593. Id.
594. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 18 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
“a use of force that causes only insignificant harm to a prisoner may be immoral, it may be
tortuous, it may be criminal, and it may even be remediable under other provisions of the Federal
Constitution, but it is not cruel and unusual punishment”). Thomas is tone deaf to the reality of
prison brutality and to the fact that declaring brutality visited upon a prisoner by prison
authorities is sufficiently offensive to warrant the appellation “cruel and unusual.” Thomas
necessarily trivialized the harm done to the inmate in this case, although he tried to avoid this
implication. See Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American, supra note 401, at 710
(insisting on maintaining a rigid distinction between law and morality). He just does not get it.
Robbing the Constitution of moral content undermines not only the Constitution itself, but it also
undermines the claim of the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative that certain value-laden principles
of equality informed the Constitution. If these principles have no moral content, then it is hard to
see just how they can mean very much, at least in the face of, or in opposition to, the overtly
moral claims of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative.
595. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (Harvest Books 1973) (1951).
596. See Thomas, Freedom, supra note 451 passim.
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in alienation, the difference being that Sam recognizes, in ways that Sambo
does not, or cannot, that alienation from other blacks is dear. Sam seeks to
make community, notwithstanding his hypocrisy, whereas Sambo makes no
such attempt before his conversion to Christ by the mortally wounded Uncle
Tom.
Justice Clarence Thomas makes efforts at being in community with other
African- Americans. But he seems almost invariably to come up short.597 And
the reason has everything to do with his exaltation of white racists like Thomas
Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln and his put-down of blacks who have fought
for civil rights.598 The unsaved Sambo cannot make community with his
fellow slaves on Legree’s plantation because of the nature of his relations with
Legree.599 Indeed, he cannot even make community with Quimbo, his foil,
mirror, conscience, rival, and nemesis. Thomas cannot make community
because of the nature of his relations with racist whites, both living and
dead.600

597. For a stunning and damning discussion of Clarence Thomas’s relations with black
people, see Kevin Merida & Michael A. Fletcher, Supreme Discomfort, WASH. POST MAG., Aug.
4, 2002, at 8, 8–12, 24, 26–28 (describing a man who: (1) causes black people to call him an
“Uncle Tom” to his face; (2) the “mere mention of [his name] often prompts emotional reactions
at barbershops, cocktail receptions, gyms, anywhere African Americans congregate;” (3) leads
essayist Debra Dickerson to describe him as a “lonely guy;” (4) dares to address the outgoing
president of the National Bar Association, a black man, as “bruh” only to generate a negative
response that Thomas was being hypocritical; (5) hangs with the white guys, ignoring a group of
black men at an event at the Greenbrier Resort in West Virginia; (6) gets omitted from Ebony
magazine’s annual list of the 100 most influential blacks; (7) leads black members of the
American Civil Liberties Union of Hawaii to resign because Thomas had been invited to
participate in a debate on affirmative action; (8) leads black people to suggest that he “suffers
from a twisted hatred of his own blackness;” (9) generates a sustained hostile reaction to a gift
from a white real estate developer to name a public library after Justice Thomas, resulting in a
compromise solution of a gift of $150,000 “in exchange for naming a wing of the library” after
Thomas because the black leaders in Savannah, Georgia, did not want to have Thomas “held up
as a role model;” (10) becomes estranged even from his “heroic” grandfather because Thomas did
not return “to Savannah to practice law and use his good education to help other blacks;” (11)
turns a meeting with the then president of the National Bar Association into a social disaster when
Thomas declares “that he often advises students not to take African American and women’s
studies courses” and proceeds to suggest that “the dearth of black law clerks was attributable less
to race and more to class, a point that bothered [the NBA president];” (12) even obliges his friend,
Donna Brazile, to concede that Thomas “is not looking to be a black leader;” (13) leads a friend
from childhood days to call Thomas “a turncoat who has forgotten where he came from,” and
(14) has done nothing to help his all-black hometown of Pin Point, Georgia).
598. See supra notes 63-90 and accompanying text.
599. One is left to wonder whether the saved Sambo can continue his relations with Legree or
whether they must come to a violent and even deadly end. Clarence Thomas, of course, has not
been saved at all, at least not in the sense that Harriet Beecher Stowe intends.
600. Clarence Thomas made a spectacle of himself when he presided at Rush Limbaugh’s
wedding. See Tony Mauro, High Court Highs and Lows, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 26, 1994, at 9.
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Many black conservatives have managed to maintain relations with the
African-American community.601 Therefore, the question is not whether
Justice Clarence Thomas is a conservative of one sort or another, but whether
he is socially isolated from black people, and if so, to what extent or degree.
Both Sam and Sambo are black conservatives,602 but they relate entirely
differently to the African-American communities in which they find
themselves. Tension clearly exists between black conservatism, particularly in
the form espoused by Sambo, and the black community,603 and undoubtedly
always will. Again, what matters is how the tension is worked out through
interpersonal dynamics, and whether alienation and social isolation become the
dominant characteristics or traits of those dynamics.
This conclusion necessarily follows: In the world of Harriet Beecher
Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Clarence Thomas is no Uncle Tom. He is no
Sam. But surely he is an unredeemed Sambo.
VII. CONCLUSION: A BRIEF NOTE ON THE WORK OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
This paper has shown why Justice Clarence Thomas is a pariah in the
African-American community. “Justice Thomas, it seems, is trying to run
away from his own biography and history—in a word, from ‘himself.’”604
Certain large implications follow from this fact, not the least of which is that
one must concede that the black man sitting on the Court is deeply and
profoundly alienated from large numbers of, if not the vast majority of,
African-Americans.605 One cannot honestly claim, therefore, that black people
Unfortunately for Clarence Thomas, Limbaugh’s racist credentials have been exposed. See
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER’S EGG 42–56 (1995) (describing Limbaugh as a racist
hatemonger). One sees an uncanny similarity between this sorry spectacle and the sight of
Legree, Sambo, and Quimbo carousing in a drunken stupor.
601. See generally Eisenstadt, supra note 103.
602. Sam and Sambo exhibit the fundamental traits or characteristics of black conservatism.
See id. at x–xi (stating that black conservatives show a “deep-seated respect for the culture and
institutions of American society and Western civilization, and the related conviction and
insistence that blacks, through their own resources, can make it within American society,” they
“place their focus on individual achievement,” and noting that “[m]ost black conservatives are
anti-Utopian, less interested in constructing an ideal society, than in getting by in the society in
which they find themselves”). See also DAWSON, supra note 98, at 282–99.
603. See supra notes 375-77 and accompanying text.
604. Calmore, supra note 3, at 200.
605. A particularly biting and pungent attack on Justice Thomas for his lone, solitary dissent
in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1048–57 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) nonetheless
concluded with a powerful reaffirmation of black community, even in the face of Thomas’s war
on his own people. Calmore, supra note 3, at 202. “It would never occur to Thomas that, in the
end, his Black political enemies and victims have more empathy for him in his sickness than his
white racist ‘friends’ could ever claim. They don’t even know him.” All About Clarence: Selfloathing on the High Court, BLACK COMMENTATOR, Mar. 6, 2003, at
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have a representative on the Court, that is to say, a person with whom they feel
any real sense of community.
It does not follow that black people are entitled to any such representation,
although clearly the same could be said of every other ethnic or racial group,
including white Americans. But apart from any consideration or analysis of
group representation political theory, having a Justice of the United States
Supreme Court who is as alienated and socially isolated from his own people
as Justice Clarence Thomas is, assuredly raises serious questions about the
fundamental nature and role of the Court.
Throughout its history, the Court has largely served as a conservative flywheel, or counterweight, particularly on the question of race. Dred Scott v.
Sandford606 and Plessy v. Ferguson,607 horrible decisions though they may be,
typify the work of the Court. Brown v. Board of Education,608 to the extent
that the decision in that case in fact represents a commitment to racial justice,
equality, and inclusion,609 is a sport, an exception. The Warren Court has
come and gone. A fairly stable conservative majority, of which Justice
Clarence Thomas is an important part, guarantees that the Court will largely
continue to function as a counterweight to racial progress and will continue to
ensure that white hegemony continues in one fashion or another. Indeed, this
majority engineered a coup d’état in Bush v. Gore610 in large part to ensure its
continued existence as the majority on the Court, even though the decision
clearly harms African-Americans.611 Other futures are possible—the Court
could come to understand its fundamental purpose differently. But it is ironic
that Justice Clarence Thomas’s tenure on the Court will do much to deny those
futures.

http://www.blackcommentator.com/32/32_commentary_pr.html. A full treatment of the case is
beyond the reach of this paper. However, Thomas clearly assigned less weight or value to the
undeniably racist practices of the Dallas County District Attorney’s office, inter alia, in
manipulating the racial composition of juries in the past, and the substantial evidence that such
practices continued in the instant case. But Thomas’s dissent is all of a piece with the regrettable
tendency of black conservatives to celebrate white norms and to denigrate African-American
norms. See Eisenstadt, supra note 103, at x–xiii; Tate & Randolph, supra note 383, at 2.
606. 60 U.S. 393 (19 How.) (1856).
607. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
608. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
609. For an argument that Brown does not, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
610. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
611. See Spencer Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 474 (2001) (arguing that the case harms blacks and others through its
merit-based vision of democracy as opposed to a more “inclusionary vision of democracy [that]
values widespread participation and looks to remove criteria or conditions that act as barriers to
such participation”).
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Nothing in Grutter v. Bollinger612 changes this basic conclusion that the
Court is an impediment to racial progress and justice, including the fact that a
member of the conservative majority, Justice O’Connor, joined the four
moderates on the Court to save at least something of affirmative action, finding
in doctrinal terms, “a compelling state interest in student body diversity.”613
Undergirding that finding was Justice O’Connor’s reluctance to challenge the
views of “major American businesses” and “high-ranking retired officers and
civilian leaders of the United States military” that affirmative action in college
and university admissions was necessary for business and for national
security.614 The point of affirmative action, for Justice O’Connor, is not social
justice, not remediation for past racial discrimination,615 but rather an
imperative for the ruling classes, which, of course, are overwhelmingly white,
to perpetuate themselves in a time of growing racial and ethnic diversity. The
Court stated:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry,
it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our
heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and integrity of
the educational institutions that provide this training.616

Thus white hegemony continues after Grutter, even if it would appear that
the interests of racial minorities are incidentally helped and not harmed by the
decision.617 Justice O’Connor concluded with a silly remark that “[w]e expect
that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today.”618 She has clearly signaled
an intention to rein in affirmative action, to get rid of it, just not now, not while
a war is raging in Iraq, a war being fought disproportionately by American
soldiers who are not white.
In assessing the cultural or institutional racial views of the Court, it is a
matter of no small concern that the four moderates on the Court found little to
object to in Justice O’Connor’s pinched construction of affirmative action.
The fact that she essentially elaborated upon Justice Powell’s views in Regents

612. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
613. Id. at 2338.
614. Id. at 2340.
615. See Lawrence, supra note 253.
616. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
617. See Bell, supra note 609. Black people tend to support affirmative action, regardless of
political ideology. See DAWSON, supra note 98, at 122, 277, 295, 301 (both Black Nationalists
and Dr. Martin Luther King, the prototypical radical egalitarian/disillusioned liberal, supported
affirmative action, and only Black conservatives appear to oppose it, and not even all of them do
so). Justice Thomas, of course disagrees that there is any benefit to African-Americans,
incidental or otherwise, from affirmative action. See supra notes 245-79 and accompanying text.
618. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347.
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of the University of California v. Bakke619 does not improve the situation, for
Justice Powell was no progressive on racial issues. Justices Marshall,
Brennan, Blackmun, and White were made of stronger stuff, articulating a
more powerful defense of affirmative action as a remedy for racial
oppression.620 Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, at least, had the presence of mind
to distance themselves from Justice O’Connor’s inane twenty-five year sunset
rule. They stated:
It is well documented that conscious and unconscious race bias, even rank
discrimination based on race, remain alive in our land. . . .
. . . [I]t remains the current reality that many minority students encounter
markedly inadequate and unequal educational opportunities. . . . From today’s
vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next
generation’s span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal
opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action.621

And yet, the eight white Justices tend to split evenly most of the time on
the matter of white hegemony because the four white moderates, more often
than not, tend to get the race question right. It is the non-white Justice, the
alienated black man, Justice Clarence Thomas, who more often than not
provides the key fifth vote in the cases that defend and maintain white
hegemony,622 and thus keeps the Court anchored to its large historical mission.
Justice Clarence Thomas’s narratives of alienation from black people—the
micro-narrative of his own personal history and experience and the ColorBlindness Macro-Narrative—become the instruments for the reinforcement, if
not the reconstruction, of a macro-narrative of white alienation from black
people, a macro-narrative that has fueled and propelled the Court from the
beginning, producing micro-narratives—decisions in individual cases—that
repeatedly trample black interests and concerns.623 Thus, again, it can be fairly
said that a major goal or function of the Court is alienation of AfricanAmericans,624 and Justice Clarence Thomas, more often than not, ensures that
that goal is maintained, enforced, or achieved.

619. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
620. See id. at 324–408.
621. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347–48 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
622. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (electing George W. Bush, a candidate who
received a pittance of black votes, President of the United States); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (striking down an affirmative action program); Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630 (1993) (striking down a congressional districting plan that produced a majority minority
district).
623. Bush, 531 U.S. 98; Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 200; Shaw, 509 U.S. 630.
624. See Geyer, supra note 4, at xxvii (stating that “objectively alienating conditions remain
fairly pervasive, especially under the, often, both politically and economically oppressive
situations . . . among the disadvantaged minorities in the West”).
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The genius, if such it be, of the first President Bush, was to install on the
Court an alienated African-American to do the work of reactionary, racist
whites. Indeed it is worthy of note that the second Bush in the White House
might have intended a similar coup, this time with Miguel Estrada, a
conservative lawyer and immigrant from Honduras. How stunning it would be
to have not only an African-American, but also a Latino ensconced on the
Court, both dedicated to white racial hegemony. The memory of the first great
act of duplicity might explain the strong resistance of most of the Democrats in
the United States Senate to the nomination of Estrada to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit), a court
often seen as a stepping stone to the United States Supreme Court. It is no
small irony that this U.S. Circuit Court functioned as a stepping stone for
Justice Clarence Thomas. Democrats found the courage to filibuster the
nomination of Estrada to the D.C. Circuit Court, something that they lacked in
connection with Justice Thomas’s nomination to the Supreme Court, and, after
several unsuccessful attempts to end the filibuster, Estrada withdrew his
nomination. The memory of the great act of duplicity by the first President
Bush might explain why many Latino groups were not blindsided by Estrada’s
ethnic identity in ways that many African-American groups were blindsided, or
even duped, in 1991 by Justice Thomas’s ethnic identity.625 Thus the failure of
the Estrada gambit, might not necessarily produce political benefits for Bush
among Latino voters.
And yet, depending upon the circumstances, alienation can be a force for
good in the world.626 Some people love better from a detached distance than in
a deep personal relationship, or in less extreme terms, better observe and
analyze from a distance than from up close. But alienation too often leads to
less happy results.627 In an age of culture wars, of close divisions on difficult
and important social questions, alienation as an ideology or as a personal
narrative is unhealthy.
Reconciliation, power sharing, and a search for common ground strike this
author to be what the country needs. Justice Clarence Thomas cannot provide
leadership, guidance, or insight into any of these. Neither can the other four
members of the conservative majority on the Court, not even Justice
O’Connor. Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and of course Thomas, were
625. The question whether Estrada is alienated from Latinos, or at least from substantial
groups or numbers of Americans of Hispanic origin, the way that Thomas is alienated from
African-Americans lies beyond the reach of this article. However, a full and complete analysis of
Miguel Estrada should include the question whether he is an alienated man, both victim and
victimizer.
626. See MONROE, supra note 9, at 2–3 (discussing the virtues of alienation).
627. Id. at 3 (distinguishing between strategies of alienation that are antidotes and those that
are “loveless, paranoid, and pathological”); Bryce-Laporte & Thomas, supra note 10, at 384–85
(discussing positive and negative alienation).
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prepared to countenance a virtually all-white leadership class, or elite, because
racial diversity— and therefore reconciliation—is of no value to them. The
Court, therefore, becomes—as it has tended to do throughout our history—a
large part of the problem, not the solution, even as the presence of Thomas on
the Court muddies the waters and tends to obscure the racist agenda of the
conservative majority of the Court, an agenda that traces back to the
beginnings of this nation.
The alienation of Justice Clarence Thomas from African-Americans is a
tragedy and a disaster, both from the macro-narrative perspective of the Court
and its work, and from the more intimate and personal micro-narrative of
Justice Thomas’s life. Surmounting the breach bids fair to be a long and
difficult process, as this article makes clear, assuming that it can even get
started. But the alienation-driven ideology of the Court in matters of race is
even worse. If any value can be found in having a latter-day Sambo on the
Court in the person of Justice Clarence Thomas, if one can see clearly in
muddied waters, it lies in the deeper realization that Sambo and Simon
Legree’s heirs on the Court, Justices Scalia628 and Rehnquist629 as well as
Kennedy630 and even O’Connor,631 are still in charge of the racial business of
the Court just as Sambo, Quimbo, and Legree combined and conspired to
degrade, defile, and defame African-Americans. Harriet Beecher Stowe thus
exposed and illuminated a terrible truth—the unholy alliance of reactionary,
racist whites and alienated blacks—the full dimensions of which she could not

628. See Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the
Myth of Colorless Individualism, in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979, 1981, 2061 (1993)
(stating that “Justice Scalia and some of his colleagues aim to achieve the Plessy majority’s
adjudicative result: absolving America of its racism without changing it” and that “Justice Scalia
and others attempt to force color-based oppression into white-immigrant models”); Dennis D.
Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies from the Perspective of
Justice Antonin Scalia’s McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1035, 1079 (1994)
(declaring that “Justice Scalia has frequently been accused of a marked insensitivity to the rights
of African-Americans”); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homo[geneous] Americanus:
The White Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1493, 1530
(1998) (stating that “[t]he sole source of support for Scalia’s turning a set-aside contract program
[in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)] into Bull Connor racism is White
racial ideology of individualism and racial distancing”).
629. See supra note 465.
630. Justice Kennedy, concurring in Croson, praised Scalia’s racist approach. See Croson,
488 U.S. at 518–19 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
631. See Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381, 407 (1989) (stating
that Justice “Marshall’s charge that [Justice] O’Connor and others have expressed ‘insulting
judgments’ about black elected officials is a story of racism on the Court” practiced or evinced by
those Justices). Justice O’Connor seems to alternate between being an heir of Simon Legree and
an heir of Augustine St. Clare, the New Orleans dandy who masks his participation in an evil
régime with a curious admixture of fecklessness, cynicism, and insouciance. Put differently, she
sometimes appears to be a kinder, gentler Legree.
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have foreseen, not because of the future abolition of slavery, but because of her
own deeply ingrained racism. At the present, it is precisely that unholy
alliance that keeps the Court aligned with the ugly tradition of Dred Scott.
Immeasurably aided by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court, properly
understood, therefore, is one of the central loci of an alienating environment,
particularly on the matter of race. It is not, in any direct physical sense, as
violent as Legree and his black henchmen were, although one might point to
the Court’s support of the death penalty632 while at the same time rejecting any
and all evidence showing the racially disparate impact of that penalty.633 But
the decisions of the Court on race, over the course of the nation’s history, have
encouraged the violence of the state, the unofficial militia such as the Ku Klux
Klan, and most devastatingly, relatively unorganized white racists who, secure
in the knowledge that the Court supports and endorses their racial views, work
so hard and effectively to alienate and oppress African-Americans in a myriad
of ways, day in and day out.
When Justice Clarence Thomas tells us that his epiphany occurred when he
realized that he had to accept the views of the nation’s founders,634 Justice
Thomas established, in a supremely ironic way, his qualifications to sit on a
Court understood as a source of racial alienation. Justice Thomas’s alienation
from African-Americans, in other words, makes him particularly suited to do
the historical work of the Court on matters of race.635 Justice Clarence Thomas
is living proof of the claim that an alienated man may be both victim, which
this author is willing to concede for the sake of argument he may well be, and
victimizer,636 which Justice Thomas’s record on the Court, resting on rigid
adherence to the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative and an estrangement from
and social isolation regarding black people, sadly demonstrates. He is guilty of

632. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
633. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). See also Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the
Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1742 (1987) (arguing
that “[t]he belief that our society is gripped by barely constrained, relentless [racial and class]
warfare. . . has been an underlying theme of the Supreme Court’s work on the death penalty”).
Indeed, Justice Scalia’s infamous one-paragraph memorandum in which he states his intention to
uphold the death penalty in the face of the truth that it is administered in a racial manner says it
all: Better that innocent black people die at the hand of the State than none so die at all. See
Dorin, supra note 628. Scalia’s monstrous evil surely places him on the same plane or level as
Simon Legree.
634. See supra notes 435-38 and accompanying text.
635. See Calmore, supra note 3, at 202, 205 (noting that Thomas’s “formal blackness lacks
social connection and any sense of how racism really operates to frustrate his quixotic gestures of
black self-sufficiency” and thus he “lives a terribly conflicted life, with blackness and judging
virtually at war with each other” and that race in a functional sense, is a dominant element in
identity and race, and as such, “invites ‘crisis’ in Justice Thomas” and has “created social distance
between him and most other blacks”).
636. See Geyer & Heinz, supra note 11, at xxxii.
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spiritual murder, a crime at least as evil as that of Sambo.637 And sadder still,
time will tell if this sorry, a sad tale of perfidy, betrayal, ambition, and
dishonesty will play itself out yet again, in this instance involving other racial
minority groups, as those bent on maintaining white hegemony seek to draw
others into a tangled web of deceit and manipulation.
But ultimately, it is the work of the Court that matters. A Court that
alienates, even as it feeds and sustains itself on the victimizing alienation of
Justice Clarence Thomas, is not a pretty thing to behold. Neither is Justice
Clarence Thomas. But he and the Court form a perfect fit, and “twas more the
pity.” Will there ever by a majority on the Court dedicated to a different
agenda, one that does not seek to maintain white hegemony? One should not
hold one’s breath waiting for such a development. Will righteousness ever fall
like the rain and will justice ever move like that rolling river?

637. See CHARLES R. LAWRENCE, III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON’T GO BACK: MAKING
139 (1997) (referring to “the material and spiritual injuries
that Clarence Thomas has inflicted on Blacks”); Calmore supra note 3, at 201–02 (stating that
“Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence and value orientation fail to incorporate the human touch that
connects humanity” and that “[t]his appears to lead him to engage, perhaps unwittingly, in the
very form of spirit murder—the generic disregard for others whose lives qualitatively depend on
our regard—that private racists adopt” and worse, that “Thomas does not simply provide cover
for these racists, but he complements them,” for “[r]ather than simply insulating their behavior, he
advances it” and therefore “[t]his spirit murder is manifested in a variety of ways and the hidden
costs are great”).
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